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This thesis examines the portrayal of common citizen-soldiers in the 
work of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. In doing so, it reveals each historian’s 
perception of the rôle of the citizen-soldier and the social, moral, and 
political place of military service within the framework of the Roman 
State. The three historians allow for an exploration of this perception 
from the Republican period, the reign of Augustus, and the beginning 
of the 2nd century AD. This allows the reader to follow the 
development of the ideology of military service in the transition from 
the Republic to the High Empire. The general scholarly consensus 
remains that Roman historians did not think about the soldiery in a 
complicated or nuanced way, and rather that they dismissed and 
disdained them as an armed mob. This thesis argues against this 
consensus in support of more recent scholarship that has began to 
examine how the Roman historians portrayed soldiers in their 
narrative. Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus each represent soldiers as engaged 
social and political individuals and military service as being 
fundamental to their conception of how the common Roman citizen 
interacted with the Roman state. Sallust presents military service as a 
unifying, democratic, and – if done correctly – reforming activity that 
all Roman citizens took part in. For Sallust, military service was so 




fundamental to the maintenance of Roman society that the 
corruption of military mores led directly to the corruption of the larger 
res publica. Livy also presents military service as a unifying and 
reforming activity, but one that was restricted to plebeian soldiers. In 
his reconstruction of the Early and Middle Republic, military service 
provided the plebeian citizen with social capital as well as an 
organised route for political engagement. The army became the 
vehicle for organised resistance to the Republican élite. The thesis 
concludes with chapters on Tacitus’ Annales and Historiae. In the 
Annales Tacitus uses the mutiny of AD 14 to demonstrate that 
organised military resistance was no longer acceptable in the new 
context of the principate. In the Historiae Tacitus establishes that the 
new dynamics of loyalty in the Imperial Army, where the vital 
connexion was now between the emperor and the individual soldier, 
had profoundly altered the relationship that citizen soldiers had with 
the Roman state.  




Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 6 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 7 
CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................. 29 
Sallust and the Military Habitus of Moral and Immoral Republics ......................... 29 
The Ideal Republic ................................................................................................... 31 
The Corruption of the Republic............................................................................... 50 
The Corruption of the Armies ................................................................................. 57 
Reforming the Habitus of a Roman Army ............................................................... 63 
The Armies in Africa, Asia, and Italy. ....................................................................... 70 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 85 
CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................ 89 
Imperium Requires Consent .................................................................................... 89 
Livy as a source for military affairs.......................................................................... 97 
Plebeian Military Identity in Livy’s History............................................................ 101 
From the Founding of the Republic to the Siege of Veii ....................................... 113 
From the Siege of Veii to 292 ................................................................................ 155 
The Conquest of the Mediterranean .................................................................... 185 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 195 
CHAPTER THREE ........................................................................................................ 201 
Republican Mutiny and Imperial Discipline in Pannonia and Germany................ 201 
The Mutinies of 14 AD as a Republican Moment ................................................. 205 
The Mutinies of 69 AD as an Imperial Moment .................................................... 222 
Percennius’ Right to Speak ................................................................................... 225 
A Catiline in the Camp ........................................................................................... 239 
The Imperial Resolution of the AD 14 Mutinies .................................................... 246 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 254 
CHAPTER FOUR ......................................................................................................... 261 
Tacitus’ Historiae and the Loyal Soldier ................................................................ 261 
An Army of Individuals .......................................................................................... 264 
The soldier and his emperor ................................................................................. 270 
The Miles and the social structure of the Legion .................................................. 283 
The Soldier and the Civilian................................................................................... 302 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 312 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 318 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 324 







The process of writing a thesis is largely a process of accruing debts. The greatest debt 
I owe to Professor Richard Alston, through whose excellent guidance this thesis has 
gradually taken form. His patient advice has repeatedly steered me out of the 
quicksand and onto the path of righteousness. I am also grateful for the alternative 
perspective and advice offered by my advisor, Professor Boris Rankov. 
This thesis has benefitted greatly from support from the department of Classics at 
Royal Holloway University of London, and I would particularly like to thank the 
academics who helped me through my upgrade and annual reviews with advice and 
support: Professor Lene Rubinstein, Dr. Liz Gloyn, and Dr. Siobhan Chomse. This thesis 
has developed with feedback from conferences and papers and I would like to thank 
the audiences in London, Szeged, and Bologna for their input. 
One doesn’t spend four years studying the Roman army without understanding the 
importance of logistics and organisation, and my time at RHUL would have been much 
more difficult without the excellent support of Margaret Scrivner and Sue Turnbull. 
I would be remiss if I did not thank the wonderfully supportive PhD community, both 
past and present, of the Department of Classics. Particularly Matt Ward and Giulia 
Maltagliati, who volunteered to read sections of the thesis and provided 
comprehensive feedback, but also H. Baldwin, W. Coles, P. Morlacchi, and D. Van Der 
Linde. Helpful advice and support for the process was provided by Drs. Cole, Preston, 
Ramsey, and Turner. Further thanks goes to the larger University of London PhD 
community, who have always been ready with advice or answers. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their endless support and understanding. 
My sister and my father, who let me prattle on about the Romans for far longer than 
anyone should have to suffer. My grandmother, as well as the rest of my family, have 
encouraged me greatly.  






The objective of this thesis is to examine the portrayal of the social and 
political position of soldiers in the works of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. In so 
doing, I analyse the ideologies and models of military service presented by 
these three historians. Their accounts provide insight into each historian’s 
understanding of how the Roman citizens who made up the common soldiery 
of the legions interacted with each other, with the state, and with other parts 
of the res publica.1 Given the fundamental rôle that the army played both in 
the Roman state and in the historical accounts of the three chosen historians, 
these models contribute to our understanding of how the authors understood 
Roman citizenship as it applied to non-élite Romans. 
It is a commonplace in scholarship about Roman society that the 
ancient sources, being comprised all but exclusively of élite individuals, had an 
unsophisticated and negative perception of the common Roman miles. To the 
Roman aristocracy, this narrative has it, the soldier was ‘a mercenary’, ‘an 
idler’, and ‘a barbarian.’2 This supposedly unsophisticated and negative 
perception is present in Carrié’s survey of the presentation of Roman soldiers 
in the ancient sources, one of the few to attempt such a survey.3 Nor is this 
                                                          
1 Throughout this thesis the terms miles, soldier, and soldiery will be used to refer to Roman 
citizens serving in ranks of the Roman legions. These terms will not encompass centurions or 
officers. 
2 Carrié (1993: 102). 
3 ‘In a more Roman, more traditionalist, analysis that describes the evolution of Roman society 
and institution in terms of corruption, the soldier occupies a place abandoned by the citizen, 
in moral decline. This intransigent ideology could not even consider the soldier a citizen...’ 




restricted to scholars writing about other aspects of Roman society, important 
and influential works on Roman military service also present this perception 
unchallenged.4  
To the degree to which the presentation of the soldier has been 
analysed in the works of Sallust, Livy, or Tacitus, the situation is not much 
better. Sallust, in particular, has been underserved. In comparison to his 
political and moral discourse, little attention has been paid to Sallust’s 
presentation of the Roman soldier. A recent work on the Roman army as a 
social institution does not even include his work in a discussion of the sources 
for the Roman army.5 Better work has been done by Milne, but even she is too 
quick to assume a largely negative conception of the Roman soldier and misses 
the potential for reform.6 Other scholars are too quick to read in Sallust a 
tendency to associate Roman soldiers with barbarians.7 Limited readings of 
soldiers and military service in Sallust’s work pose problems beyond the 
confines of military history. Traditional military service was fundamental to 
Sallust’s conception of the idealised, uncorrupted early Republic and to his 
understanding of the process of decline. Attempting to trace the dynamic of 
                                                          
Carrié (1993: 105). On the general perception of soldiers in ancient sources, see also e.g. Cloud 
(1993), Sidebottom (2002). 
4 To remain focussed on the issue as it pertains to the historians considered in my thesis, I shall 
limit myself to quoting two: in his – still essential – The Emperor and the Roman Army, 
Campbell projects Dio’s distaste for Roman soldiers (which he extrapolates from two 
references within his work) across the entire Roman political class: ‘Dio despised these soldiers 
as uneducated, low-class fellows with whom he could have no affinity or contact and who 
should not be allowed to rise above their true station in life. It seems likely that in this Dio is 
representative of his class.’ (1985: 10); Phang: ‘the upper classes depicted these soldiers as a 
mercenary rabble...’ (2008: 3). 
5 Southern (2007: 18-31). 
6 Milne (2009: 94-121). 
7 E.g. Wiedemann (1993: 54). 




moral decline without properly placing military service at the centre of Sallust’s 
understanding of the republic both muddles the process of corruption and risks 
developing a simplistic understanding of the moral state of the early republic. 
For Livy, two aspects of Livian scholarship have led to a tendency to 
ignore the complex and consistent presentation of soldiers in his history. First 
is the traditional perception of Livy as somewhat incompetent or disinterested 
in the details of military matters.8 Even recent work that pushes back against 
this perception has been more preoccupied with establishing Livy’s bona fides 
as a military historian by analysing the details of various aspects of warfare 
than with engaging with the presentation of the Livian soldier in any detail.9 
The other issue is a tendency to separate military and political issues, rather 
than to consider the constant political engagement that Livian soldiers 
demonstrate.10 There are individual exceptions, most noticeably the 2nd 
century centurion Spurius Ligustinus, who has been the subject of excellent 
analysis.11 In Livian scholarship, too, there is often the assumption of a 
dismissive and negative presentation of both the Roman people and the 
soldiery.12 
                                                          
8 Incompetence: McDonald (1957: 161); Walsh (1961: 158); Kraus (1994: 1 n.1). Disinterest:  
Luce (1977: 41); Sage (1991: 926). 
9 Roth (2006); Koon (2010).  
10 Vasaly’s statement that ‘Livy is thus at pains to demonstrate the leaderless and, therefore, 
inarticulate condition of the masses prior to the establishment of the tribunate’ (2015: 102) is 
only possible if the behaviour of the army is excluded; See also Campbell: ‘During their 
conquest of Italy and the Mediterranean, Roman citizen-soldiers seem not to have used their 
military muscle significantly to change the political structure of the Republic’ (2002: 105). 
11 DuToit (1964), Cadiou (2002), Pina Polo (1989: 272-273). 
12 E.g. Mineo: ‘The general attitude of the masses is characterised by the absence of rational 
self-control, as illustrated by the fierce attitude (ferocia) of the soldiers inappropriately 
clamouring for battle...’ (2015: 127); Bernard reads in Livy a conception of romanitas 




It is in the works of Tacitus that the presentation of soldiers has been 
most misunderstood. The idea that Tacitus is lazy or dismissive in his portrayal 
of soldiers and military matters is an old one.13 But this old idea has retained 
currency and is asserted even in works that examine Tacitus’ portrayal of 
soldier and war.14 Better work has been done in recent decades; Saddington is 
right to bring out the excellent insight that Tacitus brings to his account of the 
psychology of the Roman soldier.15 Two recent works on the Historiae by Ash 
and Master have closely examined the portrayal of soldiers, but even these 
have been too quick to present the Tacitean soldier as mercenary and 
emotional or semi-barbarian, respectively.16  
This thesis challenges such an understanding of the soldiers depicted in 
the works of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. Instead, I argue that the ancient sources 
present Roman soldiers in a much more complex and ambiguous way. Though 
these three historians had differing perceptions of the place and purpose of 
the soldier and military service, each portrayed it as a fundamental – and 
fundamentally Roman – part of their conception of the res publica. Vitally, to 
none of them is the portrait of the soldier or the experience of military service 
simplistic or inherently negative. 
                                                          
inherently aristocratic that makes non-élite Romans (amongst whom plebeian soldiers) 
inherently less Roman than their aristocratic fellow citizens (2015: 41-42). 
13 After all, Mommsen called him ‘dieser unmilitärischsten aller Schriftsteller’ (1885: 165).  
14 Kajanto: ‘he disliked the vulgus, and this expression comprised the soldiers, too.’ Although 
he allows that disciplined soldiery rated slightly higher in Tacitus’ esteem than civilian plebs 
(1970: 718); Späth: ‘a very stereotypical portrait of armies as vulgus.’ (2012: 453n8); Similar 
sentiments are expressed by Flaig (1992: 26); Carrié cites Tacitus as his prime example of the 
general dismissive attitude towards soldiers quoted above (1993: 105). 
15 Saddington (1991: 3503). 
16 Ash (1999); Master (2016). 




Nor can the issues of soldier and military service in the works of these 
historians be dismissed as simple topoi.17 The soldiers depicted in Sallust, Livy, 
and Tacitus are not static commonplaces, but complicated individuals whose 
relationship with each other and with the larger state is directly related to the 
historian’s conception of their context. To examine the presentation of the 
soldier and the ideologies of military service in the works of Sallust, Livy, and 
Tacitus is to examine how these historians understood the way that Roman 
citizens related to their state. These historians’ portrayal of the army and 
soldiers during the transition from republic to empire shows a transformation 
in the political and social engagement of the soldiery with the larger Roman 
society. This transformation was one of increasing dislocation and 
disassociation from the res publica. As Sallust presented it, the Roman soldier 
was the fundamental manifestation of the Roman citizen; to Livy military 
service was the organising structure of the Roman plebs and the means by 
which plebeian Romans engaged with the republic and how they asserted their 
legitimacy; Tacitus focusses on the individual soldier’s overriding loyalty to, 
and dependence on, the emperor in order to show how this new hierarchy 
undermined and even negated earlier dynamics of power and loyalty within 
the army. 
Under the republic, military service was configured as a communal 
activity that reinforced the bonds between individual soldiers and their 
fellows, their officers, and the res publica. To both Sallust and Livy, though in 
                                                          
17 For the soldier as topos, see e.g. Späth (2012: 444); Carrié (1991: 102-105). 




different ways, Roman soldiers interacted with their government not only as 
soldiers but as citizens who were keenly aware of their rights and status. In 
different ways, each portrays the army as playing an important part in the 
political functioning of the Roman state. As both Livy and Sallust conceived of 
the soldiery as plebeian, this demonstrates that, in their conception of the 
republic, the Roman people remained engaged and politically active 
throughout the republican period, using their leverage as part of the army to 
assert their will.  
Writing under and about the empire, the model of military service 
presented by Tacitus is very different. If republican military service reinforced 
the bonds between soldiers, the internal military hierarchy, and the Roman 
state, the imperial soldier’s experience of army life was one of disassociation 
and dislocation. Imperial soldiers interacted with their officers, the soldiers of 
other legions, and Roman civilians with suspicion and, in extreme periods, 
open hostility. For Tacitus, the only significant bond of loyalty was now the 
connexion between the individual miles and his princeps. While Sallust and Livy 
describe an army of citizen-soldiers, Tacitus presents an army of subject-
soldiers. However, even in this new context Tacitus never truly challenges the 
‘Roman-ness’ of the soldiers. Roman soldiers are not dangerous because they 
are foreign or barbarians, but because they reflect the dangerous tensions 
present in the imperial system. Nor, I argue, are their interactions with the 
state, their generals, or their emperor dominated by irrational emotionality – 
though certainly they demonstrate isolated moments of panic or anger – but 
rather are carefully negotiated with an eye to their interests and values. 




There has been substantial scholarship on military service both in the 
republic and the principate, and on Roman cultural perceptions of the purpose 
and effects of military service.18 Mostly, these have aimed at either a larger 
understanding of republican or imperial attitudes or at developing an 
understanding of the historical realities of Roman military service. My work, 
however, focusses on issues of ideology as expressed within a Latin 
historiographic tradition. As a result, it is much more about how the historians 
reconstructed and envisaged the Roman state in recent or distant pasts than 
the historical reality of those pasts and the rôle of the soldiers within them.  
While the amount of military material present in each of the historians 
is considerable, I focus narrowly on the sociological ideologies of military 
service that each historian presents. Following Cynthia Damon’s argument that 
what seemed plausible to the Roman historian provides better understanding 
of his world view that whether or not the facts were accurate, this thesis is not 
concerned with the historicity of the events presented in the historical 
narratives of each author.19 Thus I will not be concerning myself with the 
likelihood that the ringleaders of 206 BC really were called, as Livy tells the 
reader, Atrius and Albius – Mr. Black and Mr. White – or whether an unnamed 
Ligurian discovered the route into Jugurtha’s stronghold while he was 
                                                          
18 Generally see Lendon (2005) and Phang (2008); For the republic, see Rosenstein (2004) and 
(2007), Rawlings (2007); For the transition between republic and empire, see Keaveny (2007), 
De Blois (2007), Rankov (2017); For the empire see Le Bohec (1989: 36-67) and Campbell 
(2002).  
19 Damon (2007: 440). 




gathering snails.20 Such realities for this thesis are of less importance than the 
fact that they were seen as believable when written.  
To avoid over complication and incoherence, this thesis does not 
engage thoroughly with other accounts of events in the narrative, unless 
differences between ancient writers illuminate important aspects of the 
accounts of my three main historians. The focus on social and political models 
of the individual historians has two salutary effects. Firstly, it keeps the 
arguments grounded in the narratives of the chosen historians, and secondly 
it means that the analysis remains focussed on the unique aspects of each 
account, and engages less with the identification of commonplaces. 
Perhaps rather heretically for a work on Roman soldiers, this thesis is 
also not overly concerned with the organisation, equipment, tactics, or battles 
of the Roman army. The exception to this, as with the other points above, 
remains when the historians differ either from other ancient accounts or from 
our current understanding of the workings of the Roman army. Such concerns 
are, by and large, unnecessary in an examination, of, for example Sallust’s 
statement that service in a military camp was the foundation of early 
republican virtus. The relevant point to be taken from that is that military 
service was a standardised and organised process – the width of the via 
praetoriana, the location of the horse-lines, or the material of the tents would 
offer nothing of relevance. 
                                                          
20 Livy 28.24.3; Sal. Jug. 93.2-3. 




Fundamentally, this thesis is interested in the historians’ reconstruction 
of the past. Each of my chosen authors is writing about military service in 
periods and contexts different than his own. Sallust’s work concerns the turn 
of the 1st century and the 70s BC, and was written in the changed context of 
the triumvirate. Livy wrote of the early and middle republic from the last 
decades of the 1st century BC and in the fundamentally changed context of the 
reign of Augustus. Tacitus’ Annales began in the differing context of the first 
imperial transition. Only Tacitus’ Historiae was written about a period that 
likely reflected his own time, but even then in the changed context of civil war.  
The process of writing history is in part the process of reconstruction. 
Each of my chosen authors was involved in the reconstruction of a period and 
context that was different from his own. When, for example, Livy wrote of the 
mutinous armies of the decemvirate, he was forced to contextualise and 
ground it in his understanding of the early republic, a different context and 
period. Early in their works, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus each make the point 
themselves that they are writing about Romes that were different from their 
own.21 Yet to conceive of the past as different also requires thinking carefully 
about the present. An examination of the rôle played by military service in a 
historian’s reconstruction of the past can provide insight into their 
understanding of military service in their own context. 
                                                          
21 E.g. Sall. Cat. 7, Liv. 1.pr.4, Tac. Ann. 1.1.1 




This thesis is organised around separate sections on each historian. 
Latin historiography was its own genre, influenced by yet distinct from both 
Greek historiography and the other genres of Latin literature.22 The Latin 
historians worked with their own conventions and were interested in 
questions of self identity and the functioning of the res publica. This thesis does 
not examine in any detail discussions in other genres of military service or the 
position of the soldier within the state. Such an examination would involve the 
analysis of, among other things, poetry, philosophy, theatre, and letters. While 
the methodology used in this thesis could be applied to a similar project, its 
focus and result would be substantially different.  
Warfare was fundamental both to the narratives of these three 
historians and to their understanding of the Roman state. As soldiers are 
essential for warfare, soldiers play an integral part not only in the historical 
narratives of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, but in the social and political framework 
of the historical Rome that they depict. Each historian’s understanding of 
soldiers touches on the relationship between military service and citizenship, 
how citizen soldiers related to the res publica, the place of these soldiers in the 
social hierarchy, and how they interacted with each other and with the state.  
All of the chosen historians were writing about periods of change, and 
as a result their work touched on the part played by the soldiers in those 
periods of change and the effect that they had on the development of the 
Roman state. Further, as writing about the past involves thinking about how it 
                                                          
22 On this, see e.g. Kraus and Woodman (1997: 1-9), and Mehl (2014: 1-26). 




was either similar or dissimilar from the present, reflections on the rôle that 
soldiers played in the past involved some reflection of the part that they played 
in the present. Engaging with these historians’ presentations of the past raises 
methodological problems concerning the past invoked by the historians – 
Livy’s account of early Rome and Sallust’s simplified and idealised presentation 
of a prelapsarian republic in particular. However, this thesis remains carefully 
focussed on identifying consistent patterns in their portrayal of soldiers. This 
allows me to dodge issues of historicity by focussing on the conceptual models 
that the historians are using rather than the realities of the social relations of 
Roman soldiers. 
Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus have been chosen to the exclusion of others 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Greek historians of the republic or 
Augustan age have been omitted because my focus is on Romans’ 
understanding of their own past, not an outsiders view. Polybius, Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Diodorus Siculus, and Appian all write of the Romans from a 
Greek perspective, using Greek social and political models as their framework, 
and their understanding of Rome and the Romans is affected by their 
theoretical approach.23 Cassius Dio and Ammianus Marcellinus have been 
excluded due to the late period of their composition. Velleius Paterculus and 
Suetonius lack sufficient detail about soldiers for a successful understanding of 
any model they may be using. 
 
                                                          
23 On Appian as an essentially Greek thinker, see Kalyvas (2007); Lowrie (2010: 178)  





This thesis is supported by extensive previous scholarship. Besides the 
historiography of each author, I also have access to scholarship on how 
Romans related to and reconstructed their past. Scholarship on the Roman 
army is also fundamental to the project, both on its general organisation and 
development and on the emperor’s relationship with his soldiers. However, my 
approach differs as I focus carefully on individual historians’ understanding of 
these issues. This thesis does not attempt to provide analysis of general 
cultural conceptions. My goal is to define how, for example, Tacitus 
understood the social and political position of the Roman soldier, not to 
provide a thorough understanding of how early Imperial élites conceived of 
soldiers.  
Until relatively recently there have been two approaches to reading 
Roman historians. Earlier scholarship attempted to evaluate the historicity of 
the ancient historians by attempting to identify their methodology and 
historical sources.24 This older tradition is problematic because it judges 
Roman historians against a model of objective historical truth, approaching 
ancient writers as if they followed the methodologies of modern scientific 
historians.25 
                                                          
24 In this tradition e.g. Syme (1964) and La Penna (1968) on Sallust; Walsh (1961) and Luce 
(1977) on Livy; Syme (1958), Benario (1975), and Martin (1981) on Tacitus. 
25 Dench (2009: 399). 




In the later decades of the 20th century, historiography began to focus 
more heavily on the rhetorical and literary analyses of the texts, less concerned 
with historical realities than the narratives and literary models employed by 
the historians.26 The literary approach often presents the work of ancient 
historians not as ‘history’ but as ‘literature.’ Such framing turns the details of 
an historical narrative into rhetorical fictions rather than the facts that the 
historians themselves claimed to be presenting. This, I see, as an inappropriate 
approach to my project. By reading ancient history from the position that the 
accuracy of the accounts is either suspect or irrelevant, the literary approach 
ignores the fact that the ancient historian considered himself to be, as Lendon 
puts it, ‘a teller of true tales about the past.’27 My own work attempts to detect 
and analyse consistent portrayals of the soldier and military service in the work 
of each historian. To illustrate the conceptual model that Sallust, Livy, and 
Tacitus each used to understand the Roman soldier, not as a narrative force or 
a literary trope, but as a member of Roman society. 
Further, much of what interests the literary approach to ancient history 
has little relation to my efforts. As I am primarily interested in the conceptual 
models that each Roman historian used to understand the historic Rome he 
was describing, issues of allusion and intertext offer little unless the historians 
engagement with earlier writers helps us illuminate these conceptual models. 
But even here this only works if we establish that the historians were engaging 
                                                          
26 In this tradition Wisemann (1979) and Woodman (1988) are particularly influential, but see 
also e.g. Henderson (1989), Jaeger (1997), Feldherr (1998), O’Gorman (2000. 
27 Lendon (2009: 41). 




with the works of their predecessors as works of history which attempted to 
present past events more or less as the writer had understood them.28 In this 
way, similarities and differences between historians can be used to illustrate 
where the historians agreed, and where they differed, in their understanding 
of the past. 
Instead, this thesis follows a more recent strain of scholarship which 
uses the ancient sources to gain insight into the political thought of ancient 
writers. Scholars working in this field have used close readings of the sources 
to develop understandings of how Romans thought about issues such as 
republicanism, libertas, and imperialism.29 My own work is influenced by this 
scholarship, though it attempts to understand how each historian 
reconstructed their past rather than to identify wider cultural political ideas. 
This thesis also aims to further the project of reading the ancient historians 
alongside prominent thinkers of the 20th century.30 I engage with Bourdieu in 
the context of Sallust and re-examine Auerbach and Rancière’s readings of the 
opening chapters of the Annales. 
On the organising structures of the Roman army, Phang has provided 
an overview of the theory, organisation, and maintenance of the discipline of 
the Roman army.31 It is grounded in an excellent command of the sources, 
                                                          
28 Lendon (2009: 42-43). 
29 For Roman political thought generally, see Hammer (2008) and (2014), Connolly (2007) and 
(2015); on libertas see Arena (2012); on republicanism see Kapust (2011); on imperialism see 
Alston (2013) and Lavan (2013). 
30 On this see e.g. Lowrie (2010) on Agamben; Hammer (2002) on Arendt; Bhatt (2016) on 
Auerbach and Rancière; and Alston (2017), Bhatt (2017), and Hammer (2017) on Foucault.  
31 Phang (2008). 




though her theoretical approach sometimes leads her to downplay the 
practical function of much of the Roman army’s practices. Certainly, for 
example, castrametation served the purpose of reinforcing discipline and 
representing Roman power, but fortified camps also protected armies from 
ambushes and raids. Other overviews grounded more in practicalities than 
theory are provided by Gilliver and Goldsworthy.32 On the republic and 
principate specifically, Keppie’s account of the development of the Roman 
army during the republic and Webster’s on the Imperial army also provide 
necessary historical context for the thesis.33 On the culture of the Roman army, 
most relevant to this project is the work of Lendon on the Roman cultural 
approach to war – particularly his chapters on Livy and Caesar – and 
MacMullen’s analysis of the internal society of the Roman legion.34 
Chrissanthos’ work on the relationship between Roman milites and their 
commanders has done much to challenge the cultural perception – dating back 
to Polybius – of the Roman soldier as a disciplined automaton, following orders 
unquestioningly.35 
On the relationship between the army and Imperial power, the most 
comprehensive work remains that of Campbell.36 Similar ground was covered 
more recently by Stäcker, though unfortunately his work on the personal 
relationship between emperor and individual soldiers is not his strength, and 
                                                          
32 Gilliver (2001); Goldsworthy (1996). 
33 Keppie (1984); Webster (1984); On the early Republic in particular, discussed at length in 
chapter 2, see Rich (2007) and Potter (2014). 
34 Lendon (2005); MacMullen (1984). 
35 Chrissanthos (2001) and (2004). 
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that area is the most relevant to this project.37 On more specific aspects of the 
Roman military experience relevant to this paper – the army camp and 
centurions, the works of Lenoir and Richier respectively, though focussed on 
narrow geographical areas, provide a wealth of information.38 
For Sallust, most relevant to my project is the work done to define his 
political and moral reconstruction of early Rome and his understanding of its 
decline. Much of the earlier scholarship is hampered by a tendency to read 
Sallust as a Caesarean propagandist.39 Despite its age and faults, the most 
comprehensive survey of Sallust’s political thought remains that of Earl.40 Later 
scholarship has offered corrections and refinements to some of Earl’s 
weaknesses.41 Parker has written convincingly on the way that Sallust is willing 
to undermine or contradict his own narrative in service of his larger 
argument.42 Levene’s work emphasising the centrality that the narrative of 
moral decline plays in Sallust’s monographs is particularly relevant to my 
work.43 
Much of the recent scholarship on military matters in Livy’s history has 
worked to rehabilitate his reputation as a military historian from its nadir in 
the 1960s. Two vital works by Koon and Roth have argued convincingly that 
Livy’s portrayal of military matters is consistent and more thoughtful that 
                                                          
37 Stäcker (2003); on the relationship between the army and imperial power see also Birley 
(2007), Hekster (2007), and Millar (1977). For the republic see Keaveny (2007). 
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39 E.g. Syme (1964); La Penna (1968). 
40 Earl (1961). 
41 Particularly Kapust (2011); but also e.g. Conley (1981); De Blois (1988). 
42 Parker (2004). 
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earlier scholars have seen it.44 As the thesis largely concerns the way that Livy 
reconstructed culture and institutions of the early and middle republic – and 
particularly in the ways he understood them to be different from his own 
period – the works by Miles and Chaplin are particularly relevant.45 Important 
historical context for Livy’s reconstruction is provided by Forsyth and Cornell, 
although separately Cornell is perhaps too trusting of the sources and Forsythe 
too pessimistic.46  
There is a wealth of scholarship on the mutinies at the beginning of the 
Annales, although the tendency there is to read it less as a military event than 
as a venue for Tacitus to make a larger social or political point. Thus to Williams 
it is an exploration of stoicism, to Woodman it is an account of madness, and 
to O’Gorman Tacitus is making a point about reading.47 It is in the scholarship 
on the Historiae where projects similar to my own have taken place. Ash’s work 
on the relationship between generals and armies covers some of the same 
ground as my own work, but her focus remains the narrative that Tacitus is 
constructing rather than the ideological models that he is applying to the 
Roman army.48 Master’s recent work on provincial soldiers engages with the 
relationship between the army and the imperial state, but he grounds his 
argument in the experience of provincial soldiers and as a result is too keen to 
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reclassify the Rhine and Syrian legions as foreign troops to a degree that is not 
fully supported in the sources.49 
 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of four chapters, with Sallust and Livy each receiving 
one. Due to the episodic nature of his history, Tacitus has been given two 
chapters, with one each dedicated to the Annales and the Historiae. Each 
chapter involves close and comprehensive readings of each of the historian’s 
works to construct a model of the soldier and of military service. These models 
are formed by the identification of consistent patterns of behaviour in the ways 
that the soldiers relate to the larger Roman state. These relations are 
developed from the individual and group interactions that soldiers have with 
each other, with their officers, and with the Roman government and larger 
Roman populace. As the thesis concerns their place within Roman society, the 
thesis is not concerned with the way that soldiers interact with enemies, 
foreigners, or slaves. With these models defined, the ideology of military 
service – that is the purpose and effect that military service had on Roman 
soldiers and the ramifications of that effect on the larger Roman state – for 
each historian can be analysed. 
The chapter on Sallust examines the fundamental rôle that military 
service played in the historian’s reconstruction of an idealised early republic. 
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Influenced by the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, it shows how, through service in 
the camp, the Roman people developed a habitus that was responsible for 
Rome’s rise to greatness. This habitus was shared throughout the Roman state 
by all citizens regardless of social class. The markers of that habitus – 
communal competition for gloria, a willingness to bear hardship, and frugality 
at home – were the foundations of Rome’s moral excellence and its power. 
Once the primacy of military experience had been undermined by safety and 
wealth, however, the Roman people became fractured. This new Rome was 
driven by greed and ambition and the new corrupted and fractured Roman 
people could not present the virtues of old. However, given the fundamental 
nature of military service in the creation of the early Roman habitus, by 
conducting war in the traditional way and – vitally – by maintaining the 
discipline of the camp, a general could cultivate within his army a reflection of 
the excellence of the old Romans. This is shown by examinations of three 
Roman campaigns, that of Metellus and Marius in the Numidian war, that of 
Sulla in the east, and of Catiline in Italy. 
The second chapter, and by far the longest, concerns the depiction of 
military service by Livy. It shows that plebeian soldiers are portrayed 
remarkably consistently in Livy’s history from the foundation of the republic 
until the narrative breaks off in 166 BC. The chapter argues that military service 
is presented as the foundation of a distinctly plebeian military identity which 
provided the social capital and status that plebeians used to legitimise 
themselves when interacting with each other and with the state. Further, as 
the primary focus for this identity, the Roman army acted as the location of 




organised resistance to the patres during the struggle of the orders. Though its 
central place in domestic politics faded as Livy’s narrative shifted from internal 
to external matters following the first pentad, the Roman army continued to 
be a politically engaged part of the Roman state, and continued to agitate for 
its interests and rights when on campaign. Due to the lack of the detailed 
accounts of soldiers and campaigns necessary for my project, this chapter does 
not engage with the periochae. 
The third chapter analyses Tacitus’ portrayal of the mutinies of AD 14 
and argues that the historian represents the mutinies not as akin to the 
imperial revolts of AD 69 that he describes in the Historiae, but rather as a final 
representation of mutiny common to the republican period. This chapter 
largely discusses the events of AD 14 in isolation from the larger narrative of 
the first book of the Annales. This is for two reasons, firstly the dynamics of 
military service that interest me in Tacitus’ work are only evident when the 
military hierarchy is under stress – hence why my final chapter examines the 
civil war of AD 69. Secondly, though there are common themes weaved 
through book one, the account of the mutiny is episodic and clearly separated 
from the rest of the book.50 In AD 14 the soldiers did not revolt to force a 
change of emperor, but rather over practical matters concerning the 
conditions of their service. By doing so they were continuing a traditional 
method of resistance commonly employed by dissatisfied soldiers of the 
republic. The chapter argues that Tacitus uses the suppression of the mutiny 
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to make a larger point about military service under the principate, showing 
that the changed context meant that mutiny of the republican style now 
presented a much greater danger to the state than it had before and as a result 
was no longer an acceptable recourse for unhappy soldiers. 
The fourth and final chapter examines the behaviour of the soldiery of 
all factions of the civil war of AD 69. It argues that Tacitus represents the 
fundamental relationship of the individual Roman soldier as no longer his 
relationship with the state or with his fellow soldiers but his relationship with 
the emperor. In moments of disorder this bond was capable of overriding all 
other loyalties or connexions. In a context where there were multiple 
emperors, soldiers interacted with others – both soldiers and civilians – as 
either supporters or enemies of their chosen emperor. This was the cause of 
the intense hostility and violence that the soldiers were capable of inflicting in 
the course of the war. 
Finally, I bring together all four models of military service to 
demonstrate the fundamental shift in the way that Roman soldiers engaged 
with each other and with the state. While military service during the republic 
– as presented by Sallust and Livy – had a strong reforming and communal 
aspect, under the empire – as described by Tacitus – soldiering had become a 
process that involved the degradation of earlier political and social relations. 
This process that involved those same soldiers losing their essential status and 
citizen-soldiers and becoming the subject-soldiers of the imperial state. Yet 
this does not involve any simplification in the portrayal of the soldier or a shift 




to a stereotypical and negative presentation, throughout the accounts Roman 
soldiers are presented as having agency and a willingness and a desire to 
engage with and to influence the state. The difference between the soldiers 
that Tacitus describes in AD 69 and those described by Sallust and Livy was not 
one of political will – both were determined and willing to use their political 
power to force political change. What was different was the way that change 
was attempted. In the republic, Roman soldiers worked to influence the state 
by asserting their status as citizens and their essential place in the social order. 
Under the principate, the only method available to the soldiers was to ensure 
that their emperor was supreme. 
  





Sallust and the Military Habitus of Moral and Immoral Republics 
 
Sallust’s pessimism about the state of the republic shines through in the 
preambles to both the Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum Jugurthinum. In a state 
once noted for its modesty, honesty, and incorruptibility the cardinal virtues 
now appeared to be audacia ‘shamelessness’, largitio ‘bribery’, and avaritia 
‘rapacity’.51 This perception of Rome in which the early republic was the polar 
opposite of the late republic is a theme of both his surviving monographs. In 
the Catilinae, Sallust provides vivid descriptions of Rome, both the ideal early 
republic and the city after its moral collapse. He outlines the formative 
influences and patterns of behaviour of the republic in both its excellence and 
its corruption. Using these descriptions, supported by the references to the 
ideal Rome found in Sallust’s other writings, and alongside the work of 
Bourdieu, I will outline the Roman habitus, that is to say the unifying structures 
of society that form and legitimize the individual practices of citizens.52  
Outlining the habitus of Sallust’s Rome in its ideal and fallen states will 
demonstrate that, beyond the neat phrasing of the proem, Sallust perceived 
of the Romans of the late republic not simply as decayed versions of their 
ancestors but as behaving in a way that cast them almost in opposition to their 
ancestors. In Sallust’s view the decayed state of the Roman people had a 
catastrophic effect on the republic and seriously undermined the military 
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efficacy of the armies. Whereas the historian offers no solution to the general 
moral decay of his times, he does describe the process through which a 
committed general could manage the corruption of his soldiers and restore a 
semblance of the old excellence to his men. This involved keeping them in a 
military environment in the mos maiorum and allowing the old social pressures 
to cultivate some of the virtus of the early Romans.53 
This chapter will first examine the habitus of the idealised early republic 
to establish that the excellence of Rome was fundamentally based in its 
structure as a military society. Further, this early Roman society was unified, 
with aristocrats and the people alike serving together and sharing the same set 
of values and motivations. Following this, the decayed state of the late republic 
will be shown to have fractured and corrupted the earlier habitus of the early 
republic. 
Having established Sallust’s conception of the early and late republic, the 
chapter will then examine the effect that military service –  both in the correct, 
traditional way, and in the new corrupted fashion –  had on the citizens serving 
in Rome’s armies. After a general discussion, three specific case studies – 
Metellus’ army in Africa, Sulla’s army in Asia, and Catiline’s army in Italy – will 
show both the corrupting effect of leading armies against the traditions of the 
republic and the reforming nature of military service performed following the 
mos maiorum. This will show that Sallust model of the fallen citizen of his day 
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was capable of reform, at least temporary, when he was serving in a military 
camp. 
 
The Ideal Republic 
 
In the opening of the Catilinae, after describing Rome’s transition from 
kingdom to republic, Sallust provides an account of how and why early Rome 
flourished: 
Sed ea tempestate coepere se quisque magis extollere magisque 
ingenium in promptu habere.  nam regibus boni quam mali suspectiores 
sunt, semperque iis aliena virtus formidulosa est. sed civitas incredibile 
memoratu est adepta libertate quantum brevi creverit: tanta cupido 
gloriae incesserat. iam primum iuventus, simul ac belli patiens erat, in 
castris per laborem usum militiae discebat, magisque in decoris armis et 
militaribus equis quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem habebant. 
igitur talibus viris non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduos 
erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus: virtus omnia domuerat. sed 
gloriae maxumum certamen inter ipsos erat: se quisque hostem ferire, 
murum ascendere, conspici, dum tale facinus faceret, properabat. eas 
divitias, eam bonam famam magnamque nobilitatem putabant. laudis 
avidi, pecuniae liberales erant; gloriam ingentem, divitias honestas 
volebant.54 
But that was the period at which each man began to advance himself 
more and to keep his intellect more at the ready. For to kings, the good 
are more suspect than the wicked, and prowess in another is always a 
source of fear to them. It is incredible to recall how much the community 
grew in a short time after its acquisition of freedom, so great was the 
desire for glory which had arisen. From the very first, as soon as its young 
men could tolerate warfare, they learned military practice through 
labour in the camp, and they took pleasure in excellent armour and 
military horses rather than in whores and parties. To such men no hard 
work was unusual, no place rugged or steep, no armed enemy a source 
of fear: virtus had tamed everything. But the greatest competition for 
glory was amongst themselves: each hurried to be the one to strike an 
enemy, to scale a wall and to be observed while doing such deeds; they 
considered this to be their riches, this to be a good reputation and great 
                                                          
54 Sal. Cat. 7.1-6 




nobility. They were hungry for praise, generous with money; they 
wanted mighty glory, honourable riches.55 
 
At first this reconstruction of early Rome as virtuous and harmonious, idealised 
as it is, may seem commonplace.56 But Sallust’s almost entirely military framing 
of the early republic differs significantly from other reconstructions of early 
Rome.57 This Rome is an armed camp. Indeed, unlike other accounts, there is 
no mention of the importance of farming anywhere in the early Rome 
described in the Catilinae and the virtues and behaviours that are given pride 
of place are predominantly war-like. The only education offered to young 
Romans is practical experience in castris.58  
One of the more striking aspects of Sallust’s perception of the early 
republic is how deeply militarized the society seems. Military experience, and 
in particular a practical education in the camp, is the foundation of Sallust’s 
understanding of Roman virtue: ‘Iam primum iuventus, simul ac belli patiens 
erat, in castris per laborem usum militiae discebat...’59 This, it should be 
stressed, to Sallust was a situation that led to Roman citizens developing 
practical experience of military matters, not theoretical military knowledge.60 
Sallust has Marius echo this sentiment: in his speech to the people, when he 
describes his own military training: ‘Ita ad hoc aetatis a pueritia fui, uti omnis 
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labores et pericula consueta habeam.’61 ‘From boyhood to this point in my life 
my existence has been such that I regard all toil and danger as normal.’ That 
Marius is referring to the sort of practical conditioning that Sallust describes in 
Catilinae 7 is clear from a later section of his speech when he compares his 
own practical military education with the theoretical preferred by aristocrats 
with little experience: ‘Comparate nunc, Quirites, cum illorum superbia me 
hominem nouum. Quae illi audire aut legere solent, eorum partem vidi, alia 
egomet gessi; quae illi litteris, ea ego militando didici.’62 ‘Now compare their 
haughtiness, Citizens, with myself as a new man: the things which they are 
accustomed to hear or read, I have either seen or done personally; their 
leadership comes from literature, mine from soldiering.’ Marius stresses that 
his education was practical and military, in a way that echoes the wording of 
Sallust’s own description of the early republic. Marius also presents his form of 
education as traditional: ‘quod si iure me despiciunt, faciant item maioribus 
suis, quibus, uti mihi, ex virtute nobilitas coepit.’63 ‘If they are right to despise 
me, let them do the same for their own ancestors, in whose case, as in mine, 
nobility derived from virtus.’  
These passages from Marius’ speech, alongside the opening of the 
Catilinae allow the formation of a Sallustian habitus that he presents as the 
universal practical education of the Roman people and the cause of their glory. 
By considering Sallust’s account of the early republic and Marius’ account of 
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his education, we can begin to develop an understanding of the generation and 
results of the early Roman habitus. It was fundamentally military and achieved 
through practical education. Its context was military service, and its 
environment was the military camp. In this separate and separated 
environment, Roman men learned the habits of soldiers through the labour of 
military service. This habitus prioritized military life – Romans learned to prize 
war gear over civilian comfort – instilled in the Romans a capacity for enduring 
hardship, and, above all, taught them to desire recognition for their military 
excellence: ‘optumus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis bene facta 
laudari...’64 ‘the best men preferred to do rather than to speak, and that their 
own good deeds should be praised by others...’ This was the framework 
through which Roman men interacted with each other and how they related 
to the state.65 Sallust’s presentation of the results of this military habitus is 
clear:  
Igitur domi militiaeque boni mores colebantur; concordia maxuma, 
minuma avaritia erat; ius bonumque apud eos non legibus magis quam 
natura valebat. iurgia discordias simultates cum hostibus exercebant, 
cives cum civibus de virtute certabant. in suppliciis deorum magnifici, 
domi parci, in amicos fideles erant. duabus his artibus, audacia in bello, 
ubi pax evenerat aequitate, seque remque publicam curabant.66 
Hence at home and on campaign good behaviour was cultivated. There 
was the greatest concordia, very little avarice; justice and goodness 
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thrived amongst them not because of laws but by nature. Quarrels, 
disharmony and conflict were what they conducted with the enemy; 
citizens competed with citizens in the area of virtus. They were lavish in 
supplicating the gods, sparing in the home, faithful to their friends. By 
two qualities – daring in war and, when peace came, fairness – they took 
care of themselves and of their commonwealth. 
 
This is the result of the habitus cultivated in the camp. To Sallust, the martial 
successes of the republic, the moral perfection of the populace, and the civil 
concord all stemmed from the militarisation of the citizenry. The 
fundamentally military aspect of early Rome is emphasised when Sallust 
provides a general account of the military excellence of early Rome, 
concluding: ‘memorare possum, quibus in locis maxumas hostium copias 
populus Romanus parva manu fuderit, quas urbis natura munitas pugnando 
ceperit...’67 ‘I can recall the places where the Roman people, with only a small 
unit, routed the greatest of enemy forces; the cities which, though protected 
by nature, they took by storm...’ In the same passage, the historian devotes 
several sentences to discussing the excellence of early Rome’s armies. He even 
expresses a sense of regret that his chosen topic precludes a more detailed 
account.68 This suggests that to Sallust a history of Early Rome would be a 
history of her military exploits. As a consequence, civil excellence, such as the 
concordia and justice of the early republic, is discussed only alongside early 
Rome’s military affairs: ‘igitur domi militiaeque boni mores colebantur.’69 
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Particularly relevant in this passage is Sallust’s remark that the excellent 
state of Rome was maintained ‘non legibus magis quam natura.’ This is an 
important part of his understanding, as the qualities and structure of early 
Rome are presented as arising from the Roman people themselves and are not 
directed from above.70 Sallust’s perception of early Rome has no Romulus to 
assign professions to the Romans, the men of the republic are not given their 
military traditions by Servius Tullius, instead the process is altogether 
republican. To him, Rome was incapable of excellence as a kingdom. Under the 
kings, the good were suspect and those with merit were in danger from the 
state: ‘Nam regibus boni quam mali suspectiores sunt semperque eis aliena 
virtus formidulosa est.’71 ‘For, to kings, the good are more suspect than the 
wicked, and virtus in another is always a source of fear to them.’ 
The habitus of the early republic would be impossible under the kings, as 
the very qualities that republican Romans prized would have made them 
enemies to their rulers. It was the circumstances of the republic that allowed 
the Romans to develop moral excellence themselves. Indeed, Sallust states 
that, once freed from the kings, the transformation and success of the state 
happened quickly: ‘sed civitas incredibile memoratu est adepta libertate 
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Monarchy is a result only of his structure (1977: 67). 




quantum brevi creverit...’72 ‘It is incredible to recall how much the community 
grew in a short time after its acquisition of freedom...’ Besides this, Sallust 
stresses the communal, republican nature of this habitus by regularly 
conflating or ignoring class divisions. In the same sentence, Sallust describes a 
Roman iuventus that appears to be composed of both youths from the 
aristocratic class and the lower orders: ‘in castris per laborem usum militiae 
discebat magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis quam in scortis atque 
conviviis lubidinem habebant.’73 While ‘laborem militiae in castris’ most likely 
refers to the actions of milites gregarii, warhorses and fine armour were surely 
primarily noble concerns. This unified, seemingly egalitarian sense of Rome as 
a state of moral perfection is vital to Sallust’s perception of the early republic 
and to its moral collapse.74 By excising social hierarchy from his account of the 
early republic, Sallust is, in effect, democratising traditional Roman virtues. 
Thus virtus and cupido gloriae are attributes not just of the nobiles but of the 
entire populus Romanus. In the chapter preceding the discussion of Rome at 
its moral height, when talking about the founding of the city and the kingdom, 
Sallust allows space for both individuals (Aeneas) and social class (by discussing 
the senate).75 Individuals and social groups appear again in chapter 11, after 
the state has fallen into corruption and ruin. But during the idealised period of 
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early Rome there is only concordia maxuma.76 Emphasising the anonymity and 
the communal nature of the virtue of the early republic establishes the vital 
rôle that the innate cupido gloriae and the practical military education had in 
shaping the morality of early Romans.77  
Sallust further emphasises the communal nature of this transformation 
by excising any individuals from his account of the early republic. In the three 
chapters he devotes to this period of excellence, the historian mentions no 
individual by name. Sallust begins his account by mentioning Aeneas and ends 
his account of Rome’s excellence with Cornelius Sulla, long after Rome has 
become corrupted.78 Sallust’s Roman republic has no Romulus, no Brutus, no 
Cinncinatus, or Fabius, or Scipio. Even references to historical events or 
eminent men are carefully discussed in an anonymous, general way, such as 
the famous story of Manlius Torquatus: ‘in bello saepius vindicatum est in eos 
qui contra imperium in hostem pugnaverant...’79 ‘in war, punishment was more 
often inflicted on those who had fought against the enemy contrary to 
command...’  
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By removing individuals, Sallust is following a tradition established by 
Cato, who described wars without naming the generals.80 But this is more than 
simply an attempt to write history ‘in a self-consciously Catonian manner.’81 
While Cato removed generals from his account of wars, in Sallust’s idealised 
Roman republic there are no individuals of any kind, only the Roman people. It 
was the Romans who drove out their kings, not Brutus: ‘post ubi regium 
imperium...in superbiam dominationemque se convortit, inmutato more annua 
imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecere...’82 ‘After, the command of 
kings...transformed itself into haughty domineering: so, with a change of 
convention, they created for themselves annual commands and paired 
commanders...’ This anonymity remains a constant, the third person plural 
verb form is common, and when the Romans are described, general terms are 
used: ‘quisque’, ‘talibus viris’, ‘populus Romanus’. Sallust keeps individuals and 
classes out of his account of early Rome to emphasise that it was a communal, 
unified experience and that the habitus was shared between the aristocracy 
and the Roman people. 
Sallust refers to two familiar Roman attributes in this section, cupido 
gloriae and virtus.83 Traditionally, cupido gloriae was restricted to the ruling 
class,84 and Cicero explicitly describes it as an attribute of the nobility.85 Sallust, 
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on the other hand, saw it as applicable to all Roman citizens and the primary 
motivation of citizens in the early republic.86 The historian also breaks with the 
aristocratic tradition by conceiving virtus as applicable to all men.87 He states 
this explicitly when he lists farmers, sailors, and builders as men who require 
virtue for success.88 Indeed, the way that Sallust uses virtus throughout his 
work has caused significant scholarly debate. Syme saw Sallust’s perception of 
virtus as ‘something solid, distinct, and authentically native.’89 Santoro l’Hoir 
argues that Sallust manipulated the traditional aristocratic sense of vir and the 
more neutral sense of homo to recast his historical narrative in opposition to 
the earlier aristocratic usage, and in particular that of Cicero.90 Thus, as Santoro 
l’Hoir puts it: ‘often a Ciceronian vir will be rendered a Sallustian homo, and, 
conversely a Ciceronian homo will be converted into a Sallustian vir.’91 
However, Santoro l’Hoir’s framework is unconvincing for several reasons. 
Firstly it requires Sallust to be read primarily as a response to Cicero, rather 
than as an historical text in its own right. Secondly, it is difficult to prove that 
Sallust attached any of the Ciceronian or aristocratic disparaging sense to 
homo. There is little evidence that the historian expects his reader to attach 
negative aspects to the Praetor Petreius, for example, when he labels him 
‘homo militaris’ as he then goes to offer a brief and glowing account of the 
man’s career: ‘quod amplius annos triginta tribunus aut praefectus aut legatus 
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aut praetor cum magna gloria in exercitu fuerat.’92 ‘who had been in the army 
with great glory for more than thirty years as tribune or prefect or legate or 
praetor.’ Marius is referred to as both homo and vir in the Bellum Jugurthinum, 
and Santoro l’Hoir explains this by suggesting that Marius is vir only when 
Sallust explicitly approves of his actions.93 Conversely, that Metellus remains 
vir throughout the monograph is explained away by Sallust’s admiration.94 But 
this admiration, it should be noted, did not preclude the historian from 
describing Metellus undermining the efficacy of his army tent when Marius 
was elected consul.95 Further, Sallust’s perception of homo is not incompatible 
from his concept of virtus as, as we have seen, he applies virtus explicitly to 
homines who ‘arant, navigant, aedificant’; men who certainly would not have 
fit the traditional élite sense of vir.96 
More convincing is the suggestion by McDonnell that Sallust’s perception 
of virtus was more complex than it might seem.97 McDonnell detects two 
distinct uses of virtus in Sallust. The first is a vague sense of ethical virtue 
influenced by Greek thinking, the other is a traditional Roman perception of 
virtus that is inextricably linked to military activity.98 However, by asserting that 
this military virtus is detached from moral concerns, McDonnell has missed the 
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vital rôle that Sallust gave military service in the moral construction of the early 
republic. Instead, Sallust writes of virtus as something that any Roman citizen 
can attain, through a number of professions, but the route he is most 
interested in and the one he devotes the most time to, is through the 
cultivation of military habits in the camp. 
Chapters 7-9 of the Bellum Catilinae thus allow for the construction of 
the habitus for the early republic. The formative structures of the early republic 
were the camp education, foreign threat, frugality, and the pre-eminence of 
gloria as cultural capital. Camp education accustomed the citizen to 
discomfort. As the primary cultural capital was gloria, all citizens were 
conditioned to compete honourably with their fellows in battle and learned to 
scorn personal danger. Sallust’s ideal Roman begins to take shape. Because of 
his youthful training in the camp, a citizen was by inclination and education 
above all a soldier and his chief abilities and desires were military. He preferred 
the trappings of a legionary to those of a civilian, he scorned wealth gained by 
any method but honourable booty. He was brave in the face of the enemy, 
undaunted by terrain and unfazed by the toil and deprivations of campaign. He 
competed with his fellow citizens only to outdo them in battle and at home he 
was frugal, civic minded, god fearing, and law abiding. This, to Sallust, was the 
ideal Roman, the breed of men that had led the republic to greatness. It was 
to these standards that Sallust would judge later Romans. 
The fundamentally military nature of the Sallustian account is most clear 
when it is compared to another version of the social and moral structure of 




early Rome. Dionysius of Halicarnassus devotes the early chapters of his work 
to an account of Romulus’ reign and the steps that he took to ensure the moral 
excellence of his citizens. Both Sallust and Dionysius stress that virtue is 
something that is better learned than taught: 
ὁρῶν γὰρ ὅτι τὸ σωφρόνως ζῆν ἅπαντας καὶ τὰ δίκαια πρὸ τῶν 
κερδαλέων αἱρεῖσθαι καρτερίαν τε τὴν παρὰ τοὺς πόνους ἀσκεῖν καὶ 
μηδὲν ὑπολαμβάνειν χρῆμα τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς οὐ λόγων διδαχῇ 
παραγίνεσθαι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πλήθεσι πέφυκεν, ἐν οἷς τὸ πλεῖόν ἐστι 
δυσάγωγον, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργων ἐθισμοῖς τῶν πρὸς ἑκάστην ἀρετὴν ἀγόντων...99 
Observing that the means by which the whole body of citizens, the 
greater part of whom are hard to guide, can be induced to lead a life of 
moderation, to prefer justice to gain, to cultivate perseverance in 
hardships, and to look upon nothing as more valuable than virtue, is not 
oral instruction, but the habitual practice of such employments as lead 
to each virtue... 
 
Like Sallust’s Romans, who learned virtue through service in the camp, 
Dionysius’ Romulus intended to set his citizens in occupations that would train 
them. The moral effects of both Sallust and Dionysius’ early Roman habitus are 
markedly similar. In both cases the Romans learned to exercise restraint and 
in both cases the Romans learned to prize virtue over anything else. As will be 
discussed, such moderation was essential to Sallust’s concept of the moral 
perfection of the early republic as he considered the loss of this moderation 
and the embracing of civilian luxury one of the chief culprits in Rome’s moral 
decline.100 Besides moderation, both Romulus’ reign and the early republic 
developed a degree of resilience and fortitude. Romulus’ laws led the Romans 
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to withstand hardship, as in Sallust’s vision of early Rome ‘non labor insolitus, 
non locus ullus asper aut arduos erat.’101 ‘no toil was unusual, no place was 
difficult or inaccessible.’ Both led to a sense of cooperation, and the citizens 
worked only to damage their enemies. Dionysius’ Romans learned to keep 
disputes over property reserved for the enemy.102 In Sallust’s own words there 
was ‘concordia maxuma’ and the citizens ‘iurgia discordias simultates cum 
hostibus exercebant.’103 The social structures of both the reign of Romulus and 
the early republic, as recorded by the two historians, produce a markedly 
similar set of morals in the Roman citizenry.104 Both have raised citizens with a 
restrained, frugal lifestyle who are capable of withstanding hardship and 
labour and who cooperated with fellow citizens and saved their ire for the 
enemy. Yet, if the end result was the same, Dionysius and Sallust saw the 
process as markedly different. 
Vitally, Dionysius’ account lacks the fundamental military framing 
present in Sallust. This is because, unlike Sallust, Dionysius sees this as a 
twofold process; Romulus would train his Romans not only in the camp, but in 
the fields. Under instruction from their king, early Romans had to be both 
soldiers and farmers:  
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δύο δὲ μόνα τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἐπιτηδεύματα κατέλιπε τά τε κατὰ 
γεωργίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ πολέμους, ὁρῶν ὅτι γαστρός τε ἄνθρωποι γίνονται 
διὰ τούτους τοὺς βίους ἐγκρατεῖς ἀφροδισίοις τε ἧττον ἁλίσκονται 
παρανόμοις πλεονεξίαν τε οὐ τὴν βλάπτουσαν ἀλλήλους διώκουσιν, 
ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων περιποιουμένην τὰς ὠφελείας. ἀτελῆ δὲ 
τούτων ἑκάτερον ἡγούμενος εἶναι τῶν βίων χωριζόμενον θατέρου καὶ 
φιλαίτιον...τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόν τε πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸν γεωργικὸν ἔταξε βίον 
ζῆν. 
The only employments he left to free men were two, agriculture and 
warfare; for he observed that men so employed become masters of their 
appetite, are less entangled in illicit love affairs, and follow that kind of 
covetousness only which leads them, not to injure one another, but to 
enrich themselves at the expense of the enemy. But, as he regarded each 
of these occupations, when separate from the other, as incomplete and 
conducive to fault-finding...he ordered the same persons to exercise the 
employments both of husbandmen and soldiers.  
 
Dionysius states that by following Romulus’ advice men became ‘masters of 
their appetite’ and ‘less entangled in illicit love affairs.’105 So too did Sallust’s 
early Romans disdain civilian pleasures. But, while the Romans in Dionysius 
practise restraint regarding the civilian luxuries of good food and loose women, 
those described by Sallust judge them less than the martial pleasures of fine 
armour and trained mounts. ‘magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis 
quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem habebant.’106 There is another key 
difference between the accounts in Dionysius and Sallust. To the Greek 
historian, these moral benefits come from a social structure imposed strictly 
upon Rome by her king. Romulus’ observation of human nature and his desire 
to instruct his people leads him to limit their areas of activity to warfare and 
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agriculture. All of the moral benefits are the intended consequences of the 
king’s actions.107 This is contrasted clearly with Sallust’s conception of early 
Rome, where their habitus is developed communally, and there is no evidence 
of a guiding force. 
Dionysius’ version of Early Rome differs significantly from Sallust’s also 
in the importance that agriculture plays in the moral structuring of the city. 
Romulus is said to have separated all occupations into two camps, on the one 
hand were agriculture and warfare and on the other everything else. These 
other trades, which he considered ‘ἐπιδιφρίους μὲν καὶ βαναύσους’ 
‘sedentary and mechanical’ and not fit for Romans, he assigned to slaves and 
foreigners.108 By law, the only occupations open to Roman citizens were to be 
war and farming. Further, each citizen was to devote his time to both. Either 
on their own was ‘incomplete and prone to fault-finding’ (ἀτελῆ… φιλαίτιον), 
and only through spending peace in the fields and war on the march could 
Romans reach the moral superiority their king desired.109  
Indeed, the image of the peasant farmer as a representative of old 
fashioned virtue – particularly in comparison to the urban poor – appears to 
have been a common strain of thought in Rome at the time.110 The connexion 
between farming and warfare is alluded to by Cato Maior: ‘ex agricolis et viri 
fortissimi et milites strenuissimi gignuntur...’ ‘from farmers are made both the 
                                                          
107 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.28 
108 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.28.1 
109 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.28.2-3 
110 Evans refers to it as ‘one of the more hackneyed themes of Roman literature’ (1980: 134). 




strongest men and the stoutest soldiers.111 There is also a reference to this dual 
occupation in the pseudo-Sallustian letter to Caesar: ‘humillimus quisque in 
arvis aut in militia nullius honestae rei egens satis sibi satisque patriae erat.’ 112 
‘the humblest citizen lacked nothing for which he could honourably wish either 
in the fields or in military service, but was sufficient for himself and for his 
country.’ Dionysius appears therefore to be relaying a Roman commonplace 
that painted the early Roman as a citizen farmer, so much so that some 
scholars have attempted to prove the presence in Dionysius’ work of a late 
republican political pamphlet.113 Dionysius’ view of the importance of farming 
in the moral fabric of early Rome clearly matched the common perception of 
his time. 
However, farming plays no part in Sallust’s formulation of the early 
republic. Indeed, Sallust’s ambiguous opinion of farming marks him out from 
the Roman norm. At times he seems unusually dismissive of agriculture, 
particularly in the opening of the Bellum Catilinae: ‘non fuit consilium socordia 
atque desidia bonum otium conterere, neque vero agrum colundo aut venando, 
servilibus officiis intentum aetatem agere.’ ‘it was not my intention to waste 
the good of my leisure time in lethargy and indolence, nor to spend my life in 
agriculture or hunting, concentrating on the duties of slaves.’114 To Sallust 
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farming appears to have been irrelevant to the effect of service in the camp on 
the moral quality of Roman citizens. Their status as poor farmers certainly had 
no improving effect on the rural poor who joined Catiline’s cause. It should also 
be noted that when Sallust records Marius’ decrease of the property 
qualifications, he voices no concerns over the capite censi’s suitability for 
military service, though they would have had no experience as farmers.115 By 
excising farming from his account of the ideal state of early Rome, Sallust 
creates a state that was firmly, even fundamentally military. Sallust has 
reconstructed early Rome that differs from that of Dionysius in two important 
ways: there was no guiding force to correspond with the part played by 
Romulus and the only Roman occupation was warfare. While Dionysius’ early 
Romans were taught their morals by Romulus through the practices of farming 
and soldiering, Sallust’s Romans cultivated virtus as a group through service in 
castris. 
Sallust’s understanding of early Rome is unusual in its fundamentally 
military nature. Military service was the wellspring for the qualities and 
motivations of early Rome. Roman youth communally developed a habitus 
through in castris per laborem. This habitus took as its primary cultural capital 
gloria, which was earned primarily through military excellence. As a result of 
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the habitus, Romans of the early republic were willing to suffer hardships that 
led to great military success, while at home their lives were marked by frugality 
and equanimity. The communal nature – Romans underwent this process 
regardless of class – meant that government and society was marked by 
concordia maxuma and aequitas. It was this culture that allowed Rome to 
become the powerful and stable state that is described at the beginning of the 
Bellum Catilinae. 
However, Rome’s excellence could only last as long as the habitus was 
maintained. Levene has argued convincingly that Sallust uses Catonian 
allusions in a way that demonstrates that the tensions that led to the decline 
of Roman morality following the destruction of Carthage were present even in 
the idealised state that he describes in the opening of the Catilinae.116 By 
alluding to Cato – who lived in the period of moral excellence he described –, 
Sallust demonstrates that the tendencies towards moral degeneracy that the 
Censor railed against was present even in his ideal Rome.117 This has important 
implications for Sallust’s conception of military service. As it was the habitus 
learned in camp that taught early Romans to rise above the tendencies toward 
immorality, we shall see that the degradation of that habitus led to the moral 
collapse of the last century of the republic.118 Having described the habitus of 
Sallust’s early republic and the patterns of behaviour of its citizens, it falls now 
to discuss the results of Rome’s moral collapse. This will allow for an evaluation 
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of a habitus for the historian’s perception of the corrupted republic, which will 
enable the comparison between armies composed of corrupted citizens and 
those restored to the mos maiorum. 
 
The Corruption of the Republic 
 
Turning from Sallust’s golden age to the moral collapse that follows 
requires a brief comment on when exactly he perceived this corruption to have 
taken place. While the most detailed description of the republic at its moral 
height occurs in the Bellum Catilinae, briefer accounts of this ideal state are 
also found both in the Bellum Jugurthinum and in the fragments of the 
Histories. All three works are clear on the fall of Carthage as being the end of 
this golden age, but the dates of its beginning are somewhat contradictory. In 
Catilinae, moral perfection is said to have developed soon after the founding 
of the republic.119 The Jugurthinum makes no mention of any start of this 
period, but also seems to clearly establish that this moral excellence was an 
effect of the Roman republic specifically, not of just Rome itself.120 Thus the 
period of greatness can start no earlier than the expulsion of the Tarquins. 
The Histories, however, muddies the water. Unlike the ‘concordia 
maxuma’ described in the Catilinae’s account of early Rome, the Histories 
refers to the struggle of the orders and the secession of the plebs both in the 
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narration and in the speech of the tribune Licinius Macer.121 Indeed, Macer 
explicitly dates the period of ‘maxima concordia’ to between the Second and 
Third Punic Wars: ‘optimis autem moribus et maxima concordia egit inter 
secundum atque postremum bellum Carthaginiense.’122 ‘ This more 
complicated perception of the early republic shows a more developed sense 
of Roman history and perhaps an ‘increased pessimism’ on the part of 
Sallust.123 This discordance does not, however, affect Sallust’s image of the 
ideal Roman. As we have seen, it is the circumstances – cupido gloriae, external 
threat, frugality at home, and military education – that led to the development 
of the ideal Roman citizen. Nor, as we will see, does the end result differ. 
Sallust’s corrupted present is as consistent as his idealised past. We are faced 
with a chronological problem, but not a structural one. The structural problems 
remain the same. Sallust’s thesis can be expressed very simply: Rome is now 
corrupt; Rome was once not corrupt; a change in the circumstances and habits 
of the Romans has caused this corruption. Inconsistences in detail and 
chronology between or even within the work can be maintained since the 
overall thesis remains consistent. 
On one point Sallust is remarkably consistent, the inciting incident for the 
process by which the republic became corrupt was the destruction of Carthage. 
The wealth and security that followed the end of the Punic war led to ambitio 
                                                          
121 Sal. His. 1.11M; 3.48M.1 
122 Sal. His. 1.11M 
123 Earl (1961: 42)  




and avaritia.124 The traditional scholarly narrative is that these vices led to a 
division between the people and the nobles which fractured the concordia of 
the earlier republic. Sallust is thus accused of ignoring social and economic 
factors and focussing solely on the individual vices and social discord that led 
to the destruction of the civil order.125 In this narrative, the ambitio of the 
populace was inflamed by the avaritia and luxuria of the nobility.126 In such a 
way, the traditional narrative has it, by moralising the process, Sallust became 
‘easy prey’ to conventional notions about the virtue of the early Romans.127 
But, as discussed above, Sallust’s notions about the morality of the early 
Romans differed significantly from the more conventional view presented by 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 
It is my contention that focussing on the individual vices and political 
struggles obscures a key point in Sallust’s perception of the collapse of 
concordia. The destruction of Carthage and the growth of wealth in the city 
disrupted the collective habitus that shaped the development of the ideal 
Roman citizen. The unifying external threat had vanished. Otium, luxuriae, and 
divitiae corrupted the habitus and led to the spread through the republic of 
the vices that would destroy it: avaritia, ambitio, superbia, and crudelitas.128 
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Cupido gloriae was pushed out by ambitio and avaritia. The increased wealth 
disrupted the universal frugality of the golden age. At the same time, military 
service was becoming less fashionable, as men sought advancement through 
other careers.129 Sallust has Marius allude to this change when he invites his 
audience to compare his own career with that of an aristocratic commander 
given command of an army without ever having earned practical military 
experience.130 Sallust’s ideal Rome had been a place of universal virtue, a 
perception he developed by discussing the republic at its height in anonymous 
and general terms. In the Catilinae, he uses the same method to show that 
Rome’s corruption was universal. Once again he carefully avoids discussing 
either individuals or social classes in order to demonstrate the universal nature 
of the corrupt state.131 
In the opening of the Bellum Jugurthinum, Sallust justifies writing a 
history of the Numidian War in part because he considers it the inciting 
incident that led to the political collapse at the end of the republic. The war 
marked the beginning of popular resistance to the superbia of the nobility and 
this caused the social struggles that would end with the civil wars.132 Taken on 
its own this appears to contradict the narrative of universal corruption offered 
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in the Bellum Catilinae. However, in the context of the later passage in the 
Jugurthinum where Sallust discusses the moral collapse of the republic the 
causality becomes clearer. Sallust states that ‘Ceterum mos partium et 
factionum ac deinde omnium malarum artium paucis ante annis Romae ortus 
est otio atque abundantia earum rerum, quae prima mortales ducunt.’133 ‘The 
custom of parties and factions and, then, of all evil practices arose at Rome a 
few years before from inactivity and an abundance of those things which 
mortals consider to be priorities.’ This fractured society was not the fault of 
either party, but rather the result of the corrupted state of the citizenry. The 
text is clear on this: ‘Namque coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem 
in lubidinem vortere, sibi quisque ducere, trahere, rapere.’134 ‘For the nobility 
began to turn their rank, and the people their liberty, into matters of whim: 
every man for himself appropriated, looted, and seized.’ Sallust spreads the 
blame throughout the republic; it is not the solely the nobilitas or the populus 
that is responsible for the moral collapse but both, the fault lies with quisque. 
Sallust here allows us to see the habitus of this new Rome, a society 
appears greatly changed from that of its ideal counterpart. The primary 
cultural capital is no longer gloria but money and wealth:  
igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit: ea quasi materies 
omnium malorum fuere. namque avaritia fidem probitatem ceterasque 
artis bonas subvortit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, deos neglegere, 
omnia venalia habere edocuit.135  
At first the love of money, and then that of power, began to prevail, and 
these became, as it were, the sources of every evil. For avarice subverted 
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honesty, integrity, and other honourable principles, and, in their stead, 
inculcated arrogance, inhumanity, contempt of religion, and general 
venality.  
 
Without the external threat and the military education, the populace are now 
shaped by otium and the erstwhile frugality has been replaced by increased 
wealth gained from Rome’s conquests.136 As a result, the patterns of behaviour 
of these new Romans are fundamentally different from their ancestors. A new 
Roman is not driven by cupido gloriae, but rather by cupido pecuniae and 
cupido imperi. His ability to bear hardship and danger has been undermined by 
otium. His avarice had made him effeminate: ‘Avaritia...corpus animusque 
virilem effeminat.’137 Whereas his ancestors had been diligent in honouring the 
gods, this new Roman neglects them. Unlike the law abiding citizen of the 
earlier period, he is false and double-dealing. With all citizens competing 
against each other for wealth and power the earlier concordia has vanished; 
Sallust makes no mention of it.138  
Most notably, compared to the overwhelming military aspect of the early 
Roman habitus, Sallust introduces an entire section of the state that has no 
experience of military service. Sallust has separated the civilian sphere from 
the military one. An indication of this fractured Roman state is given by the 
appearance, for the first time in the work, of the noun miles.139 Prior to this 
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first occurrence, even in the explicitly military passages describing the wars of 
the republic, Romans had only been described as vir, cives, or indirectly. It was 
not exercitum Romanum that defeated the enemy in the field, but populus 
Romanus.140 Now, however, Sallust divides the corruption of Rome into two 
separate fields, the military and the civilian, and the people of Rome into two 
separate groups, the aristocracy and the people, both equally corrupt.141 First, 
he describes the new fallen state of the civilian population. The new desire is 
not for armour and horses but for houses, land, and, above all, money: ‘rapere 
omnes omnes trahere, domum alius alius agros cupere, neque modum neque 
modestiam victores habere, foeda crudeliaque in civis facinora facere.’142 
‘everyone started to seize and loot; one man desired a house, another land; 
the victors showed neither restraint nor moderation but did foul and cruel 
deeds against their fellow citizens.’ Further, this wealth was no longer 
esteemed only if it had been come by honestly. Gone were the divitatiae 
honestae of the idealised period. Both in the Bellum Jugurthinum and the 
Bellum Catilinae, Sallust uses ‘rapere’ to describe the method by which these 
new Romans attempted to gain their newly desired wealth.143 This wealth, 
then, was no longer legitimate military booty but the ill-gotten gains of thieves. 
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Moreover, Sallust uses ‘rapere’ in connexion with wealth to exclusively denote 
the wealth that was gained illicitly by civilians and undisciplined soldiers.144  
Fragmented as it was, the populus Romanus no longer shared the unified 
habitus of the early republic.145 The men of the corrupt republic could not have 
been more dissimilar from their ancestors. They lacked the attributes that 
Sallust saw as leading to the greatness of the republic. They, like their 
ancestors, were the products of their circumstances, but while their ancestors 
had been shaped by external threat, frugality, and rigorous military training, 
these new Romans were shaped by security, leisure, and wealth. Because the 
uncorrupted Roman habitus was thoroughly grounded in military service and 
the virtues cultivated in the camp, it is now to the camp that we must turn to 
fully understand the process and nature of this new corrupted state. 
 
The Corruption of the Armies 
 
The corruption of Rome had a direct effect on the military efficiency of 
the republic, since the corruption was as widespread on campaign as it was at 
home. DeBlois has argued argued that Sallust perceived soldiers and veterans 
as a separate social group within the republic, there is little evidence in the text 
to support this.146 Armies in Sallust are still portrayed as temporary collections 
of citizens enrolled for the purposes of a campaign: In his account of the 
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Jugurthine War, each of the armies sent to Africa is raised from the populace, 
with no suggestion that this is simply a case of reenlisting veterans.147 Indeed, 
the only detailed information given about the source of recruits concerns 
Marius’ formation of his army, when the recruitment is expanded to include a 
new, as yet untapped source of civilians liable for military service.148 Further, 
when Sallust describes veterans in his account of the war, he is invariably 
referring to soldiers who have been serving in a particular campaign and 
contrasts them with the untried levies brought out as reinforcements by each 
successive consul.149 In Sallust’s account of the Numidian war, then, miles is 
not a profession, but simply a temporary state that a citizen occupies when 
enlisted for a campaign. 
The tight links between the army and the civilian population are 
emphasised by Marius. In his speech to the people, the new consul clearly 
portrays his soldiers in the old style, that is as citizens fighting for the 
republic.150 The speaker is, of course, not the historian himself, but nowhere 
else in the work does the Sallust suggest that there is any significant 
differentiation between soldiers and citizens. In the Catilinae, Sallust 
associates the motivations and desires of the Sullani with the lowest rung of 
the Roman citizenry. The poor of Rome are enticed to join Catiline because 
they see the chance to transform their fortunes through civil war just as Sulla’s 
men had done a decade earlier.151 This is a result of the new order of things, 
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where the primary motivation of a Roman is no longer cupido gloriae but 
cupido pecuniae. Not only do men not care about winning the esteem of their 
fellow citizens in service of the state, they are willing to imperil that state to 
enrich themselves. Both the Sullani and the rural poor also are shown to be 
disinclined towards the difficult labour of farming. Sallust stresses the 
unsuitability of the Sullan veterans for farming, twice mentioning that they had 
squandered their wealth.152 These men have not become habituated towards 
labor.153 Later, he describes civilian labourers that were no longer willing to till 
the soil and wished to join Catiline.154 The connexion is clear: soldiers are 
simply members of the citizenry, prey to the same corrupting forces and social 
pressures of their fellows in the civilian sphere. Here again we see the result of 
the new habitus. Now shaped by otium rather than conditioned to labor, 
Roman citizens look askance at the hard graft of agricultural work. 
Sallust alludes to the negative effect that the corrupted citizens had on 
the military efficacy of the armies of the republic. In his discussion of Caesar 
and Cato, he returns to his earlier assertion that it was the quality of the 
populace that had led the early Romans to their successes against larger armies 
and richer states: 
sciebam saepenumero parva manu cum magnis legionibus hostium 
contendisse; cognoveram parvis copiis bella gesta cum opulentis regibus, 
ad hoc saepe fortunae violentiam toleravisse, facundia Graecos, gloria 
belli Gallos ante Romanos fuisse. ac mihi multa agitanti constabat 
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paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse, eoque factum, 
uti divitias paupertas, multitudinem paucitas superaret.155  
I knew that the Romans had frequently, with small bodies of men, 
encountered vast armies of the enemy; I was aware that they had carried 
on wars with limited forces against powerful sovereigns; that they had 
often sustained, too, the violence of adverse fortune; yet that, while the 
Greeks excelled them in eloquence, the Gauls surpassed them in military 
glory. After much reflection, I felt convinced that the eminent virtue of a 
few citizens had been the cause of all these successes; and hence it had 
happened that poverty had triumphed over riches, and a few over a 
multitude. 
 
Once the populace had become corrupted, however, it was only the size and 
power of the republic that protected it from serious military reverses.156 Rome 
is no longer dominant due to the inherent excellence of its citizens but merely 
because of its large population and resources. It has become, in a sense, one 
of the powerful states that the early Romans so easily overcame. 
While the populace and the soldiery remained linked in Sallust’s 
perception of the republic, it is clear that he perceived some differentiation 
within the officers of the armies. This is signalled by the recurring Sallustian 
epithet homo militaris. In the Catilinae, Sallust uses this designation to describe 
three men commanding Roman troops against the conspirators. The first two 
of these are the praetors sent to intercept the Allobroges: Valerius Flaccus and 
Pomptinus.157 The last is Antonius’ legate, Petreius, who commands the state 
army in the final battle against Catiline.158 An example of the career of a homo 
militaris is given by Sallust when he introduces Petreius: during his thirty-year 
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career he had held the positions of legate, prefect, tribune, and praetor.159 The 
other two men Sallust repeatedly describes as having a military career, though 
does not explicitly label either homo militaris, were Marius and the renegade 
Sertorius.  
It is important not to take this categorisation too far. Sallust did not 
perceive these military men as ‘all but professional officers’ as DeBlois has 
claimed.160 Sallust seems to have regarded the homo militaris as neither an 
exclusively military career nor a new phenomenon. Most of the men described 
have held magistracies that did not have direct military connexions. Valerius 
Flaccus and Pomptinus are serving praetors, while Petreius had previously held 
the same magistracy, as had Marius and Sertorius. That they had all served as 
praetors is instructive. By the late republic, praetors were rarely expected to 
command soldiers in the field and the praetorship had ceased to be an 
exclusively military appointment.161 Further, while most of the men Sallust says 
had held military tribuneships, Pomptinus is not recorded as having been a 
tribune.162 It is therefore more convincing to consider Sallust’s conception of 
homo militaris as simply describing a man who had military experience, rather 
than someone who was pursuing a military focused career.163 
The pedigree of the five men is also worth considering. While Pomptinus, 
Petreius, Sertorius, and, of course, Marius were of modest family, the praetor 
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Valerius Flaccus was the son of a consul and from a family of impeccable 
breeding with roots stretching to the foundation of the republic.164 Indeed, in 
the late republic the aristocratic class, though losing ground since the 
Hannibalic war, still occupied a substantial portion of the recorded military 
tribunes.165 This homo militaris, then, was not a novus attempting to find a 
place from himself in the system dominated by the nobiles, rather Sallust 
seems to have perceived him as simply one of several varieties of politician. Of 
course, a general could fight a war without relying on military men. Calpurnius 
Bestia seems to have formed his staff exclusively from noble politicians, and 
Sulla, though arriving in Numidia without any experience, would become an 
effective officer under Marius’ command.166 
With the quality of the armies tied to the quality of the citizen soldiers, 
and their officers, Sallust had his explanation for the military reverses that 
Rome suffered in the late republic. In the Bellum Jugurthinum and the Histories 
he uses his account of the revolt at Vaga and the disastrous campaign of 
Albinus to demonstrate the ineffectiveness and unreliability of armies 
composed of the citizens of the late republic.167 However, Sallust demonstrates 
how the circumstances of campaign provide an opportunity for a Roman army 
to recapture something of the old Roman habitus. 
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Reforming the Habitus of a Roman Army 
 
While Sallust appears to see the corruption of the republic as irreversible, 
he does demonstrate that citizens serving in an army can be restored to 
something approaching the standards of their ancestors. This involves a two-
pronged process that requires changing a soldier’s behaviour and his 
circumstances. By restoring the mos maiorum and training an army through 
castrametation, a general could restore the mettle and moral superiority of his 
troops. However, this process was both temporary and elusive, requiring the 
constant attention of the general and the cooperation of his officers. In 
Sallust’s understanding of the development of the early Roman habitus, the 
camp played a fundamental rôle, both for common soldier and the élite 
officers, as under the republic the Roman youth ‘in castris per laborem usum 
militiae discebat...’168 ‘learned through labour in the camp military practice...’ 
Further, the fact that labour in the camp dated from the beginning of the 
republic suggests that Sallust saw castrametation as something innately 
Roman.169 
Castrametation is the process of building marching camps, and it served 
as a form of training for the Roman armies throughout the republic and into 
the empire; similar to modern close order drill, it gave the Roman soldier a 
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standardized and controlled activity.170 Polybius provides a systematic 
description of the camp as it was theoretically constructed in the middle 
republic. There are, of course, several reasons why we should be cautions of 
Polybius’ account.171 However, the details of the account are less relevant here 
than the fact that castrametation was a formalised and regulated practice: 
every aspect of the building of camps in the republic was organised and 
dictated by tradition. That Sallust understood this is reflected in his judgement 
of certain commanders conducting campaigns contrary to those traditions.172 
The placement of each tent in the legion and the spaces between them were 
carefully organised and regimented, as was the length and layout of the paths 
between them.173 The physical defences, sentries and military duties were all 
carefully and uniformly organised.174 Importantly, the camp was meant to be 
an almost exclusively military environment. With the exception of the officers’ 
slaves, everyone inside the camp was a soldier.175 The ordered environment of 
the camp represented hierarchies and order and gave each person within the 
camp their specific place in that hierarchy and order. It was also replicated and 
recreated on a daily basis, as generals moved their armies. Soldiers, therefore, 
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had to be conscious of the built environment and its ordered hierarchies, that 
they continuously – and communally – recreated. By separating soldiers from 
the civilian world and establishing a restricted, ordered environment, a general 
removed corrupting civilian influences and forced his soldiers into an 
exclusively military environment. In this environment, Roman citizen-soldiers 
would develop a military habitus that was distinct from the corrupt civilian 
habitus of the contemporary republic, but echoed the moral excellence of the 
early republic. 
As will be discussed at greater length below, it is this method that 
Metellus uses to restore and strengthen his army while on campaign in 
Numidia. His actions take a lazy and corrupt army and rebuild it as a disciplined 
force that, like the ancients, is brave in the face of the enemy, undaunted by 
terrain and unfazed by the toil and deprivations of campaign. Accounts of 
discipline restored in this manner also occur in several fragments from the 
Historiae. One fragment, most likely related to Lucullus’ own struggles with 
maintaining discipline, refers to directing an army towards the mos 
maiorum.176 ‘Exercitum maiorum more verteret.’ ‘he returned the army to the 
traditional practice.’177 In his discussion of Varinius’ reforming his army in the 
3rd Servile War Sallust’s portrayal of the army is similar to his comments 
concerning Albinus’ army in Numidia; here again, the correct course of action 
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is to restore the old practices. ‘Et tamen interim cum volentibus numero 
quattuor <milium iuxta illos castra poni>t. va<llo, fossa, permag>nis operibus 
commun<ita>.’178 ‘In the meantime, with four thousand willing troops, Varinius 
pitched camp near the enemy, fortifying it with rampart, ditch, and extensive 
earthworks.’ Following McGuishin’s suggestion that the detail given by Sallust 
suggests that previous commanders had not bothered with proper 
castrametation, it is likely that Varinius was the first of the commanders sent 
against Spartacus to conduct his campaign in the traditional way.179 
Unfortunately for Varinius, his overconfidence leads him to move against 
Spartacus before the process is complete.180 His defeat reinforces Sallust’s 
point that military success is directly tied to restoring the mos maiorum. 
As we have seen, Sallust perceived the development of the Roman 
habitus as a communal practice, not imposed on the people from above. This 
view influences his understanding of how the habitus was to be cultivated in 
later armies. While the military hierarchy had to be respected, as an essentially 
republican process the appropriate habitus could not be enforced by harsh or 
domineering leadership. Sallust describes the proper method as a careful 
balance between indulgence and firmness. For instance, he praises Metellus’ 
prudence in restoring the discipline of his army before moving against the 
Numidians and by controlling this discipline by moderation rather than 
cruelty.181 Nowhere does Sallust speak favourably of excessive severity in 
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restoring or maintaining the habitus of Roman soldiers, though such practices 
were generally considered not just laudatory but necessary to maintain order 
in an army. For instance, Valerius Maximus provides an approving list of 
particularly brutal punishments meted out to soldiers by the great generals of 
the republic.182 He ends his account thus: ‘aspero enim et absciso castigationis 
genere militaris disciplina indiget, quia vires armis constant; quae ubi a recto 
tenore desciverint, oppressura sunt nisi opprimantur.’183 ‘For military discipline 
requires a harsh, brutish sort of punishment because strength consists in arms, 
and when these stray from the right path they will crush unless they be 
crushed.’ Indeed, Sallust seems to be explicitly addressing this tradition when 
he describes moderate command of as much a benefit to the republic as the 
greatest strictness.184 Moderate command, then, was necessary if the ancient 
habitus was to be cultivated, rather than enforced from above. The general 
needed to provide the circumstances for the communal development 
described in the Bellum Catilinae, something he could not do by playing the 
martinet. 
Besides moderation, another method of maintaining the mos maiorum 
was by openly sharing the danger and hardships of the men. Marius makes 
much of his willingness to share the experiences of the soldiers in his speech 
to the people.185 He proves his words no empty boast; as throughout the war 
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he labours alongside his men and is personally present at the major military 
events of his campaign.186 Metellus also goes to pains to show himself to the 
men, disturbing his sleep to inspect the night sentries and visiting all parts of 
the column when on the march.187 Similarly, the Historiae shows Lucullus, 
faced with imminent defeat, riding alone to join his retreating men and 
encourage them to fight as Romans should.188 By sharing the labour, hardships, 
and dangers of his men, a general could reinforce the sense of social 
homogeneity necessary for the development of a reformed habitus. When the 
early Romans assaulted enemy armies or citadels in Sallust’s account of the 
early republic, they did so as a unified populus Romanus, not as soldiers 
directed from the rear by aristocratic generals. 
There was a perception amongst the Romans that military discipline 
came as a ‘package’ and if any part of it was eroded, the rest would follow.189 
Sallust seems to have followed this thinking. In his work this is most clear in 
the immediate and damaging effect that a breakdown in co-operation 
between officers has on the effectiveness on the troops under their command. 
Sallust does not use the term ‘concordia’ in his narrative outside his account of 
the early republic, cooperation between the general and his subordinates 
fulfils the same rôle in this reformed military habitus that concordia held in 
early Rome. However, this cooperation also appears to have been one of the 
most fragile aspects of the habitus. In the early stages of the Metellus’ 
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campaigns, when he and his legate Marius are cooperating, the Roman army 
operates at peak efficiency. Yet, when Marius falls out with his commander 
following his desire to seek the consulship, the first thing to go is the discipline 
of Marius’ troops.190 This same breakdown is alluded to in Sallust’s account of 
the notoriously troubled campaign against Numantia, where Aemilianus is 
saddled with an officer staff that Sallust describes disparagingly as ‘factiosi.’191 
To Sallust, the maintenance of this military co-operation – a sort of ersatz 
concordia – was essential in restoring the mos maiorum and increasing the 
effectiveness of the troops.192 While he does not term it concordia, this social 
and military unity – which grew out of moderate leadership and the discipline 
of a traditional camp – was vital to the maintenance of the reformed habitus 
of the Sallustian soldier. When cooperation broke down due to rivalry within 
the command tent, the habitus was in danger of breaking down. 
Having described in general terms this process, an examination of the 
Numidian War will allow an understanding of its details. In the Jugurthinum 
Sallust provides detailed descriptions of two varieties of army. In the early part 
of the campaign the reader is given a scathing description of an army 
composed of and led by corrupt men. When Metellus takes command, the 
situation improves greatly. Sallust first describes the method by which the 
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general restored the habitus of his soldiers and then provides evidence that, 
even though the republic was not capable of the virtue and vigour of the mores 
maiorum, an army properly led could capture something of the old quality of 
Rome. 
 
The Armies in Africa, Asia, and Italy. 
 
Sallust provides a portrait of an army formed of the newly corrupted 
citizens in the early chapters of the Bellum Jugurthinum. Under the command 
of the incompetent Spurius Albinus and his brother, the army and its officers 
exhibit all the behaviours resulting from this new Roman habitus, they are 
unwilling to bear hardship or danger, they are motivated by avaritia and 
ambitio, and they are disunited even in the face of danger. 
Avaritia is perhaps the most obvious motivation. The army is unwilling to 
run the risks of attacking the enemy and earn honest booty, but is perfectly 
willing to steal cattle and slaves from the provincials in order to barter with 
traders for foreign wine and luxuries. 193 Even worse, their greed puts the entire 
army at risk when Jugurtha attempts to subvert the army. So bad are 
conditions in the camp that the king is able to send envoys to spread sedition 
not only under cover of night but in broad daylight.194 Sallust gives an 
indication of how widespread this corruption is when he reports that the 
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primipilus of one of Albinus’ legions was amongst those induced to betray the 
army.195 
Their unwillingness to bear hardship is most clear in the description of 
the winter camp. The soldiers are static, only moving their camp when forced 
to by an accumulation of sewage or a shortage of food.196 The camp is neither 
fortified nor guarded and camp followers and soldiers mix freely day and night, 
and the soldiers are supplementing their military fare with foreign wine and 
purchased bread.197 This is not merely an indication of sloth on the part of the 
soldiers; baking bread was a regulated and formalised aspect of camp labour, 
and thus formed part of a proper Roman’s habitus.198 Sallust’s judgement is 
damning; the army is ‘iners’, ‘imbellis’, and ‘neque periculi neque laboris 
patiens’.199 
When Metellus arrives in Africa to take command, he sets about 
immediately rectifying the situation. As the passage provides the most 
complete and detailed account of Sallust’s understanding of good leadership, 
it is worth quoting in full: 
Namque edicto primum adiumenta ignaviae sustulisse: ne quisquam in 
castris panem aut quem alium cibum coctum venderet, ne lixae 
exercitum insequerentur, ne miles hastatus aut gregarius in castris neue 
in agmine seruum aut iumentum haberet; ceteris arte modum statuisse. 
Praeterea transuersis itineribus cottidie castra movere, iuxta ac si hostes 
adessent vallo atque fossa munire, vigilias crebras ponere et eas ipse 
cum legatis circumire; item in agmine in primis modo, modo in postremis, 
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saepe in medio adesse, ne quispiam ordine egrederetur, ut cum signis 
frequentes incederent, miles cibum et arma portaret. Ita prohibendo a 
delictis magis quam vindicando exercitum brevi confirmauit.200 
And that in an edict he removed first the props of their apathy: no one 
should sell bread or any other cooked food in the camp; no camp 
followers should accompany the army; no spearman or troop soldier 
should keep a slave or baggage animal in camp or in the column; and that 
he set a narrow limit on other things. Besides this, he moved camp daily 
on sideways routes, he fortified it with a rampart and ditch just as if the 
enemy were in the vicinity, he set frequent watches and went round 
them personally with his legates; likewise in the column he was 
sometimes in the front, sometimes at the rear, and often in the centre, 
to ensure that no one broke rank, that when advancing they were 
massed around the standards, and that the soldiery carried food and 
arms. In this way, by the prevention of offences rather than by 
punishment, he soon toughened his army. 
 
Sallust spares little praise for Metellus’ actions when faced with the state of 
Albinus’ army. Rather than attacking Jugurtha, he remains within Roman 
territory and enforces the old disciplines. With daily marches and regularly 
building fortified camps, the consul accustoms his army to the military labor of 
the ancients. By moving his camps and setting sentries, he separates his army 
from the corrupting civilian world around them. Having denied his soldiers 
otium, he moved to cut them off from the luxuriae that they had enjoyed under 
Albinus. He drove out the suttlers that had supplied them with foreign wine 
and the bakers that had allowed them access to anything other than simple 
military fare. By daily marches and castrametation, Metellus was, in effect, 
teaching his army usus militiae. It should be stressed, that despite Sallust’s 
remark that the process occurred brevi, it is clear that the process took some 
time. While Metellus was reforming his army, Jugurtha had time to send and 
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receive messages to Rome, and arrange an embassy to Metellus.201 Further, it 
shall become evident that the reformed habitus is a very fragile thing, and 
vulnerable to backsliding if the proper camp discipline is not maintained. 
Throughout Sallust stresses Metellus’ hands on and constant approach 
to maintaining the habitus of his army: the consul seemed to be everywhere 
at once, inspecting sentries, observing the marches from the front, middle and 
rear of the line.202 Metellus’ practice has the desired effect, and when he 
marches on Numidia, his army, once composed of fresh levies and the 
demoralized remnants of his predecessor’s campaign, is now the most 
formidable force in Africa.203 Excepting a few brief calamities and the 
breakdown of co-operation between Marius and Metellus, the army in Africa 
appears to be exhibiting the ideal habitus through the remainder of the 
campaign. Like the early Romans, they are able to withstand the attacks of 
their enemies, as the battle of the Muthul River and the siege of Vaga.204 They 
are also able to bear the toil and hardship of campaign, including a forced 
march through the desert.205 Once again, therefore, the army fits the 
description of the early Romans given in the Bellum Catilinae.206 
It is also illustrative that the largest reverse under Metellus occurs when 
the garrison at Vaga is ambushed and destroyed. On the day of their 
destruction, Sallust paints a picture of soldiers who have abandoned the 
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habitus of their ancestors. The officers have been lured away from their troops 
with the promise of feasting. The men themselves are mingling with the civilian 
population of the town and, like the civilians around them, they are 
unarmed.207 Softened by contact with the civilians and being separated from 
their standards, the soldiers are quickly massacred by the Vagenses.208 
Removed from the reformative habitus of the camp, then, the modern 
corruptions have reasserted themselves and reduced the martial vigour of the 
soldiers in Vaga. As a result, such men cannot withstand the attack even of a 
foreign mob.  
The disaster at Vaga can be contrasted with an earlier battle near Zama 
when Jugurtha with a large force managed to overrun the badly defended 
Roman camp. While many are killed in the opening of the engagement, the 
survivors, numbering only forty, manage to hold off the Numidians until they 
are relieved.209 Unlike the men at Vaga, these men, remaining in the camp and 
subject to its discipline, retain something of their ancestors’ excellence, like 
them they are able to resist a large foreign force ‘parva manu’.210 Here the 
importance of the camp and its reformative aspect is shown in dreadful 
simplicity. The reformed Romans at Zama are capable of fighting of an attack 
by a large enemy force, the relapsed men at Vaga are not. 
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Levene has suggested that the Bellum Jugurthinum can be read as an 
‘historical fragment’ that prompts the reader to consider the events of the 
Jugurthine War within the larger narrative of the political decline of the 
republic.211 In the context of this chapter, while the Jugurthinum ends with a 
successful Roman army, restored to the earlier habitus and with Marius and 
Sulla cooperating, we must consider this alongside Sallust’s narrative of 
decline, where he singles out Sulla especially for undermining Roman 
excellence.212 While Vaga and Zama provide examples of the practical 
importance of maintaining the military habitus, in his brief description of 
Sulla’s campaign against Mithridates Sallust provides an example of the 
catastrophic moral results of allowing soldiers to serve outside the mores 
maiorum. In the East, the historian records, ‘Sulla exercitum quem in Asia 
ductaverat, quo sibi fidum faceret, contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque 
liberaliter habuerat.’213 ‘Sulla, in order to secure the loyalty of the army which 
he led into Asia, had allowed it a luxury and license foreign to the manners of 
our forefathers.’ As Sulla was successful, Sallust cannot attribute a defeat to 
the abandoning of the mores maiorum. Instead the historian describes the 
appalling effect the campaign had on the morality of the soldiers. Like their 
civilian counterparts these men show no respect for the gods, but rather 
‘delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere.’214 ‘to pillage shrines, and 
to desecrate everything, both sacred and profane..’ In the long list of wealth 
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and fine goods the Sullani acquired, Sallust does not once mention praeda – 
the usual term for legitmate military spoils – but again uses the verb rapere.215 
As discussed above, this appears to be language that Sallust uses to 
delegitimise wealth he considered gained dishonestly. 
Sallust also suggests that the circumstances of the campaign made them 
less like proper soldiers: ‘Loca amoena, voluptaria facile in otio ferocis militum 
animos molliverant.’216 ‘in the intervals of leisure those charming and 
voluptuous lands had easily demoralized the warlike spirit of his soldiers.’ 
Indeed the depiction of the men could barely be worse, and Sallust finishes by 
dismissing them as soldiers ‘corruptis moribus.’217 This strongly negative 
portrayal matches that of the soldiers under Albinus’ command in Numidia, 
though the primary focus there was their ineffectiveness as troops, not their 
immorality. In the brief account offered of Sulla’s command, Sallust provides 
an example and a warning of the result of allowing men to campaign ‘contra 
morem maiorum.’ This is what armies of corrupt citizens look like when they 
campaign outside the traditional military habitus. They more resemble bandits 
than soldiers and represent a dangerous group to introduce to the already 
unstable republic. 
By contrast the reforming effects of a properly cultivated military camp 
are demonstrated to a remarkable degree in the closing pages of the Catilinae. 
Once he settles on open military action, Catiline immediately begins taking 
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similar steps to Metellus to increase the fighting ability of his army. From the 
moment he arrives in his camp, he cultivates the appearance of a republican 
general: ‘cum fascibus atque aliis imperi insignibus in castra ad Manlium 
contendit.’218 ‘he marched quickly with fasces and the other insignia of 
command to Manlius’ camp.’ Catiline’s efforts to portray himself as a 
legitimate magistrate have received much attention.219 Less attention has 
been paid to Catiline’s efforts to present his own forces as a proper Roman 
army.220 This attempt appears to have begun the moment he joined his forces 
with those of Manlius: 
Catilina ex omni copia, quam et ipse adduxerat et Manlius habuerat, duas 
legiones instituit, cohortis pro numero militum conplet. deinde, ut 
quisque voluntarius aut ex sociis in castra venerat, aequaliter 
distribuerat, ac brevi spatio legiones numero hominum expleverat, quom 
initio non amplius duobus milibus habuisset.221 
Catiline formed two legions from the entire force which he himself had 
brought and which Manlius had had, the complement of the cohorts 
being in proportion to the number of soldiers; but then, as volunteers of 
various of his allies came to the camp, he distributed them equally and 
in a short while had filled up the legions with the number of men, 
although initially he had had no more than two thousand.  
 
Catiline’s efforts to present his army as a traditional republican force involved 
several steps. First, he had organised them into cohorts and legions, not on an 
ad hoc basis, but from the beginning as a two-legion army, with the constituent 
parts under strength at first. Secondly, Sallust reports that the conspirators had 
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managed to acquire an aquila, supposedly from Marius’ campaigns against the 
Cimbri.222 Most importantly, however, Catiline situated his forces in castris. 
Sallust’s Catiline, therefore, appears to understand something of the 
significance of education in a camp. He himself alludes to this in his speech 
before the battle at the end of the monograph, when he downplays the 
efficacy of his own words:  
Compertum ego habeo, milites, verba virtutem non addere, neque ex 
ignavo strenuum neque fortem ex timido exercitum oratione imperatoris 
fieri. quanta cuiusque animo audacia natura aut moribus inest, tanta in 
bello patere solet. quem neque gloria neque pericula excitant, 
nequiquam hortere... 223  
I have found, soldiers, that words do not supply prowess and that neither 
is an apathetic army made committed, nor a cowardly one courageous, 
by a speech from its commander. Whatever daring resides in the heart 
of each man by nature or by habit, it is usually visible to the same degree 
in war. It would be pointless to exhort the man who is roused by neither 
glory nor danger... 
 
Sallust has Catiline speak in a manner that echoes the language of his depiction 
of early Rome. Once again we have the dismissal of the individual and the 
lauding of the collective quality of soldiers. Here too, moreover, we have the 
sense that virtus is something that must be cultivated, not simply imparted. 
Catiline also makes reference to the idea that true Roman soldiers are those 
‘gloria...excitant.’224 Particularly evident, in the speech, is the focus on mores 
and natura, both things that Sallust sees as part of Early Rome’s success.225 Yet, 
Catiline focuses on the audacia of his men; indeed, audacia plays an important 
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part in his address to the troops, as he uses it three times.226 This is a corrupted 
understanding of Sallust’s early Rome, as, despite the detail given to Rome’s 
martial excellence, Sallust mentions audacia in that context only once.227 
Indeed, Sallust reminds his readers that the early republic punished excessive 
audacia in battle.228 Further, though Catiline made appeals to the cultural 
capital of the early republic, he also talks in terms of the new corrupted 
republic: ‘memineritis vos divitias, decus, gloriam, praeterea libertatem atque 
patriam in dextris vostris portare.’229 ‘remember that you carry in your own 
right hands riches, honour, glory; even freedom and your native land.’ 
Catiline’s speech represents a commander and an army that is between the 
two moralities. Their time as traditional military formations in the camp have 
begun the process of reform, but they have not fully abandoned the habitus of 
the new republic. The conspirators thus occupy a place between the idealised 
Sallust’s idealised Romans, who value decus and gloria, and the army of Sulla, 
preoccupied with divitiae. 
Nor are Catiline’s efforts reduced simply to rhetoric. Sallust provides 
evidence of his efforts to cultivate the habitus of a Roman army by continually 
stressing that even when avoiding battle Catiline is maintaining a military 
camp: ‘Catilina per montis iter facere, modo ad urbem modo Galliam vorsus 
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castra movere, hostibus occasionem pugnandi non dare...’230 ‘Catiline marched 
through the mountains, moved his camp now towards the city and now in the 
direction of Gaul, and gave the enemy no opportunity for battle...’ In all, of the 
nine uses of castra in the Bellum Catinlinae, six refer to Catiline’s forces, one 
to the idealised early republic and two to the forces of the Roman state.231 
Catiline’s regular movement of his camp may have been driven by a desire to 
avoid battle with the government forces, but this would have had a similar 
effect as Metellus’ exercises in Africa. Intentionally or not, Catiline had 
banished otium from his army and it was developing the habitus of the soldier. 
To use Sallust’s own language from the archaeologia, Catiline’s army ‘per 
laborem usum militiae discebat.’232  
There is evidence, too, that cultivation of the military habitus was having 
an effect on the quality of his soldiers, as Sallust reports that in the early stages 
of the conspiracy there were no defections from Catiline’s camp: ‘neque ex 
castris Catilinae quisquam omnium discesserat.’ 233 ‘and not a single one 
deserted Catiline’s camp.’ However, as we have seen in the cases of Metellus 
and the Servile War, the process of reformation was a continuous one, and one 
that did not have a full effect on all of his soldiers, as Catiline did suffer 
desertions when the executions of Lentulus and Cathegus became known. That 
the reforming nature of military service had yet to effect these men is made 
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evident from Sallust’s comment that the deserters were from ‘quos ad bellum 
spes rapinarum aut novarum rerum studium illexerat...’234 ‘those whom the 
hope of plunder, or the love of change, had led to join in the war...’ These men 
reflect the corrupted soldiers of the new habitus, resembling the army of Sulla 
veterans of which, Sallust has told us, were with Catiline’s army.235 These are 
not men who have yet undergone the reformative process of military service 
and thus retain the habitus of the corrupted republic. This, however, is to be 
expected, as we have seen, because the process of reform was an extended 
one, requiring time to properly cultivate the correct behaviour and motivations 
in the soldiery. 
Catiline’s determination to direct his forces according to tradition 
continued when he finally committed his forces to battle: ‘signa canere iubet 
atque instructos ordines in locum aequom deducit.’ ‘he ordered the trumpets 
to sound and led his army in order of battle down into the plain.’ The 
appropriateness of Catiline’s approach to leading men in battle is also stressed 
by Sallust: ‘strenui militis et boni imperatoris officia simul exequebatur.’236 
‘performing at once the duties of a valiant soldier and of a skilful leader.’ 
Interestingly, in his account of Catiline’s early life, Sallust made no mention of 
Catiline’s military experience or ability, something that is mentioned by 
Cicero.237 Instead, Sallust allows the military effectiveness and high morale of 
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both Catiline and his army to manifest itself at the end of the Bellum Catilinae. 
Such effectiveness is presented as surprising to the commander of the state 
forces.238 Indeed, it should be. Catiline’s forces are formed of a number of 
Sullan veterans, disaffected noblemen and landless peasants, all 
manifestations of the corrupted state of the late republic. They joined the 
conspiracy out of a desire for the wealth that would allow them a life of 
otium.239 However, the time they have spent on manoeuvre and building 
camps has begun to cultivate in them some of the habitus of the early republic 
and turned them into effective soldiers. As we have seen, another result of the 
habitus learned in castris during the early republic was a strong degree of 
concordia. There is evidence of, if not concordia, then some unified sense of 
purpose amongst the Catilinarians at their final battle. Catiline’s legates, 
Manilius and an unnamed Faesulan, appeared to take Catiline’s orders without 
question and both died at the posts he had assigned them.240 Amongst the 
army, too, there is a sense of a kind of ersatz concordia: ‘Sed confecto proelio 
tum vero cerneres quanta audacia quantaque animi vis fuisset in exercitu 
Catilinae.’241 ‘When the battle was ended it became evident what boldness and 
resolution had pervaded Catiline’s army.’ Further, in his description of the 
battle’s aftermath, Sallust provides us with evidence of this unified sense of 
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purpose in the army by depicting the dead Catilinarians lying where they took 
up battle and with wounds to the front.242 
Sallust uses the actions of Petreius, Antonius’ legate, to show that the 
army of the Roman state has also been kept in proper order, though Antonius 
himself is ill.243 Petreius’ extensive military experience has been discussed 
above, but it is his relationship with his soldiers and his understanding of their 
motivations that interest us here. Sallust makes it clear that he knows many of 
the men in his army by name: ‘ipse equo circumiens unum quemque nominans 
appellat’244 ‘riding up and down upon his horse, he addressed each of his men 
by name’ and later ‘plerosque ipsos factaque eorum fortia noverat.’245 ‘he 
knew most of the soldiers and their honourable actions.’ Such familiarity with 
so many men would suggest that they had served with him before, and thus 
experienced some of the reforming nature of military service. Petreius’ speech 
to the troops also suggests this, as he reminds them of their past military 
achievements.246 There are differences, however. Petreius’ army did not 
demonstrate the same degree of unified purpose as that of the conspirators: 
‘strenuissumus quisque aut occiderat in proelio aut graviter volneratus 
discesserat.’ ‘all the most valiant had either fallen in the fight or come off with 
severe wounds.’ Yet some variation in the quality of soldiers is to be expected. 
As we have seen, the reforming nature of camp service was a process, and 
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many of the soldiers in Petreius’ army had been in castris for even less time 
than the conspirators, as they were recruited in response to the outbreak.247 
The battle at the end of the Bellum Catilinae is a battle between two 
forces that have both been, to some degree, reformed through military 
service. Reading Sallust’s account of the battle in the context of the 
reformative nature of the Sallustian military habitus provides an answer to the 
problem of Sallust’s presentation of the Roman Government and Catilinarian 
forces as remarkably similar at the close of the Bellum Catilinae.248 Levene has 
shown that Sallust problematises his own presentation of the ideal republic by 
implying that the Romans of that period had the same inclinations towards 
immorality, but did not indulge them.249 Other scholars have outlined the 
morally complex nature of Sallust’s Catiline, where he seems to embody some 
of the virtues of early Rome, while epitomising the drives of the new corrupted 
republic.250 Therefore, both Catiline’s men and the soldiers of Petreius are 
representatives of the new Roman state, but both armies have undergone a 
degree of reform through their service in the camp. Both, though formed of 
men from the corrupted republic, exhibit some of the characteristics and 
qualities of their forbears that Sallust praises extensively at the beginning of 
the monograph. Sallust’s closing sentences emphasise this, as he describes the 
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In the early chapters of the Bellum Catilinae, Sallust provides the reader 
with an account of the early republic. According to him, the early Romans’ 
successes were due to the moral superiority and hardiness that their education 
and lifestyle had developed in each citizen. By nature and education such men 
were frugal, brave, and hardy. To Sallust, the excellence of early Rome was 
grounded in the concordia and shared values of its citizens. This concord was 
strong and durable enough that the Romans of old acted with a shared sense 
of purpose and commitment that was strong enough to even override social 
class. This idealised situation was due to the shared experiences of military 
service that all citizens gained from time spent in the military camp and on 
campaign, which cultivated a moral and unified habitus.  
However, the success of the republic was its undoing. With the 
destruction of Carthage and the increase of wealth and leisure within the city, 
the traditional pillars of Roman virtue were worn away and the moral edifice 
of the republic collapsed. Once the republic had become corrupted through 
otium and wealth, Roman society became too fractured to maintain this 
habitus. Due to the nature of Roman war making, this moral collapse effected 
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not only the civilian life of the city but also Rome’s armies. On campaign, 
Roman armies began to mirror the corrupted state they served, and were 
driven more by comfort and loot than by the cupido gloriae that had motivated 
their ancestors. The new patterns of behaviour were ill suited to the rigours 
and dangers of campaigning and the effectiveness of Rome’s armies suffered 
as a result. 
However, on campaign and in the camp a good general could recreate 
the conditions of the early republic. Life inside the camp was frugal and 
rigorous, while the organising and building of the camp provided something 
approaching the practical military experience of the ancients. Further, while 
the republic itself had little to fear from an external threat, the external threat 
to soldiers on campaign was all too real. Even cupido gloriae could be 
simulated through the public praising of brave individuals and the giving of 
military awards for valour.  
Not only could the structures of the old Roman habitus be recreated, the 
structures of the new corrupt habitus could be suppressed. In a properly built 
camp, which was fortified and guarded, moved and reconstructed on a regular 
schedule, the Roman soldiers would have little chance to indulge in the otium 
and divitiae that had led to the development of audacia, avaritia, and largitio 
in the larger republic. An army kept to this military habitus would rediscover 
the patterns of behaviour of its predecessors, and Sallust provides accounts in 
his work of armies which, though raised in the late republic and consisting of 
the corrupt populace, reflect his description of the idealised earlier armies. 




A proper understanding of this reformative model of military service 
contributes to our understanding of Sallust’s work in several ways. Firstly and 
simply, it allows us to push against a tendency to dismiss Sallust as a source for 
military affairs.252 More than this, however, a full understanding of the rôle 
that military service played in the development of Sallust’s ideal early republic 
contributes vital detail to scholarship that aims to systematise and analyse the 
process of moral decline that pervades Sallust’s work. Primarily, it offers 
clarification to the debate over the exact sequence of ambitio and avaritia.253  
By properly understanding of the educational nature of military service 
we can see that the important issue is not really whether ambitio or avaritia 
began the process, but that the decline of military service had made the Roman 
people vulnerable to such temptations. My analysis of military service in Sallust 
also offers important nuance to Milne’s argument that it was the absence of 
war that began the process of decline.254 My analysis argues that it was not a 
lack of war – for wars were certainly not lacking in the 2nd century BC – but 
the erosion of the camp education that weakened the morality of the Romans. 
Finally this chapter builds on the work done by Levene, as the potential for 
reform within the army lends support to his argument that the tensions that 
resulted in the decline of Rome were present at its beginning.255 The fact that 
citizens of the corrupted republic can experience reform by returning to the 
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mos maiorum shows that to Sallust it was the circumstances of the late 
Republic that led to its corruption, not any innate moral difference. 
Unfortunately for a republican like Sallust, as this method involved 
exercising control not only over the behaviour but the circumstances of their 
soldiers, it could only be maintained while an army was on campaign. Once 
soldiers were demobilised, they were once again absorbed into the corrupted 
republic they had served. As a result, the reformative nature of military service 
offered little help in addressing the structural problems of the larger republic. 
  





Imperium Requires Consent 
 Tension Between Commanders and Men in Livy’s History 
 
In book Two and book Forty-Five of his history – near the beginning and 
the end of the surviving portions of his narrative – Livy provides accounts of 
two severe, aristocratic generals who, in the conduct of their campaigns, 
managed to alienate the troops under their command. Both faced determined 
resistance from the men below them, who were committed to frustrating their 
commander’s plans.  
The circumstances were very different, in 471 BC Appius Claudius was 
skirmishing against a tribe on the borders of Latium while three centuries later 
Aemilius Paullus was subduing the Macedonian king, Perseus. However, the 
cause of the trouble in each case was the same: the generals were conducting 
their wars and exercising their imperium without concern for the status, rights, 
and interests of the men under their command. Appius Claudius, in particular, 
was given a remarkable warning by his officers: ‘concurrunt ad eum legati 
tribunique monentes ne utique experiri vellet imperium cuius vis omnis in 
consensu oboedientium esset.’ ‘the legates and tribunes gathered hurriedly 
around him and warned him upon no account to test his imperium, when its 
effectiveness depended on the consent of those obeying it.’256 In Livy’s 
conception of the republic this was a dangerous way to lead men. Roman 
soldiers in his history were, from the foundation of the republic, aware of their 
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interests, engaged politically, and jealous of their rights and status. When they 
felt those rights were being ignored or trampled upon, they were willing to 
resist or defy the authority of their commanders. 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, to Sallust the wellspring of 
republican Roman virtue was military service. On campaign and in the camp 
young Romans of all classes learned through military service and labour to be 
ideal citizens.257 In Livy’s understanding of the early republic, the foundation 
of republican virtue is a rather less martial process. In his discussion of the 
overthrow of the Tarquins and the early days of the republic, the historian 
explains that the Regal period was a necessary part of the development of 
Roman civic identity. 
The monarchy allowed for a slow growth of common Roman identity 
that served as a form of vaccine that protected the fledgling republic from what 
Livy saw as the dangers of liberty: interclass strife and demagoguery. What 
might have happened, he asks, if the kings had not kept the Roman people 
from liberty ‘priusquam pignera coniugum ac liberorum caritasque ipsius soli, 
cui longo tempore adsuescitur animos eorum consociasset?’ ‘before ever the 
pledges of wife and children and love of the very soil (an affection of slow 
growth) had firmly united their aspirations?’258 This concept of Roman political 
identity developing under the kings and tempered by family and farming is 
unique among Roman historians.259 Indeed, although Rome’s military 
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successes make up a large part of his history, in Livy’s list of the republic’s 
achievements war is part of a larger whole, sandwiched between their peaceful 
successes and the quality of their magistracies.260 
To Livy, military service appears to have had a different effect on the 
social cohesion of the republican citizenry. In Sallust’s account it was a grand, 
unifying process that brought citizens together and led to Rome’s greatness. 
He even democratizes the process by conflating noble officers and common 
soldiers and by excluding individuals from his account of the republic’s early 
accomplishments.261 In Sallust’s framing, military service unified and reformed 
the morals of the citizenry. In Livy’s account of the republic, rather than being 
a fundamental part of the republic military service was somewhat less of an 
unalloyed good. To Livy, the plebeian soldier was marked by a distinct and 
separate identity, with its own measurement of status, its own interests and 
motivations. This identity was different from, and occasionally at odds with, 
the élite culture of the Livian republic. Further, when plebeians speak publicly 
in Livy’s narrative, they assert their status as soldiers, they never make any 
reference to their civilian occupation or make reference to a social status that 
is not related to their military service. The Plebeians in Livy’s narrative are 
overwhelmingly represented as soldiers, even when craftsmen appear, they 
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appear in military service.262 In Livy’s narrative, plebeians present themselves 
as a military class and as the only counterpart to the élite.263 
Plebeian military identity in Livy is marked by four essential aspects. 
The first was a strong political identity and continual political engagement. 
Soldiers were fully aware that they were citizens and remained politically 
connected to the situation in the city. They also were prone to a degree of 
politicking within the camp; this is most present when they resist command or 
when the army reacts to a vacuum in the higher echelons of the army.  
Plebeian soldiers in Livy’s narrative were also united by a strong sense 
of self identity. That was the foundation of how they related to each other both 
on campaign and during peace. Those in the camp were brought together by a 
common sense of humour, a ribald and occasionally grim way of joking that 
Livy identifies as particular to the Roman soldier.264 There was an emphasis on 
the shared dangers and toils of military life and soldiers often made appeals to 
the service they have given the state and speak to their peers as commilites.265 
The cultural currency of the camp was measured in the amount of time men 
                                                          
262 Roman citizens are only explicitly referred to as craftsmen when serving in Mamercinus’ 
army against the Gauls (Liv. 8.20.3-4). 
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the plebs as a group – particularly in the early republic – as to some degree or another exempt 
from military service. On the plebs as for the most part not eligible for military service, see e.g. 
Momigliano (1966) and (1986), Ogilvie (1965: 294); for the plebs as a more varied group, see 
e.g. Cornell (1983: 118) and (1995: 256-258); Raaflaub argues that they played a greater part 
in the Roman military (1993: 148-151). 
264 The so-called iocus militaris. E.g. Livy 3.29.5; 5.49.7; 7.10.13; 7.38.3; 28.9.18. 
265 E.g. Livy 2.55.7, 3.50, 42.34.15. Though Livy uses the term ‘commiles’ but rarely – twelve 
times, in fact – both plebeian soldiers and generals often reference shared military experiences 
indirectly by speaking of their long service or referencing specific campaigns. Ogilvie suggests 
that by largely restricting commilites to speeches, Livy lends the word pathos (1965:375). 




have spent on campaign and the recognition that soldiers had won from their 
commanders. Their status was often symbolised by the scars their bodies 
carried, which attest to the shared experiences of their time under the 
standards, or by decorations they had earned in battle.266  
Soldiers were also determined to ensure that their service served a 
purpose that they themselves found appropriate. In the early years of the 
republic this meant that they tended to welcome campaigns that served to 
protect the republic or benefit the Roman people as a whole, while they were 
more resistant to fighting to extend or preserve the power of the Senate over 
the surrounding peoples. When wars became more profitable in the 4th 
century, this benefit was often measured in the share of profit that individual 
soldiers would make from their military service. 
Livian soldiers also had a strong understanding of their own interests, 
and were willing to pressure or even break with their commanders to promote 
those interests. These interests were either related to the political situation in 
Rome or arose from tactical considerations, as the soldiers made efforts to 
ensure that their commanders were making military decisions that the men 
saw as correct. As plunder came to play a larger part in Rome’s war making, 
the men began to also exert pressure to ensure that they received what they 
saw as a fair share of the proceeds of the war they were fighting. But even 
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here, when Livy highlights moments of trouble surrounding the division of 
spoils, the issue is usually framed more as concern over soldiers having their 
status and contribution recognised, rather than merely a matter of greed. 
These aspects of the republican soldier remain constant in the extant books of 
Livy’s history. Further, this military identity represents the primary plebeian 
identity in Livy’s narrative. When plebeians speak in public, they exclusively do 
so as soldiers, and assert their status as such to legitimise themselves.  
Canny generals throughout Livy’s history understood this culture and 
on occasion made appeals to it themselves, casting themselves as commilites. 
Beyond that, they made attempts to appear to honour and protect the status 
of the men they commanded. Such generals often secured the support and 
respect of their men. In contrast, those who commanded in an aloof and 
heavy-handed manner, or took steps that were seen to undermine the status 
of their milites often found themselves at odds with their own armies. 
Also constant throughout Livy’s account of the republic is the 
remarkable degree to which the soldiers remain organised and politically 
motivated. The men would react with hostility to bad generals, unpopular 
wars, and decisions made by command that the soldiers perceived to be either 
unfair or against their own interest. Such reactions largely manifested 
themselves within the structure of the army, as the men used their centurions 
as a conduit to express their desires to their commanders. This happens so 
often – and without any pushback from the centurions – that Livy appears to 
have seen this as part of the normal working of the republican Roman army. 




Indeed, with very few exceptions, whenever problems arose between 
command and the soldiery, centurions sided with the soldiery. When 
negotiation between the army and command reached an impasse, the army 
communicated its desires and acts to influence command through more drastic 
measures. These included refusal of service, the deliberate sabotage of their 
effectiveness as soldiers, and even mutiny.  
The Roman army as described by Livy appears to operate in a state of 
tension and negotiation between the soldiery, composed of the milites gregarii 
and the centurions, and command, composed of the senatorial generals and 
the military tribunes. This tension appears whenever the interests of the 
commanders and their men are at odds. The inciting issue in almost all 
instances of trouble within the army seems to have been threats to the distinct 
plebeian military identity. All Livian soldiers shared a strong understanding of 
their own identity or interests. When the decisions of command challenged 
that identity or threatened the interests of the men, the army acted to 
influence or countermand their generals. This shared identity and clear 
perception of their interests is common to all soldiers in Livy’s account, from 
the men who joined Brutus to drive out the Tarquins in Book One all the way 
through to the soldiers attempting to block the triumph of Aemilius Paullus in 
Book Forty-Five. 
More importantly, if the only legitimate plebeian identity in Livy’s 
republic is the military one so prominent in his narrative, then Roman soldiers 
can be read as stand-ins for the plebeian class as a whole. If the rôle of the 




army in Livy’s republic as the organising and directing force in plebeian 
resistance is overlooked, the interaction between the plebs and the larger state 
is in danger of being misunderstood.267 This means that when Livy’s narrative 
shifts at the end of book five from a focus on the struggle of the order to 
Rome’s increasing foreign wars, the plebs – as a politically active section of the 
res publica, concerned about their status, and aware of their rights – do not 
vanish from the narrative. Rather, the Roman plebs remain politically active 
and engaged in their rôle as soldiers, who continue to guard their status and 
their rights from encroachment from their aristocratic officers. 
To demonstrate the relatively unchanging nature of plebeian military 
identity, the communal sense of shared interest and the tension this creates 
with command I shall look at the entirety of Livy’s surviving work divided into 
four sections: Books One to Five, Six to Ten, Twenty-One to Thirty, and Thirty-
One to Forty-Five. For each section the presence of this military identity will be 
established and then the various ways the army communicated its wishes or 
displeasure to command will be analysed to demonstrate that the tension 
between the soldiery and command in Livy’s account is not merely an 
occasional breakdown of discipline but rather a permanent aspect of the 
republican army that flares into serious political conflict whenever the soldiers’ 
interests or identity is challenged by the actions of command. Further, as the 
soldiers represent the plebs on campaign, much as their officers represent the 
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aristocracy, the tension between command and soldiery is the tension 
between plebs and patres. 
Livy as a source for military affairs. 
 
The degree to which Livy’s work is a useful source for Roman military 
systems and affairs is hardly a settled subject. Though his reputation has 
recovered from its nadir in the 1960s, Walsh’s dismissive judgment of the 
historian’s ‘crippling ignorance’ of military affairs still colours the discussion of 
warfare in Livy’s history.268 Also, modern scholars are prone to view Livy’s 
military accounts as largely literary rather than historical efforts.269 Arguments 
against Livy’s usefulness as a source for the military, despite the huge 
proportion of his history dedicated to matters of war, largely turn on two 
issues. Firstly, his supposed tendency to follow his sources so closely means 
that his reliability is directly tied to the reliability of his source, something, with 
the exception of Polybius, it is difficult for modern scholars to qualify.270 
Secondly, Livy’s lack of a military career has undermined belief in the accuracy 
of his accounts, a problem compounded by a perceived tendency to obscure 
or elide details of military engagements and a few relatively insignificant, but 
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269 Lendon (1999: 276); this view has a long pedigree, see Syme’s dismissal of Livy’s account of 
early Rome: ‘In the first Decade the author takes leave of legend only to plunge into fiction’ 
(1959: 27). 
270 On the traditional view of Livy’s reliance on his sources see Syme (1958: 148); Walsh (1970: 
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famous, cases where he has misunderstood the tactical details reported by 
Polybius.271   
There has been considerable pushback on the traditionally dim view of 
Livy’s quality and reliability both of his history in general and specifically of his 
military sections. There is no need for this work to enter that argument to any 
great degree, but I will touch on several aspects of the debate to demonstrate 
that arguments against Livy’s military experience and reliability do not pose a 
threat to his usefulness to the purpose of this chapter.  
On the issue of Livy’s use of sources, two recent works have addressed 
two aspects of Livy’s writing on war to demonstrate that regardless of Livy’s 
sources, there are two models of military activity that are applied consistently 
throughout his work. Koon argues convincingly that Livy’s detailed battle 
scenes consistently represent his ‘literary vision of combat’ and his 
understanding of the ‘mechanics of infantry fighting’.272 His argument for the 
historian’s military experience in the Perusine war is less convincing, grounded 
as it is in an assumption that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.273 
Koon maintains that battles in Livy maintain a consistent structure and 
vocabulary that is not merely a result of his sources, arguing that the battle 
                                                          
271 For both the traditionally damning view on Livy’s famous mistranslations, see Walsh (1958). 
Barnes (2005) and Briscoe (2013) are more moderate in their assessment. 
272 Koon (2010: 23-35) 
273 Koon (2010: 23). Though I fear Koon also over estimates the degree to which provincial 
aristocracy took part in the civil wars and, indeed the experience of the Augustan literary class. 
(2010:27). 




narratives are too detailed to be derived from the annalists, differ from 
Polybius’ account, and are also distinct from, though influenced by Caesar.274 
Approaching Livy’s siege narratives rather than his pitched battles, Roth 
argues that Livy, while closely following his sources, exerts enough control over 
them to standardise his siege narratives, once again creating a consistent 
depiction of Roman sieges regardless of the time period and his particular 
source.275 Most importantly for this chapter, Roth shows that, with a few 
exceptions, Livy generally does not include anachronistic siege technologies in 
his accounts of early sieges.276 This demonstrates that Livy understood that 
certain military technologies were inappropriate for earlier periods of Roman 
history and excised them from his account in order to maintain the plausibility 
of his depiction of the early republic.277 
Certainly, there are other occasions where Livy is willing to adapt his 
sources to fit his literary understanding of the republic. During the first 
Macedonian war, when Titus Flamininus and Phillip V met at the beach near 
Nicaea, Philip behaved with his characteristic irreverence. In Polybius’ account 
Flaminius was receptive to Philips jests as the Roman was repeatedly described 
as ‘γελάσαντος’ ‘laughing’.278 Later, the Roman grandee joined in:  
ὁ δὲ Τίτος οὐκ ἀηδῶς μὲν ἤκουε τοῦ Φιλίππου χλευάζοντος: μὴ 
βουλόμενος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις [μὴ] δοκεῖν ἀντεπέσκωψε τὸν Φίλιππον 
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εἰπὼν οὕτως: ‘εἰκότως’ ἔφη ‘Φίλιππε, μόνος εἶ νῦν: τοὺς γὰρ φίλους 
τοὺς τὰ κράτιστά σοι συμβουλεύσοντας ἀπώλεσας ἅπαντας’. ὁ δὲ 
Μακεδὼν ὑπομειδιάσας σαρδάνιον ἀπεσιώπησε.279  
Titus was by no means displeased by Philip's jests, and not wishing the 
others to think he was so, rallied Philip in turn by saying, ’Naturally you 
are alone now, Philip, for you have killed all those of your friends who 
would give you the best advice.’ The Macedonian monarch smiled 
sardonically and made no reply. 
 
Livy’s account is starkly different, while Philip retains his famous jocundity, 
Flamininus limited himself to a few brief opening remarks – and even these are 
given in indirect speech – that laid out the demands of the Roman people and 
then spent the rest of the meeting in dignified, austere silence. Gone are his 
receptive, even encouraging, responses to Philip’s jokes; a representative of 
the senate should not indulge in banter with a foreign king. The private 
conference the following day, once again given only as indirect speech, was 
also business-like and dignified.280 Livy adapted his source to fit his greater 
narrative; in his reconstruction of the republic, great Romans do not make 
jokes. 
That Livy was willing to control the information coming from his sources 
to create consistent models of pitched battles, sieges, and Roman behaviour is 
an important point for this chapter. In the following sections I will lay out the 
identity of the Livian soldier, his motivations, and his social capital. This will be 
shown to be a fundamentally plebeian identity, distinct from and often in 
opposition to the élite identity of the senate and the generals and officers 
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above them. Further, aspects of this identity create a dynamic within the 
Roman army that makes this construction different from those presented in 
other historians. The simmering tension with command and the fact that, 
when order breaks down, centurions invariably side with the soldiery against 
command show that Livy conceived of Roman soldiers as different from the 
rigorously disciplined soldiers described by Polybius. Further, they do not fit 
Caesar’s account, where legionaries are shown with ‘a uniformity of behaviour 
and simplified motivations.’281 
Which brings me neatly to the question of Livy’s military career or lack 
thereof. To the subject of this chapter, whether Livy spent time on campaign 
or not, and absent any evidence I am content to assume he did not, becomes 
less relevant. Compared to accounts of the army in the civil wars and the 
Augustan age, the soldiers depicted in Livy are unlikely to reflect the army of 
his time. Rather they, like his siege narratives and his battle scenes, are 
rhetorical creations, designed to reflect his understanding of the position of 
citizen-soldiers in the republic that he has reconstructed.  
 
Plebeian Military Identity in Livy’s History 
 
Before beginning my analysis of the part played by soldiers in Livy’s 
narrative, I define what is meant here by the ‘Roman soldier’. Historically, in 
the early and middle republic – the period covered by the extant books of Livy’s 
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history – the Roman army was composed of citizens performing temporary 
military service.282 Military service in the form that concerns us here: plebeian 
infantrymen – milites gregarii and centurions – was the responsibility of those 
who met the property qualifications of the plebeian military class, the adsidui. 
Those men spent varying amount of time on campaign, often short periods in 
the early republic and far longer in the wars of the middle republic, and often 
spent intervals between campaigns in civilian life.283 
Livy’s picture is different from that of the modern consensus. Certainly, 
Livy is aware of the Servian classes and the property qualification for military 
service. He devotes several sections of book one to Servius Tullius’ new census 
qualifications.284 In that he gives the minimum property qualification for 
military service as a minimum worth of 11000 asses, any citizen worth less was 
not liable for military service.285 On occasion the presence of the Servian 
classes appear in the narrative, such as following Cannae when the senate 
recruits soldiers ‘ex omni aetate et fortuna.’ ‘of every age and condition.’ This 
is perhaps also the case during the panics surrounding the tumultus gallici that 
happen occasionally in the first decade.286 
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More commonly, however, Livy appears to conceive of a republican 
army that was open to, and recruited from, all levels of plebeian society, even 
the very poor. At the dawn of the republic the men serving in Tarquinius 
Superbus’ armies are the same sort that he has digging ditches and sewers.287 
Decades later, all of the victims of nexum debt-bondage – those most 
economically insecure in the city – have served or go on to serve in the army.288 
Much later in the work, if we are to take his own statements about his 
patrimony at face value, the most successful soldier in Livy’s account, Spurius 
Ligustinus, would not have met the minimum qualification for service.289 
Just as there is little internal evidence for the various military classes 
within Livy’s narrative, there is no sense either of separate military and civilian 
identities. Amongst the plebeian class, Rome is not divided into soldiers and 
citizens, but rather those citizens who have served in the army and those who 
have not. Perhaps even more specifically those who are currently on campaign 
and those who remain in the city. 
The debate over the spoils of Veii is illustrative. Appius Claudius warned 
that an equal division of the loot threatens to strip soldiers of their just reward. 
The senate must act to ensure that: ‘non avidas in direptiones manus 
otiosorum urbanorum praerepturas fortium bellatorum praemia esse,’290 ‘the 
hands of urban layabouts, grasping for plunder, would not snatch away the 
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prizes due to brave warriors.’ Claudius did not distinguish between soldiers and 
civilians, but rather between those spending their time in otium in the city and 
those on campaign. This framing at first may seem unfair, since only 
exaggerated rhetoric could describe the daily labour of a craftsman or farmer 
as otium, especially since the army at Veii has been on extended campaign and 
someone must have been supplying them with food and equipment. If, 
however, military service is the way that Roman plebeians demonstrate their 
worth, then such dismissive words make sense. Within the narrative, Roman 
antipathy to non-military labour or, more correctly, to being perceived as 
someone who does non-military labour predates the republic.  
In 509, when Brutus was raising the populace against the Tarquins, his 
speech turned from the personal crimes against Lucretia291 to the more 
general tyranny of the Tarquins, he claims  ‘miseriaeque et labores plebis in 
fossas cloacasque exhauriendas demersae; Romanos homines, victores 
omnium circa populorum, opifices ac lapicidas pro bellatoribus factos.’292 ‘and 
the misery and the labours of the plebs, who were plunged into ditches and 
sewers and made to clear them out. The men of Rome, he said, the conquerors 
of all the surrounding peoples, had been turned from warriors into artisans and 
stone-cutters.’ Two aspects of Brutus’ speech are important, firstly, that he 
frames such labours as a threat to the Roman peoples’ status as soldiers. 
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Secondly, Brutus makes this appeal not to the soldiers in the fields, but to the 
plebeians remaining in the city. 
During the debt crisis and the decemvirate those suffering under the 
system who make appeals to the people, either themselves or as tools for 
demagogues, tend to be soldiers. The debtor exploited by Manlius Capitolinus 
is a veteran with extensive experience – and a respectable number of scars. 
Verginius is, obviously, a respected centurion.293 When we are given any details 
about plebeian tribunes, beyond their rabid opposition to the patres, it is 
invariably their military record. In Livy’s history no plebeian asserts his status 
by mentioning his wealth, and when men assert themselves as citizens, they 
almost always do so alongside assertions of their status as soldiers.294  
The universal image of military service is reinforced in the speech of the 
prisoners of Cannae, who stress their worth to the state as soldiers and citizens 
not as an absolute difference with other Romans, but as a qualitative one. They 
are better soldiers because they are more experienced than new recruits, not 
because they are fit to be soldiers and the others are not. When they list the 
measures the senate is taking to reinforce the army after the losses against 
Hannibal – rearming those who escaped, arming the poor and the aged, and 
freeing slaves – it is only the last that provokes protest, as they argue that 
money would be better spent on their ransom than manumission.295 Their 
comments concerning the prospect of arming freed slaves are also illustrative. 
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While they have argued for their own worth as soldiers over those of the newly 
recruited Romans, they refuse to do so with the slaves: ‘nam si conferam nos 
cum illis, iniuriam nomini Romano faciam.’296 ‘for to compare us with them 
would be to degrade the Roman name.’ Romans – even the adolescent, aged 
or poor – can be appropriately measured as soldiers, but slaves cannot. 
In Livy’s account of the republic, every Roman had the potential to be, 
as the prisoners of Cannae put it, ‘civis et commilito’. The status of a plebeian 
was measured by the degree to which he had fulfilled that potential. The 
distinctly military aspects of this plebeian identity are made starker by the 
almost complete lack of individual Roman civilians in Livy’s account. As 
mentioned above, when Roman citizens are described in any detail, the details 
given are almost invariably military. The pious M. Albinius who donates the use 
of his cart to Vestal virgins fleeing Rome before the Gallic sack is an example 
of the rare plebeian citizen introduced without any evidence of his military 
status.297 Yet even here while we are given no details about his military 
experience we are given little information about his civilian life either, beyond 
that he is a plebeian and has a wife and children.298 We are told that he was 
among the part of the citizenry considered ‘inutilis bello,’ which on the face of 
it suggests that Livy considers a large part of the plebeian class to be unsuitable 
as soldiers. However, the situation in 390 was unusual. There were concerns 
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about supplying large numbers of men on the Capitol and Livy states that many 
Romans have been ordered out of the city including the majority of 
plebeians.299 From the context, then, we can establish that the plebeians that 
Livy refers to as inutilis bello were designated so as a result of specific 
conditions during the sack, not that they represented a section of the populace 
seen as unfit for military service.  
Livy’s conception of the republican plebeian was that of a soldier, 
regardless of whether they were on campaign at the time. When they spoke 
to each other or to patres they asserted their status with reference to the 
shared social capital of their common military identity. While Livy gives no 
explicit description of this military identity in his surviving books, the important 
aspects of it can be constructed from the work. Further there is little sense of 
any change in patterns of behaviour in the course of his narrative. The status 
of the Livian soldier is measured in three ways: experience of the shared 
hardships of campaigning, the length of time the soldier spent on campaign, 
and official recognition of his quality by a commanding officer. The identity of 
the Roman soldier is also separate from that of the Roman élite commanding 
them. Plebeian soldiers and élite officers had distinct sets of social capital, and 
measured and asserted their status according to a different rubric. 
Feldherr, in his analysis of duels and devotiones in Livy’s description of 
the early republic emphasises that the importance that aristocratic feats of 
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arms play in his narrative is directly related to the reaction of the audience to 
such deeds.300 Livy, however, restricts this to aristocratic officers. There are no 
moments in Livy’s history where an audience – or indeed the reader – 
witnesses a heroic deed performed by a common soldier. Rather, when a 
plebeian soldier asserts his status he boasts not of a single proud action, but 
rather of a career of service, measured by number of campaigns, official 
recognition and, often the physical scars of his time in the camp. 
By removing from his account any descriptions of plebeian soldiers 
performing deeds of valour and instead referring to them only obliquely 
through either the recognition they have received distinguishes the plebeian 
military identity from that of the élite. This emphasis on recognition for deeds 
rather than the deeds themselves is evident from the early books of Livy’s 
history. While prosecuting the Decemvir Spurius Oppius a tribune presents an 
unnamed centurion as a witness. The man’s worth as a witness, as a soldier 
and citizen, is framed in the context of official recognition and length of service. 
‘testis productus, qui septem et uiginti enumeratis stipendiis, octiens extra 
ordinem donatus donaque ea gerens in conspectu populi...’301 ‘A witness was 
brought forward, who, after reckoning up twenty campaigns, after having been 
particularly honoured eight different times, and wearing these honours in the 
sight of the Roman people...’ The man’s actions themselves are not described 
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in any detail, as the relevant point is that his actions have been recognised and 
rewarded by command. The victims of the nexum debt bondage in the turmoil 
leading to the first secessio do the same.302 
As discussed above, this focus on length of service and the recognition 
of authority is in stark contrast to Livy’s description of aristocratic officers and 
cavalrymen. When such men are praised in the narrative it is usually as 
reference to their virtus and the illustrious heritage, the tribune Cornelius 
Cossus and the consul Agrippa Furius being prime examples of this.303 In his 
defence of the unnamed centurion, the tribune is careful to stress the length 
of time that he has spent in the army. At the trial of Spurius Oppius, it was 
mentioned that the centurion that he wronged had served in twenty 
campaigns. It appears that to the Livian soldier demonstrating one’s status as 
an old veteran was an integral part of establishing oneself as a good soldier 
and a good Roman. Similar sentiments are expressed about veterans during 
the political wrangling that surrounded the war with Veii.304 
By making length of service and official recognition the two 
benchmarks of worthy military service, soldiers in Livy perhaps allow for an 
understanding of shared experience. Time spent under arms and rewards from 
commanding officers allow for the individual soldier’s record to be presented 
in a general and objective way. This in turn presents the soldier as a valuable 
member of a group that extends beyond his immediate comrades on the 
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battlefield and in the tent line. There is evidence in Livy’s narrative for this 
sense of a shared identity across the Roman army that extends even to men 
that have not spent campaigns together. 
Volero, a soldier resisting conscription, appealed to those present in 
the Forum both as citizens and fellow soldiers when the lictors threatened him 
with violence.305 When taking refuge amongst his comrades from the 
Decemvirs, Verginius is able to rouse his army to march against them with 
appeals to their shared identity – he addresses them as commilitiones twice in 
a short speech.306 Those men, however, are his personal comrades. Yet when 
the tribune Icilius instigates mutiny amongst the army fighting the Sabines, he 
uses both the murder of their own comrade, Siccius, and the wrong committed 
against Verginius – a fellow soldier but not a personal comrade – to provoke 
the men to action.307 This suggests that Livy saw plebeian identity as extending 
beyond the personal bonds a soldier might form on campaign with his 
contubernales. Rather, military service cultivated a common sentiment across 
the army, even if men had served in different campaigns under different 
generals. Personal knowledge or connexion to an audience of his peers was 
not essential for a soldier asserting his status.  
One aspect of the plebeian military identity in Livy that, though minor, 
appears to be integral to the shared identity and something that separates 
plebeians from their aristocratic officers is their sense of humour. The Roman 
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senators and generals described by Livy are a fairly humourless lot. This stands 
in marked contrast to plebeian soldiers, who Livy frequently depicts as joking 
amongst themselves. Frequently, though not exclusively, this takes the form of 
the rude verses sung or chanted by soldiers during a triumph.308 Though clearly 
part of the triumphal ritual, this iocus militaris is presented by Livy as being 
something the soldiers create themselves. This is particularly evident in the 
triumph of the dictator Mamercus Aemilius where Cornelius Cossus’ feats of 
bravery led the legionaries to praise him extensively over their commander.309 
The soldierly nature of this joking is made explicit when Livy refers to the rough 
joking of the army of 355 BC as ‘iocus militaris.310’ Joking is a distinctive 
behaviour that marks soldiers out as different from the larger Roman 
population. This is indicated by Livy’s use of vocabulary: of the thirteen times 
Livy uses the word ‘iocus’ to describe the behaviour of a Roman citizen, nine 
are in military contexts while the remaining four involve Romans who are 
influenced by or speaking with foreigners.311 The iocus militaris represents a 
pattern of behaviour that is common to plebeian soldiers throughout Livy’s 
history and serves to emphasise the difference between their identity and that 
of the patres. 
Three aspects of the plebeian military identity: the importance of 
official recognition, the emphasis on long campaigns and shared experiences, 
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and the joking nature of soldiers all appear in Livy’s narrative as unique to the 
plebeian infantry of Rome’s armies. All of them are also present in the 
narrative almost from the beginning of the republic and certainly within the 
5th century. In Livy’s formulation of the republic, the plebeian class is the 
counterpoint to the élite of the Roman republic. This plebeian class self-
identifies, organises, and expresses its will primarily through military 
experience and the plebeian sections of the army. This is particularly 
prominent during the first pentad, and the next section will deal with the place 
the army plays in the development of the republic from its founding to the fall 
of Veii. 
  




From the Founding of the Republic to the Siege of Veii 
 
The Political sensibility of the Early Republican Army 
To begin this examination Livy’s conception of the republican soldier – 
politically engaged, aware of his interests, and wary to challenges to his status 
and his rights – I will consider the emergence of this form of Roman citizen in 
the founding of the republic and the early struggle of the orders. It is at the 
dawn of the republic that the Roman plebs first appears in Livy’s narrative as 
an organised and engaged force within the Roman state, and throughout the 
4th century the army serves as the manifestation of their will. This section will 
deal with the part the army played in the ousting of the Tarquins, its leading 
rôle in the first secession, its central place in the second, and the status of the 
army as the plebeian tribunes’ primary source of influence. It has been 
observed that, historically, even as a temporary militia of citizens serving only 
for the duration of a campaign, republican soldiers must have brought aspects 
of their time as soldiers back into their civilian lives.312 In Livy’s account of the 
early republic – and indeed in all of his surviving work – while citizens brought 
aspects of their civilian life into their military service, it was only in their status 
as soldiers that they could effectively resist the senate, since the willingness of 
plebeian soldiers to go to war was necessary in the near constant border 
skirmishing that marked the first century of the republic.313 
Roman soldiers exerted influence in the politics of the republic from 
the very beginning of Livy’s republican account. After Brutus raised the 
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populace at Rome against the Tarquins, his next step was to head directly to 
Ardea in order to co-opt the army.314 Tarquin, on the other hand, left the army 
in the field and returned to Rome to restore order. Brutus avoided the king and 
his retinue on the road and was able to reach the camp and secure the support 
of the army. At the same time, the king failed to win back the city and, with 
both army and city against him, entered exile.315 The rôle played by the army 
in the founding of the republic is worth brief consideration for two reasons. 
Firstly, Brutus appears to have understood the central place of the army better 
than Tarquin did. Throughout Livy’s first pentad the army functions as the 
organised manifestation of popular sovereignty.316 Brutus understood that his 
revolution would not succeed without the support of the army, as he avoided 
contact with the king before he had secured the support of the troops. Nor was 
his avoidance of direct confrontation with the king necessarily driven by 
practical concerns, while Livy is not explicit, it is likely that Tarquin returned to 
Rome with an armed retinue, yet the historian is explicit that Brutus himself 
did so, too: before departing for Ardea, Brutus organised his own armed 
retinue.317 Brutus’ intention was to raise the state against the Tarquins, not 
merely replace him as king. To do so he needed to win the support of the army. 
Tarquin, on the other hand, did not seem to grasp that without the 
support of the army he cannot control Rome. As was the case with Appius 
                                                          
314 Livy 1.59.12 
315 Livy 1.60 
316 Forsythe (2007: 36) 
317 Livy 1.59.12 




Claudius and Aemilius Paullus, Tarquin did not understand that imperium 
required the consent of those under his command. This is made clear in the 
speech that Livy gives Brutus, at the end of which Brutus urged the people ‘ut 
imperium regi abrogaret exsulesque esse iuberet L. Tarquinium...‘318 ‘to 
abrogate the king's authority and to exile Lucius Tarquinius...’ The use of the 
technical republican language ‘imperium...abrogaret’ is vital here.319 Ogilvie 
recognised that the anachronistic language has the effect of connecting the fall 
of the Tarquins to the development of the republic.320 This has interesting 
connotations for how Livy understood Roman sovereignty. Romans generally 
understood consular imperium as deriving from the power of the kings, as Livy 
himself suggests.321 Yet if the power of a king could be revoked by the citizenry, 
then the line between the regal period and the republic becomes blurred. The 
fact that Roman soldiers and citizens could withdraw the imperium of Tarquin 
also firmly illuminates Livy’s model of republican military service dated from 
the ouster of the Tarquins: like the kings before them, republican generals and 
magistrates could only wield power if their citizens and soldiers were willing to 
recognise it.  
Tarquin misunderstood this and, in quitting the camp to retake the city, 
left the army vulnerable to Brutus’ politicking. Yet, this misunderstanding 
manifests not only in his poor last minute decision to abandon the army at the 
moment of crisis, but in his behaviour as king. Livy is clear that part of the 
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reason Rome is ripe for revolt is because the Tarquins had spent much of their 
reign antagonising Roman soldiers. In his speech to the people Brutus 
reminded them that the king has been pressing men of the military class into 
manual labour: ‘Romanos homines, victores omnium circa populorum, opifices 
ac lapicidas pro bellatoribus factos.’ ‘Roman men, victors over all the 
neighbouring peoples, had been turned from warriors into artisans and stone-
cutters.’322 The unhappiness of the citizenry with this situation was recognised 
even by Tarquin, who decided on war with Ardea partly to fill his own coffers 
and partly to give the soldiers a break from the labour and the chance for 
spoils.323 The situation makes it clear that Roman citizens, while they accepted 
military service, were less happy about being compelled into corvée – their 
employment as lapicidae in particular would have been problematic as it was 
an occupation associated with slaves.324 But the issue at hand was as much the 
result of forcing Romans into labour as it was the nature of labour itself. 
Tarquin’s labour program effectively turned Roman soldiers into Roman 
workers. This represented a direct threat to the status of Roman men as 
soldiers. As will be discussed below, in Livy’s republic the Roman plebeian’s 
understanding of himself as a soldier was fundamental to his sense of his own 
worth as a citizen. 
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There is further evidence that the royal family had alienated the men 
in the army. During the siege of Ardea there appears to have been a relaxation 
of discipline, largely benefiting the aristocratic officers rather than the 
soldiers.325 During this period, the princes did little to cultivate the image of 
themselves as dedicated soldiers: ‘regii quidem iuvenes interdum otium 
conviviis comisationibusque inter se terebant.’ ‘the young princes for their part 
passed their idle hours together at dinners and drinking bouts.’326 This begins 
a pattern that is present throughout Livy’s work where commanders who hold 
themselves aloof and separate from the men suffer disorder, while successful 
generals show themselves to be taking part in the dangers and discomfort of 
campaign alongside their soldiers. The Tarquins made three mistakes that 
were to be repeated by republican commanders later in Livy’s history. Firstly, 
they failed to understand the army’s rôle as the organised representatives of 
the plebeians. Secondly, they antagonised the army by treating the soldiers in 
a way that the men saw as disrespectful. Finally, they made no effort to portray 
themselves as commilites with the men or even to be seen sharing the rigours 
of campaign. While in 509 this situation the army did not act on its own 
initiative, the enthusiasm with which it joined Brutus’ coup is evident: 
‘liberatorem urbis laeta castra accepere...’327 The fall of the Tarquins was 
grounded in both Brutus’ understanding of the place of the army within the 
Roman state and in Tarquin’s failure to understand that the support of the 
army was in essence the support of the Roman people. This was the first of 
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many regular events in the history of Rome where the success of an élite 
individual depended on his ability to understand and gain the support of the 
plebeian soldiery. 
As a true citizen militia serving only when needed and, according to Livy, 
without recompense for the first hundred years of the republic, the concerns 
of republican army for the most part mirrored the concerns of their fellow 
citizens. In Livy’s account, the centrality of the army as a force in republican 
politics is evident from the beginning of the republic. The lead up to the first 
secessio plebis grew out of the senate’s inability or disinterest in resolving the 
crisis arising out of high levels of debt amongst the plebeians.328 Livy focusses 
exclusively on the issue of debt, eliding the larger political or agrarian issues 
described by other historical sources, though all accounts also mention debt.329 
Focussing on the issue of nexum has the effect of making the crux of the issue 
the systematic loss of status suffered by the plebs forced into servitude by the 
patres. The level of debt-bondage arising from the crisis was intolerable to the 
plebs, and Livy gives as his only individual example the travails of a decorated 
old centurion.330 With this framing the senate’s unwillingness to address the 
issue of debt becomes an unwillingness to protect the status of soldiers. This 
is particularly clear in the way the plebs framed their complaints:  
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fremebant se foris pro libertate et imperio dimicantes domi a civibus 
captos et oppressos esse, tutioremque in bello quam in pace et inter 
hostis quam inter civis libertatem plebis esse.331 
They complained loudly that while they were abroad fighting for liberty 
and dominion they had been enslaved and oppressed at home by fellow-
citizens, and that the freedom of the plebeians was more secure in war 
than in peace, amongst enemies than amongst citizens. 
 
This short passage is important for three reasons. Firstly, and most importantly 
it demonstrates that the Plebs have learned that their political strength lies in 
their status as Rome’s soldiers, and that they are better protected from the 
senate as part of the army than as individual citizens. This is emphasised by the 
language used, as the plebs is conflated with the army. Secondly, it makes it 
clear that the sort of people being enslaved in Livy’s narrative are the same 
sort that are serving in the army. Finally, it once again demonstrates that the 
Plebs chief protest against such treatment concerns their status as soldiers.  
The importance of this status made even more explicit when Livy 
describes an individual victim of the situation. A ragged old man came into the 
forum and despite his pitiful condition he was recognised by his fellow citizens 
as a veteran: 
ordines duxisse aiebant aliaque militia decora volgo miserantes eum 
iactabant; ipse testes honestarum aliquot locis pugnarum cicatrices 
adverso pectore ostentabat.332 
the word went round that he had commanded companies; yet other 
military honours were openly ascribed to him by the compassionate 
bystanders, and the man himself displayed the scars on his breast which 
bore testimony to his honourable service in various battles. 
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To the plebeians gathered around him, all of this man’s worth was measured 
by his military service. The centurion also prioritised his status as a soldier. 
After showing his scars, he goes on to describe his service against the Sabines. 
It is only later that he mentions his civilian status as a former small farmer, and 
even then only as necessary details in the tale of his decline.333 Once again, the 
issue was not framed as injustice done simply to Roman citizens, but 
specifically as injustice done to Roman citizens who had established their 
status as soldiers. Such degrading of the status of soldiers was, as we have 
seen, a primary cause of Tarquin’s alienation of the army.  
Roman soldiers feeling that their status has been challenged was a 
regular point of contention between the army and command, even a passing 
comment that compared soldiers to slaves led to the lynching of a Roman 
general.334 At this point in the narrative the old centurion’s tale of misfortune 
proves the breaking point and the building discontent boils over into disorder 
on the streets and threats to senators. When the angry crowd is confronted by 
the senators, once again the injustice of their situation is contrasted with their 
status as soldiers. Crowding around the consuls, they show them their fetters 
and the signs of their deprivation: ‘haec se meritos dicere exprobrantes suam 
quisque alius alibi militiam.’335 ‘These, they cried, were the rewards they had 
earned, and their bitterly rehearsed the campaigns they had each served in 
various places.’ That Livy conceives of the victims of nexum to be plebeian 
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soldiers is made clear when the senate temporarily agrees to address the issue 
in order to allow recruitment for a war against the Volsci. When the senate 
declares a moratorium on the enslavement of those in debt, countless debtors 
rush to the forum to enlist in the army.336 The temporary moratorium 
protected the plebeians’ status as soldiers, and they were willing again to serve 
in the army. 
Although the actions of the consul provided temporary relief, the 
tension between the plebs and the patres continued and when it came to a 
head again, once more resistance came from the army. While the tension was 
caused by the wider issue of debt, the inciting incident was the intention of the 
consuls to keep the army in the field longer than the men thought 
acceptable.337 This decision was itself spurred by the central part that the army 
was playing in the politics of the city, the consuls believed that removing the 
army from the city would halt the disorder, suggesting that they thought that 
the majority of the troublemakers – or at least their ringleaders – were men 
liable for military service. With the exception of Sicinius, who proposes the 
secession, no other individuals are named and Livy frames this as a collective 
debate. That this action was taken primarily by the army can be inferred from 
Livy’s account. The army begins to plot sedition after it is ordered out of Rome 
to commence actions against the Aequi.338 While Livy’s wording is not clear as 
to whether the army rebelled before or after it had moved out of the city, the 
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narrative suggests that the men have already marched, as their first concern is 
a military one – how to extricate themselves from the sacramentum without 
impiety.339 Their first plan, to kill the consuls, is dismissed as heinous, although 
this is not be the last time that Livian soldiers consider lynching their 
commanders. 340 Instead the plebeian army decided to remove itself from the 
command of its generals.341 
Having decided on secession, the men still conducted themselves as an 
army, and their first step was to fortify the sacred mount as if it were an army 
camp: ‘ibi sine ullo duce uallo fossaque communitis castris...’ ‘there, without 
any commander, they fortified their camp with ditch and palisade.’342 That the 
decision was made separately by the army is also supported by Livy’s comment 
about the mood in the city following the occupation of the Sacred Mount: 
those plebs left behind worried about their ability to defend themselves from 
the aristocrats: ‘pauor ingens in urbe, metuque mutuo suspensa erant omnia. 
timere relicta ab suis plebis uiolentiam patrum.’ ‘A great panic seized the City, 
mutual distrust led to a state of universal suspense. Those plebeians who had 
been left by their comrades in the City feared violence from the patricians.’343 
As the army functioned as the engine of organised plebeian resistance, with it 
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out of the city the remaining plebeians were at the mercy of the aristocrats. 
Even the choice of the Sacred Mount as a camp may suggest that the secession 
originated among the army after it had left the city, a location that Livy himself 
says caused some confusion in the sources.344 Though further away from Rome 
than the Aventine, the Sacred Mount is located between the archaic city and 
the territory of the Aequi and would have been a logical choice for an army 
already in the field. Livy’s account shows that the while the cause for the 
secession was not simply a military issue, the decision to secede was made 
collectively by the army with no obvious or significant conferral with those 
members of the plebs who remained in the city. Even at this early stage the 
army is presented as capable of debating and taking political action as a group 
on the behalf of the larger plebeian order, and their engagement with the 
political process is evident.  
The army also plays a prominent part in the events of the second 
secession and the fall of the decemvirate. As they began to feel their control 
slipping, the decemvirs started to worry about the sentiment of the army. The 
dissatisfaction among the soldiery was already evident, though they had not 
yet refused service outright, Livy reports that the men were taking the 
extraordinary action of wilfully courting defeat in order to express their 
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unhappiness.345 When an individual soldier agitated inside the camp, the 
decemvirs took quick action: 
L. Siccium in Sabinis, per inuidiam decemuiralem tribunorum 
creandorum secessionisque mentiones ad uolgus militum sermonibus 
occultis serentem, prospeculatum ad locum castris capiendum mittunt. 
datur negotium militibus quos miserant expeditionis eius comites, ut 
eum opportuno adorti loco interficerent.346 
L. Siccius was serving in the campaign against the Sabines. Seeing the 
bitter feeling against the decemvirs, he held secret conversations with 
the soldiery and threw out hints about the creation of tribunes and 
resorting to a secession. He was sent to select and survey a site for a 
camp, and the soldiers who had been sent to accompany him were 
instructed to choose a favourable opportunity for attacking and killing 
him. 
 
This passage allows a glimpse of the politicking and plotting present in the 
army. While Livy rarely explicitly describes such behaviour, he must have 
conceived of it happening regularly, as the results of such political agitation 
within camp – denial of service, planned defeats, and outright mutiny – are 
frequent in his narrative. However, the passage also demonstrates that the 
political situation had not yet progressed to the stage where resistance to 
command was universal, as the decemvir Fabius is able to find a number of 
troops willing to kill their comrade. Livy does not make Dentatus into the 
prominent character than other sources, who depict him as a great fighter of 
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duel, however, making him into a prominent figure would undermine the 
communal nature of the dissatisfaction that leads to the secession.347 
In the fallout of the pursuit and death of Verginia once again the army 
played a central rôle.348 Verginius himself was a serving soldier, who travelled 
from camp to Rome to plead for his daughter’s freedom.349 After his daughter’s 
death he returned to his army, on campaign against the Aequians, both to 
protect himself from Appius and to raise the army against the government.350 
The other men involved in the affair, Icilius and Numitorius, fled the city to join 
the army fighting against the Sabines, again with the express intention of 
stirring them up against the decemvirs.351 Both of these attempts were 
successful and once again Livy portrays the army as the driving force in a 
secessio plebis. The southern army, moved to revolt by Verginius, marched 
back to Rome and occupied the Aventine.352 It is at the urging of the returning 
soldiers that civilians begin to join with the troops:  
eunt agmine ad urbem et Auentinum insidunt, ut quisque occurrerat 
plebem ad repetendam libertatem creandosque tribunos plebis 
adhortantes.353  
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They marched in military order to the City and occupied the Aventine. 
Every one whom they met was urged to recover the liberties of the plebs 
and appoint tribunes. 
 
Here again the army is presented as the organising force behind plebeian 
political action. Once there the men elect from amongst themselves ten 
military tribunes to represent them with the senate.354 When news of this 
reaches the army in Sabine territory, they themselves elect ten tribunes and 
move to join with those already on the Aventine.355  
Most interesting about Livy’s account of the occupation of the Aventine is the 
communal nature of the soldier’s decisions. At all times the men are shown 
making decisions collectively, rather than being led by any individual. Verginius 
and Icilius are able to influence and prompt these decisions, but neither 
operate as leader of the men. Icilius, indeed, is shown as scrambling to divert 
the will of the northern army in a direction that will benefit his political career 
before he loses the chance to exert any influence over their actions.356 He 
recognised that the politically active and engaged citizens in the northern army 
could serve as his base of support in his political career, just as the southern 
army would for Verginius. As with the ousting of the Tarquins, the winners and 
losers of the political disorder will be those who recognise that the army is 
politically engaged and cognisant of its interests and use that fact to influence 
the political situation. Both Verginius and Icilius recognised that their positions 
as tribunes depend on winning the support of the army. 
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In Livy’s account of the early republic, Roman citizens on military 
service consistently demonstrated a communal will and willingness to break 
with their commanders over political matters when they felt their rights at 
home or on campaign were being infringed. This sense of the army as politically 
active and engaged was also shown in the struggles between the senate and 
the tribunes over legislation when the army is abroad. 
The presence of the army during political struggles was a recurring 
issue in the politics of Livy’s early republic. Often during pieces of contentious 
legislation, there was an attempt by the senate to ensure that the army is out 
on campaign while the tribunes struggled to get the army recalled. Indeed, 
such senatorial tactics predate the tribunate, as it was an attempt to keep the 
army away from the city that sparked the first secession.357 In 459 the tribunes 
accused the consuls of keeping the army in the field to derail legislation: 
‘clamant fraude fieri quod foris teneatur exercitus; frustrationem eam legis 
tollendae esse; se nihilo minus rem susceptam peracturos.’358 ‘They exclaimed 
that the army was being detained abroad from dishonest motives; it was 
intended to frustrate the passing of the Law.’ With the return of the army, the 
tribunes were able to frustrate the consuls by getting themselves re-elected, 
though a vote on the law in question was postponed. Similar debates over the 
presence of the army were common in this period, also happening, for 
example, in 460 and 457.359  
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Tribunican successes in this period were dependent on them having 
attained both the presence of the army and its support. In 460, during 
Herdonius’ occupation of the Capitol, the senate was alarmed to find that the 
tribunes had called a political gathering, leading to the soldiers laying down 
their arms and deserting their positions.360 Despite the best efforts of the 
senate, they failed to properly rearm the populace, and it was only the 
intervention of the Tusculan dictator Mamilius that prompted the Roman 
people to return to military discipline, and even then despite the protests of 
the tribunes.361 In 457 tribunican efforts to pass laws favouring the plebs were 
unsuccessful, Livy states explicitly that the triumph of the senate was due to 
the fact that Rome had two armies in the field.362  
The success of the tribunes in 460 and the senate in 457 show how the 
deployment of the army could be used to frustrate plebeian efforts. In 460, 
responding to a uniquely dangerous situation, the army was stationed within 
the city, while in 457 both armies were abroad. This suggests that it was not 
respect for the imperium of their senatorial generals or their awe for the 
sacramentum that subdued the political sensibilities of the army.363 The 
deployment of the army outside of the city strengthened the power of the 
senate in a more prosaic way; it separated the soldiers from the tribunes, 
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isolating the plebeian magistrates from the most organised and engaged part 
of their constituency.  
Within Livy’s narratives the plebeian tribunes also appear to 
understand that their power – and by extension the political power of the plebs 
– is severely weakened when the army is on campaign. The primary weapon of 
the tribunate against the senate in this period was the veto of a dilectus, and 
they deployed it with regularity. In the middle decades of the 5th century. Livy 
records six occasions when the tribunes blocked, or threatened to block, the 
dilectus: 460, 459, 458, 457, 445, and 441.364 Blocking the dilectus had a double 
effect. Most importantly, it allowed the tribunes to keep the base of their 
support – the army – within the city where it could take part in politics. Also, 
since it was only effective when there was a threat of war, it also put pressure 
on the senate, who would have to resolve the situation before the enemy could 
be dealt with. 
The political understanding and engagement of the Roman army in 
Livy’s account of the early republic is particularly clear in his preferred version 
of the mutiny and lynching of the consular tribune Postumius Regilensis, 
discussed in more detail below. Livy frames the episode firmly within the 
context of the political struggle between plebs and patres.365 Livy describes an 
army that was composed of citizens who brought their political concerns and 
their understanding of their rights with them from the city. With an option to 
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refuse service, citizens liable for military service exercised considerable 
leverage over the senate and magistrates. Before the formation of the 
tribunate this refusal was the only leverage the plebs held. This situation made 
the army the organising and directing force behind resistance to the senate. 
When the tribunes were in place that refusal remained the most potent 
weapon in their political arsenal. As a result, the cooperation of the army 
became vital to the tribunes’ efforts to resist the aristocracy. While the 
tribunes now had the power to direct plebeian resistance, that resistance 
remained organised through the army. 
The position of the army as the driving political force of the Roman 
plebs can be accentuated by comparing the two Roman secessions to the civil 
war that broke out in Ardea in 443. Much like the second secession, the inciting 
incident revolves around the fate of a young woman, and, having spiralled out 
of control leads to a separation between the Ardeate aristocrats and 
commons.366 Beyond the superficial differences, however, the two accounts 
are significantly different. Unlike the situation in Rome, where the personal 
conflict between Verginius and Appius Claudius was merely the spark that 
prompted a conflict rooted in wider political concerns over Roman 
government, there is no reported further political issue at stake in Ardea. 
Further, while both Roman secessions began with the army and were 
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conducted with discipline and restraint, in Ardea the violence arises in the 
streets amongst the people as a whole.367  
Driven from the city, the Ardeate plebs begin raiding and looting the 
estates of the nobility, actions that Livy explicitly contrasts with the restraint 
of the Roman plebs: ‘nihil Romanae plebi similis.’368 The historian also 
consistently portrays this as a civilian conflict. At no point does he refer to the 
armed Ardeates as milites, reserving that term for the detachments of Volsci 
and Romans that are drawn into Ardean territory by the conflict. He further 
emphasises this by telling his readers that the plebs were largely composed of 
opifices – workers – who were motivated by the prospect of plunder.369 These 
chaotic and violent scenes stand in marked contrast to the behaviour of the 
Roman army and people during the secession. In his account of the first 
secessio plebis, Livy describes the people withdrawing to the Sacred Mount: 
‘modestiam patrum suorum nihil uiolando imitati.’ ‘having imitated the good 
behaviour of their fathers and made no depredations.’370 
At the dawn of the republic, the Roman plebs were taught of their 
agency and power, perhaps inadvertently, by Brutus. His behaviour during the 
coup, both his appeals to the Roman plebeian sense of status as soldiers and 
his mad scramble to ensure control of the army before confronting Tarquin, 
demonstrated the central, even indispensable, rôle that the army played in the 
foundation of the republic. The soldiers’ understanding of their own power, as 
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well as their perspective on their status as soldiers and their rights as citizens 
caused the army to be the organised and active political manifestation of the 
plebeian order in secessions and the establishment of the tribunate.  
The origins of the secessions in the army is evident in Livy’s narrative 
and in the military flavour of the camps on the Sacred Mount and the Aventine. 
As a result of the military aspect of plebeian identity meant that in the 
secessions plebs comported themselves with discipline and restraint, in 
contrast to the open violence of the civilian uprising in Ardea. By basing their 
grievances in matters of law, they allow their demands to be met through 
negotiation, avoiding the need for open conflict or outside arbitration. The 
contrast drawn by Livy is stark. Even when they have physically removed 
themselves from the authority of their government and generals the Roman 
plebs remain soldiers. While even when armed and occupying a fortified camp 
the Ardeate plebs remain civilians.  
 
The Purpose of Service 
In Livy’s framing of the republic, the plebs were usually content to serve 
in the army when they believed the war was being fought for a purpose that 
benefits them. In the century before Veii the two primary justifications for war 
that the army would accept were to defend the republic or to benefit the 
Roman people as a whole. They were resistant to wars fought without proper 
justification or fought to extend the hegemony of the Senate over Latium. 
Importantly, there was no sense from soldiers that they saw war as a method 




to gain personal glory, indeed, by restricting descriptions of glorious deeds to 
aristocratic officers, Livy himself removes that motivation from the men. The 
interests of the plebeians serving in the Roman legions were always more 
practical than a simple desire for glory. Whereas Sallust’s early Romans were 
unified by their cupido gloriae, to Livy that remains a purely aristocratic 
preoccupation. 
There are substantial differences in the way that Livy depicts 
aristocratic and plebeian soldiers. When aristocratic soldiers are praised, either 
by Livy or by those in his narrative, much is made of their personal qualities 
and exploits. At the trial of Caeso Quinctius the great men of the state lined up 
to defend the young aristocrat by referring to his breeding and his military 
record. The consul Quinctius Capitolinus spoke of the man ‘cum multa referret 
sua familiaeque decora’ ‘with many references to his the glories of himself and 
his family’ and affirmed that he was the finest member not only of his family 
but of the state.371 The consulars Spurius Furius and Lucius Lucretius also listed 
the young man’s achievements.372 Lucretius finished by suggesting that Caeso 
was destined to be the finest servant of the republic as he was ‘instructum 
naturae fortunaeque omnibus bonis’ ‘endowed with every advantage of nature 
and of fortune.’373  
This sort of rhetoric, which links martial skill and aristocratic breeding, 
is particularly common in Livy’s account of the 5th century. When Cinncinatus 
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spoke of his son’s banishment, he accused the tribunes of trying to strip Rome 
of her defences: ‘cum Caesone filio suo virtutem, constantiam, omnia 
iuventutis belli domique decora pulsa ex urbe Romana et fugata esse’ ‘With his 
son Caeso, manhood, steadfastness, and all the qualities which honour youth 
in war and in civil life had been driven from Rome and put to rout.’374 Nor was 
the military virtue of the patrician merely due to the advantages of wealth. The 
patrician Tarquitius, who would later be named magister equitum, was born 
so poor that his time in the legions was spent in the infantry. Even so, despite 
his reduced circumstances, ‘bello tamen primus longe Romanae iuventutis 
habitus esset.’ ‘he was however regarded by far the as best of the Roman 
youth.’375 Similar sentiments connect the skill of the consul Agrippa Furius to 
his patrician birth.376 This casting of martial skill as particularly patrician is 
perhaps most explicit in Livy’s remarks about Cornelius Cossus. The young 
tribune is described as not only of excellent breeding and ability, but also 
remarkably handsome.377 Livy’s account also hints at what motivates these 
aristocratic warriors. Cossus was, the historian tells us, mindful of his family 
name ‘quod amplissimum acceptum maius auctiusque reliquit posteris.’ ‘which 
was very famous when it came to him, he left to his descendants one still 
greater and more glorious.’378 
This hits on the main aspect of the link between martial skill and 
aristocratic bearing. Aristocrats can win fame through martial exploits. 
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Cornelius Cossus’ achievements are presented firstly as a service he does to his 
family and his name. Further, his killing of the enemy king wins him great 
personal glory, so much so that in the dictator’s triumph the marching soldiers 
sing about Cossus, not their general. The actions won the young tribune so 
much honour that he ‘auerteratque in se a curru dictatoris ciuium ora et 
celebritatis eius diei fructum prope solus tulerat’ ‘had drawn the gaze of the 
citizens away from the car of the dictator upon himself, and the honours of 
that crowded festival were virtually his alone.’379 Roman nobles could use war 
to expand their fame and contribute to the fame of their families. Warfare then 
served a purpose beyond the defence of the republic or the acquisition of 
territory. It was a purpose in itself. Alongside concerns of national security of 
economics, war allowed the aristocratic class of the early republic to expand 
its power by gaining personal glory through military exploits. 
This was not the case for the citizens that made up the bulk of Rome’s 
armies. Whereas Rome’s militarized aristocracy actively sought war, for the 
people it was something they merely accepted as a fact of life.380 While the 
great patrician heroes are measured by their lineage, personal qualities, and 
individual exploits – often given detailed descriptions by Livy – Roman infantry, 
both the milites gregarii and the centurions, have their contributions and 
military records framed in a more general light. The centurion Verginius is 
described in terms of his honesty and his rank, no personal details about his 
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military exploits are given: ‘L. Verginius, honestum ordinem in Algido ducebat, 
vir exempli recti domi militiaeque.’381 Similarly the unnamed soldier persecuted 
by the decemvir Spurius Oppius was praised for the length of his military career 
and the decorations he had received from command.382  
In his account of the murder of Siccius Dentatus, Livy elides his famous 
career as a fighter of duels.383 One aspect of the identity of the Roman soldiery 
present in other sources but downplayed in Livy is the emphasis on single 
combat. Certainly, the historian makes much of the duelling of aristocratic 
officers, such as Manlius Torquatus, his unfortunate son, and Valerius 
Corvus.384 Yet it is evident from other sources that single combat, rather than 
being restricted to the aristocracy, was practiced and lauded by all ranks.385 
Livy’s history, however, contains no examples of either milites gregarii or 
centurions taking part in single combat.386  
By downplaying the importance of single combat to the average 
soldier, and prioritising recognition of deeds over the deeds themselves, Livy 
emphasises the communal and community aspect of soldiery. Stripped of his 
heroic life, Siccius’ part in the story is that of a murdered centurion. Livy finds 
no place in his account for details of the individual exploits or personal quality 
of common soldiers. Whereas war provides the nobility with a chance to 
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benefit through conspicuous displays of virtus, regardless of the purpose of the 
campaign, common soldiers cannot. As war was not a source of individual 
deeds; war needed to be justified to the plebs through some other means. If 
an acceptable justification could not be found, the war ran the risk of meeting 
resistance. 
In the Livian narrative of the very early republic there also appears to 
have been resistance to wars fought to extend Roman hegemony over the 
peoples of central Italy. As the tribunes began to deploy their veto to block 
enlistment, they found that the willingness of the people to support them 
depended very much on the cause of the conflict. Even before the 
establishment of the tribunate the Roman people, including those liable for 
military service, were reluctant to agree to war if the primary purpose was 
simply to expand or preserve Rome’s local hegemony. The war in 494 is 
presented by the patres as an emergency that threatens to expose Rome to 
attack by her enemies, but met determined resistance from the people.387 The 
truth, however, was that the primary motivation behind the war was to 
preserve Rome’s influence over the Latins, since if Rome did not march to the 
aid of their allies the senate would be forced to allow the Latins to rearm and 
look to their own defences, an action the senators did not look on favourably: 
‘tutius uisum est defendi inermes Latinos quam pati retractare arma.’ ‘It was 
seen as better to defend unarmed Latins that to permit them to rearm.’388 The 
people, however, saw the war preparations as not simply not to their 
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advantage, but actually against their own interests. The senate made no effort 
to justify the war to the people but instead won their support with political 
concessions. 
As the Volsci, led by the renegade Coriolanus, marched on Rome the 
senate attempted to mobilise while the people demanded that the city sue for 
peace.389 Livy frames this as being related to the fear that the commons had of 
their nemesis Marcius Coriolanus, but he also recounts that the cause for war 
was the Roman occupation of Volscian territory and that if the senate was 
willing return the land to the Volsci they would have considered peace.390 
There was similar resistance to warfare in the early years of the conflict with 
Veii. The senate pressed for war, while the tribunes successfully argued that 
the war was not in the interests of the plebeian class, but rather an attempt by 
the aristocracy to divert attention from domestic trouble.391  
While resistance to war was usually led by the plebeian tribunes, the 
magistrates required the cooperation of the soldiers if their resistance to be 
effective.392 On occasions when the tribunes attempted to stop a war without 
securing the support of the army, those attempts failed. In 460 efforts to refuse 
the levy were frustrated by the soldiers’ respect of the sacramentum.393 While 
it seems clear from Livy’s account that the proposed war with the Volsci and 
Aequi was unpopular, and the senate was keeping men under arms through a 
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trick of the law, the men clearly preferred to serve in the campaign rather than 
risk the dishonour and impiety of violating their military oath. 
Attempts to block the veto during periods of national emergency were 
usually derailed by the soldiers’ willingness to take up arms to defend the 
republic, as happened in 458.394 In these situations the men made the 
understandable decision that any short term political gains are not worth 
risking the wellbeing of the state. If the tribunes attempted to block a popular 
war they could be outmanoeuvred by the government: after the plebeian 
tribunes veto the dilectus in 398 the military tribunes merely form an army out 
of volunteers, sidestepping the need for a levy.395 While the soldiers generally 
acted in solidarity with the tribunes, this relationship of mutual support was by 
no means guaranteed.  
When the tribunes’ aims were not aligned with the wishes of the 
soldiers or when they were perceived as placing political gains over the 
interests of the republic, the army was perfectly willing to break with them and 
side with the senate. In a similar manner, when the centurion Volero Publilius 
refused to be enlisted at a lower rank he was sentenced to a beating by the 
consul. As he struggled with the lictors, the veteran called on the tribunes for 
support. Finding no help from the tribunes he called on his fellow citizens to 
aid him: ‘provoco et fidem plebis imploro. Adeste cives, adeste commilitones; 
nihil est quod exspectetis tribunos, quibus ipsis vestro auxilio opus est.’396 ‘I 
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appeal to the plebs for protection. Attend, citizens! Attend, fellow soldiers! 
You have nothing to expect from the tribunes, they themselves need your aid.’ 
His appeals are successful, and in the ensuing riot the lictors’ fasces are broken 
and the consuls forced to take refuge in the senate house. The ire of the 
Romans coming to Volero’s aid – Romans Volero describes as both citizens and 
soldiers – is directed at the consuls and their representatives. The frustration, 
however, stems from the failure of the tribunes to fulfil their obligations to 
protect citizens from authority. Volero frames this starkly as cowardice as the 
tribunes are afraid of retribution from the senate.397 The plebs clearly agreed 
with him, and in the next election the firebrand centurion himself is returned 
as tribune. 
The Roman plebs were willing to refuse service or agitate in the 
interests of furthering larger constitutional issues, such as the establishment 
of the tribunate or the abolition of the decemvirate. However, they also 
exerted influence on the government in order to ensure that their military 
service was given to the state when it served a purpose that they themselves 
found acceptable. Importantly, too, the plebeian tribunes, though their power 
was based on the support of the soldiers, could not assume that support. When 
the actions of the tribunes threatened the status of the soldiers, such as by 
risking the violation of the sacramentum, or when it threatened the security of 
the state itself, those soldiers were willing to side with the senate against their 
own magistrates. 
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Agitating for Their Rights and Interests on Campaign 
Besides the secessiones and resistance to the dilectus, which was based 
in the city and required the efforts of the tribunes, the soldiers of the Livy’s 
early republic were also willing to take action on their own to communicate 
their interests to their commanders. On multiple occasions Roman armies 
found themselves on campaign under the command of a hated aristocratic 
commander. In each of these situations the army attempted to convey their 
dissatisfaction with their generals by deliberately undermining their martial 
ability. Under the consul Caeso Fabius in 481, the consul Appius Claudius in 
471, and the decemvirs in 449 the men of the Roman army took the 
extraordinary action of sabotaging their own military effectiveness to convey 
their dissatisfaction to their generals and the senate. The presence of multiple 
Appii Claudii in narratives of tension between aristocratic generals and 
plebeian soldiers should not come as a surprise. Vasaly has argued convincingly 
that in Livy’s first pentad the Appii Claudii are used to represent unrestrained, 
tyrannical exercises of power.398 Such figures would of course regularly come 
into conflict with the politically engaged soldiers of Livy’s republic. 
The difficulty between Fabius and his army arose both out of larger 
political issues and out of grievances on campaign. At this point in Livy’s 
narrative the Fabii were positioning themselves as primary opponents to 
reform that would benefit the plebeians. However, the deep personal 
antagonism the soldiers showed towards their commander appears to have 
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been exacerbated by the actions of the consul’s relative the previous year. 
When the consul Quintus Fabius sold the loot taken on campaign and diverted 
it all into the treasury, he became the first Roman magistrate Livy describes as 
making the mistake that was to regularly provoke soldiers into disobedience 
during the republic: denying soldiers what they see as a fair share of the profits 
of a campaign.399 What constitutes a fair share of the proceeds of a war is a 
recurring issue in the relationship between soldiers and their commanders and 
relates to the tension between aristocratic officers and the plebeian troops.400 
Money diverted from the troops to the treasury – controlled by the senate – 
provoked anger because the benefits of the war flow to the patres at the cost 
of the plebeian order. That the army was largely motivated by the slight given 
them by a Fabius is evidenced by the intense personal feelings involved – Livy 
thrice mentions the hatred felt by the army to their commander.401  
Just as the cause of the trouble originated in the army, the resistance 
to command was also expressed militarily. After Fabius’ cavalry routed the 
Aequi in battle, his infantry, acting out the deep loathing for their commander, 
refused to pursue the retreating enemy. Nothing would compel the men to 
follow orders. They then abandoned the battle line and returning to the camp 
in state of resentful dejection.402 This was not simply a symbolic gesture made 
after the battle; Livy is clear that besides being a shameful rejection of 
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discipline, it actually put the army – and indeed the state in jeopardy.403 The 
soldiers felt that their commander, as a member of the Fabii, was not acting in 
their interest and demonstrated their disquiet to the extent of putting 
themselves and, if Livy’s hyperbole is to be believed, the state at risk. The 
extraordinary activities of the soldiers under Caeso Fabius were likely so drastic 
because of the intense antagonism that had developed between the plebeians 
and the Fabii. Already unpopular due to their intense resistance to reform, the 
family’s relationship was soured further over a decision made on campaign. 
The Fabii managed to alienate the plebs both as citizens and as soldiers. 
There was further trouble within army under the consul Appius Claudius, 
father of the decemvir. In 471 in campaign against the Volsci, his army behaved 
much the same way as Fabius’ army had done.404 From the moment the 
campaign began the men were truculent and obstructive and Livy provides a 
vivid portrait of their behaviour:  
segniter, otiose, neglegenter, contumaciter omnia agere; nec pudor nec 
metus coercebat. Si citius agi vellet agmen, tardius sedulo incedere; si 
adhortator operis adesset, omnes sua sponte motam remittere 
industriam; praesenti voltus demittere, tacite praetereuntem exsecrari...  
Sloth, idleness, neglect, and obstinacy were in all they did. Neither shame 
nor fear restrained them. If he wished the column to advance more 
rapidly they deliberately retarded their pace; if he stood by to encourage 
their work, they would all relax the industry they had manifested of their 
own accord. In his presence they sunk their gaze; as he passed by they 
cursed him under their breath...405 
 
                                                          
403 Livy 2.43.7. The historian is heavy with the condemnation here, stating that the army’s 
actions ‘rem publicum...prodebat.’  
404 Livy 2.59.1 Livy draws a direct comparison. 
405 Livy 2.58.7-8 Ogilvie: ‘the troops were prepared to work on their own but resented Appius’ 
encouragement.’ (1965: 384) 




Such conduct is remarkable and worth analysing. This was a more complicated 
and targeted tactic than mutiny, the soldiers went to great lengths to 
demonstrate to their commander that they did not consider him to be in 
command. Vitally, as was common in such displays of disorder, Livy 
demonstrates that the soldiers had not abandoned their status as soldiers. As 
he says, they continued with the labours of campaign when the consul was not 
present. That the army had a personal issue with their commander was 
emphasised by the experience of Claudius’ colleague, Quinctius, who, partly 
due to his disposition and partly due to efforts to avoid the sort of trouble 
afflicting the other army, cultivated an atmosphere of cooperation. Livy 
remarks that Quinctius army was marked by ‘tanta concordia’.406 
Appius Claudius’ problems, like much in the 5th century, come out of 
the larger context of hostility between the Plebs and the senate. In this struggle 
Appius Claudius positioned himself as one of the plebeian order’s fiercest 
enemies.407 However, the open disorder originated from within the army and 
was provoked by concerns over Appius Claudius’ strictness. Livy portrays the 
consul as a martinet who allows his personal antipathy towards the plebeian 
soldiers under his command to grow into outright brutality. Though the 
historian does not provide examples of Claudius’ behaviour in the early stages 
of the campaign, the language he uses makes it clear that the consul was 
commanding with a degree of violence unusual in Roman armies: ‘haec ira 
indignatioque ferocem animum ad vexandum saevo imperio exercitum 
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stimulabat.’ ‘His wrath and indignation at this thought drove his fierce spirit to 
torment the army with a savage exercise of authority.’408 In attempting to 
regain control Claudius attempted ‘omnes auctoritates.’409  
Excessive severity on the part of Roman generals is unusual in Livy’s 
account of republic and usually provokes resistance from the men.410 Just quite 
how bad the treatment was is indicated by Livy’s comment that Appius 
Claudius’ aggression was encouraged by the fact that soldiers in the field were 
not protected by the plebeian tribunes, suggesting that had Claudius behaved 
within the city as he did on campaign, the tribunes would have intervened.411 
The issue at hand appears to have been the exact reach of the consul’s 
imperium.412 The men appear to have felt that their general was exercising it 
too freely and their actions essentially denied him control. Nor do the soldiers 
and centurions appear to be the only ones who felt that way, when the army 
was besieged and still unwilling to follow orders, Claudius’ tribunes and legates 
warned him not to force the issue.413 It was only following a disastrous defeat 
that Claudius was able to cow his army and discipline them with his natural 
severity: 
advocataque contione invectus haud falso in proditorem exercitum 
militaris disciplinae, desertorem signorum, ubi signa, ubi arma essent 
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singulos rogitans, inermes milites, signo amisso signiferos, ad hoc 
centuriones duplicariosque qui reliquerant ordines virgis caesos securi 
percussit; cetera multitudo sorte decimus quisque ad supplicium lecti.414 
Then he summoned an assembly and soundly berated them, not without 
reason, as an army which had been false to military discipline and had 
deserted its standards. Asking them all in turn where their arms and 
where their standards were, he caused the unarmed soldiers and the 
standard-bearers who had lost their standards, and in addition to these 
the centurions and the recipients of a double ration who had quitted 
their ranks, to be scourged with rods and beheaded; of the remaining 
number every tenth man was selected by lot for punishment. 
 
That a general who could barely get his men to march at an appropriate pace 
was now able to inflict such brutal punishment without any resistance seems 
at first remarkable. However the way Appius Claudius went about punishing 
his army is illustrative. First to be punished were those who acted in breach of 
the way they were expected. Standard bearers were not supposed to lose their 
standards; centurions and men awarded for bravery were not supposed to be 
the first to flee. These men had not behaved as soldiers and as such did not 
have the status of soldiers. Further, with the campaign ended in defeat, the 
army had lost its primary weapon against its commander, the ability to refuse 
service. With their status as soldiers undermined by their actions they were 
unable to influence their commander and still beyond the protection of the 
tribunes. Claudius’ army was at his mercy. Even so, the consul’s brutal 
reassertion of his authority should not obscure the fact that the army’s 
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resistance was effective and the principle demand of the army – that they 
withdraw from Volscian territory – had been met. 
There was a similar display of intransigence from the armies under the 
decemvirs. Once again they not only refused to fight but actively courted 
defeat. Two Roman armies, one campaigning against the Aequi and the other 
against the Sabines were defeated in battle due to the actions of the soldiers 
themselves. Livy makes it clear that these defeats were both politically 
motivated and intentional:  
illa modo in ducibus culpa quod ut odio essent ciuibus fecerant: alia 
omnis penes milites noxia erat, qui ne quid ductu atque auspicio 
decemuirorum prospere usquam gereretur uinci se per suum atque 
illorum dedecus patiebantur.415  
The only fault of the generals was that they had made the citizens detest 
them; the rest of the blame belonged to the soldiers, who, that nothing 
might anywhere prosper under the command and auspices of the 
decemvirs, permitted themselves to be beaten, to their own disgrace and 
that of their commanders.  
 
Both armies continued this behaviour off the battlefield. One army retreated 
to its camp and refused to offer battle to the victorious Sabines; the other army 
went further, abandoning its camp to the enemy and retreating to the allied 
city of Tusculum.416 These were extraordinary actions, taken at great risk not 
only to the men themselves but to Rome. With both Roman armies refusing to 
fight, the senate was forced to arm the general populace in case either the 
Sabines or the Aequi moved on the city. As remarkable as the risk taken by the 
armies in 449 was the fact that, unlike in 471, it went unpunished. The reason 
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for this is unclear, though it is worth noting that these mutinies occurred during 
the general period of unrest that preceded the collapse of the decemvirs. 
Appius Claudius and his colleague had learned the same lesson the army tried 
to teach his father, that their imperium only existed when the soldiers that 
make up the army recognised it. Nor were the two armies alone, instead they 
were part of the general resistance to the decemvirs that was to soon come to 
a head and lead to their ousting that same year. It is these two armies that lead 
the second secession. 
One issue that that will become a larger part of Livy’s later narrative 
that is comparatively rare in his account of the 5th century is disputes over 
loot. Perhaps part of the issue here is that there simply is not much plunder 
available in the wars of the 5th century. Praeda is referred to regularly, but not 
usually in much detail. Rather it is mentioned in passing during Livy’s formulaic 
accounts of war declared, armies sent over the frontier, cities taken, plunder 
distributed, peace arranged, and the armies withdrawn. When it is described 
in any detail it is usually because something of interest has prompted the 
discussion, such as the unusual amount taken from the Aequi, or the 
mishandling of the booty by command.417 Other hints in Livy’s narrative 
suggest that the amount of plunder taken from the frequent wars in the 
republic’s first century was not particularly large. Livy makes references to old 
and decorated soldiers but there is never any sense that they have profited 
from their military service.  
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In his account of the plunder taken at the siege of Veii Livy emphasises 
its great amount by informing the reader that the loot taken was greater than 
all the loot won in the republic’s previous wars.418 Even if the statement is 
exaggerated, taken with earlier statements about particularly profitable wars, 
such as the war with the Aequi in 471, it suggests that the majority of wars 
fought by Rome in before Veii were not particularly profitable.419 Given Rome’s 
modest territory and relatively small army of the 5th century, this likely reflects 
the historical reality of the first hundred years of the republic.420 Indeed, the 
vast majority of the campaigns fought against the Volsci and Aequi are 
described more akin to raiding parties than decisive military engagements.421 
This interpretation is supported by the introduction of the stipendium during 
the siege of Veii. The general sense in Livy’s account is that warfare is not 
merely not profitable for the common soldier but when fought over extended 
period also represents a financial burden for those under the standards. 
Yet even here there are disputes between the men and their 
commanders over loot. As mentioned above, the trouble between Quintus 
Fabius and his men grew partly from his cousin’s handling of praeda. Praeda is 
present in many of the accounts of the wars fought in books two through four. 
Livy makes many references to the plunder taken from enemy cities and 
camps.422 He even on occasion explicitly describes a large amount of loot given 
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to the army, as happens in a war against the Aequi.423 Rare though they are, 
the issues over loot in the first pentad clarify something that will become a 
running issue when Roman war becomes more profitable. Trouble over praeda 
arises not necessarily from the greed of the soldiers and their desire for loot, 
but rather from concern about their status and a sense that they, as the 
manifestation of the plebeian contribution to war, are benefitting from their 
own campaigns.  
Livy also plays down the mercenary motivations of 5th-century soldiers 
when he recounts the lynching of the consular tribune Postumius. In Livy’s 
account Postumius’ mishandling of the booty leads to his prosecution. During 
the trial he made certain threatening and disparaging remarks that incensed 
his men. When he returned to camp he was stoned to death by his furious 
soldiers.424 Livy judges this version more believable than an alternative account 
of the mutiny; that it sprang out of the army’s anger at the lack of loot available 
once the city was taken.425 The alternate story would make the army’s murder 
of their commander a purely mercenary step, one out of character with Livy’s 
perception of the Roman army.426 Instead, his account focusses on men 
infuriated not by their commander absconding with their share of the loot, but 
by his disparagement of their status and threats he has made in public. This fits 
it into the pattern first established in the first book, where Tarquin alienates 
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his men by forcing them to do manual labour. In Livy Roman soldiers are not 
often given to tolerating threats to their status as soldiers. This event is also 
worth mentioning because it provides the only example in Livy’s history of 
centurions actively resisting the men during a mutiny.427 
This interplay between status as soldiers and share of the spoils is at 
the heart of one of the few moments in Livy’s history when soldiers do not 
protest when stripped of their loot. When the dictator Cinncinatus was 
unhappy with the performance of the part of the army commanded by Lucius 
Minutius against the Aequi, he refused to allow any share of the plunder to go 
to the consul’s men, reserving it all for his own army.428 However, Livy remarks 
that not only did the army not complain when they were denied plunder, they 
voted to give a gold crown to the dictator and ‘proficiscentem eum patronum 
salutaverit.' ‘saluted him as a patron when they marched out.’429 During that 
campaign the army of Minutius had found itself trapped in camp by the enemy 
and Rome was forced to dispatch a relief army. The consul’s men, cowering in 
the camp, had not behaved as soldiers and were not deserving of a share of 
the praeda, something they appear to have recognised. This is the same 
dynamic that led to the decimation of 471, though both the perceived failures 
of the soldiers and the subsequent punishment were hardly as sever. Just as 
the soldiers of Appius Claudius had not behaved as soldiers, neither had those 
of Minutius. By abandoning their standards and fleeing, Appius Claudius’ men 
                                                          
427 Livy 4.50.5 
428 Livy 3.29.2 
429 Livy 3.29.3 




had temporarily lost their status as soldiers and the protection it warranted. In 
a similar way, those men who spent the war against the Aequi in camp suffered 
a loss of status and therefore any claim to loot taken in battle. 
The sense that soldiers on campaign earned a share of the profits is also 
present in the mutiny faced by Caeso Fabius. There the trouble came to a head 
when Fabius diverted the proceeds of a campaign entirely into the treasury. 
This did not just strip his soldiers of the share of the profit that they felt they 
had earned, but defrauded the entire plebeian class by diverting it to the 
treasury and placing it entirely at the disposal of the senate. While the modest 
proceeds of Rome’s 5th-century wars mean that there was little opportunity 
for a dispute over loot, there was occasional trouble. Importantly, however, 
the trouble did not arise merely out of mercenary motivations. Instead, much 
like the other issues that prompt protest in Livy’s narrative the trouble arose 
out of concerns that the soldier’s status were not being recognised. 
Livy’s first pentad is largely focussed on the struggle of the orders and 
the changing political situation of the 5th century. As a result, the primary 
political activity of the plebs occurs in the city, as they resist the dominion of 
the patres and through the secessions and resistance to the dilectus are able 
to wring concessions from the senate. However, as the organised and 
politically active manifestation of the plebs, when the army is on campaign it 
retains the same political engagement and actively agitates for its interests. In 
effect the plebeian class brings its political struggle with it on campaign: the 
army’s concerns on campaign, mirror those in the city. The soldiers are 




resistant to domineering generals, much as the plebs clash with the more 
authoritarian members of the senate. The plebs are determined that they 
receive some benefit from the state, whether domestically or militarily. 
Plebeian soldiers even expect to have some influence in the decision-making 
process, agitating for a change of tactics when they feel their generals are 
pursuing the war incorrectly. 
The internal politicking that characterises much of books two through 
five of Livy’s history fades into the background as the narrative focus shifts to 
Rome’s early wars of Italian conquest. This has the effect of making the urban 
plebs appear increasingly as passive supporters of the senate’s actions. When 
there is trouble between the senate and the people, the circumstances are 
usually extraordinary, such as the demands to ransom the prisoners of Cannae 
or the Bacchanalian affair. If Roman milites gregarii and centurions are taken 
as representative of the plebs as a whole, however, the situation appears very 
different. The tension between plebs and patres that characterised the early 
republic remains throughout the surviving books of Livy’s account, in the guise 
of plebeian troops and aristocratic officers. The plebs remained politically 
engaged, careful of their status and jealous of their rights and privileges. 
Concordia on campaign was always at risk of breaking down through the 
actions of autocratic commanders or recalcitrant soldiers. The following 
sections will examine the period following the siege of Veii, the war with 
Hannibal, and the period of Roman expansion to demonstrate both that 
plebeian military identity remained constant, and that aspects of this identity 




meant that cooperation between the men and their officers, between the 









From the Siege of Veii to 292 
 
The Prospect of Loot and Soldiers’ Concern about Their Status. 
The siege of Veii marks a turning point in Livy’s narrative of the early 
republic. We have already noticed that the account of the ten year siege 
contains two changes to the experience of the Roman soldier. First, the 
extended duration of the war lead to the introduction of the stipendium in 
406.430 Second, the great amount of plunder and territory won with the fall of 
the city made the war with Veii the first truly profitable war Rome had 
fought.431 The siege of Veii and the sack of Rome later in the same book also 
mark a shift in Livy’s narrative. Internal disorder and politicking gradually 
disappears from the work, as it increasingly focusses on Rome’s wars against 
other Italian states. These changes, however, have little influence on the 
behaviour of Roman soldiers. Plebeian military identity remains remarkably 
consistent throughout the period. 
Both Livy and Diodorus Siculus identify the siege of Veii as the point at 
which the Roman government began to compensate their soldiers for the costs 
of military service.432 The protracted nature of the siege perhaps lead to an 
effort to defray the expenses of those serving and, importantly, the purpose of 
the payment was to cover the cost of service, not to recast the relation 
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between the republic and the soldier as that of paymaster and mercenary.433 
Both Livy and Diodorus Siculus are careful to make this explicit. Livy states that 
‘stipendium miles de publico acciperet, cum ante id tempus de suo quisque 
functus eo munere esset.’434 ‘the soldiers should be paid from the public 
treasury, whereas till then every man had served at his own costs.’ The 
historicity of the institution of the stipendium need not concern us here, but in 
Livy’s narrative the stipendium marks a shift towards wars fought beyond 
Latium, particularly against the Gauls and the Samnites.435 However, political 
concerns and tension between the plebs and the patres continues into Livy’s 
second pentad. 
In Livy’s account, however, pay appears to have been seen as the norm 
after c. 406, and political wrangling over the raising of taxes needed to pay the 
troops became another point of contention between the tribunes and the 
senate. Indeed, Livy’s narrative has the tribunes alone sceptical of the proposal 
and the senate’s offer to pay the men is otherwise universally popular. Even 
the tribunes’ concerns about the measure are based on the source of the 
money raised to pay the men, not the concept of military pay itself.436 
However, the introduction of the stipendium changed little in the way plebeian 
soldiers approached war. As we have seen, Roman soldiers in Livy’s account 
were resistant to wars that offered little benefit to them, and actively opposed 
any military action that they saw as disadvantageous. In this context, it was 
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inevitable that in extended campaigns some actions needed to be taken to 
limit the burden of military service on the soldiers. In the previous century, it 
was the financial instability caused by campaigning that lead finally to many 
Romans falling into debt-bondage.  
According to Livy the capture of Veii introduced a new problem to the 
economic balance of the Roman state. As victory approached the Roman 
commander, Camillus, recognised that the loot from the sacked city would be 
unprecedented: ‘urbem opulentissimam capi, tantumque praedae fore 
quantum non omnibus in unum conlatis ante bellis fuisset...’437 ‘a city of great 
wealth was on the point of being taken, with booty more than if all previous 
wars had been put together.’ For the first time Rome was on the verge of 
conquering a truly wealthy people. The war had so tested Rome’s resources 
that it had required the levying of a tax and the compensation for the costs 
borne by its soldiers, but it was about to become a profitable venture. Camillus 
was faced with a difficult question: who would profit from the war? He referred 
the question to the senate. The senate debated two options, that any citizen 
who wished could go to Veii and take part in the sack or that the booty be used 
to pay the stipendia of the soldiers who took part in the siege, transmitting the 
profits directly to the soldiers who had fought at Veii and then indirectly to the 
remaining citizens by the suspension of the tributum.438 The senate decided in 
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favour of the first plan and granted the right of plunder to any citizen willing to 
make the trip. 
Arguing against this, however, Appius Claudius suggested that if the 
senate used the loot to pay the soldiers, ‘non avidas in direptiones manus 
otiosorum urbanorum praerepturas fortium bellatorum praemia esse,’439 ‘the 
hands of urban layabouts, grasping for plunder, would not snatch away the 
prizes due to brave warriors.’ While the senate worries about who amongst 
the plebs will have a share of the spoils, it is telling that there is no indication 
that the soldiers at Veii had any objection to sharing the loot with the 
remaining plebs – urban layabouts or not. The soldiers fight bravely and 
successfully when the city is stormed and the soldiers and visiting plebs all 
cheerfully scour anything of worth from the city.440 Indeed, what little trouble 
there is over the division of praeda concerns Camillus’ choice to divert the 
proceeds of the sale of slaves directly to the treasury, which angers the plebs 
as a whole.441 The senate, and in particular Camillus and Appius Claudius 
misunderstood what was likely to anger the soldiers. They do not mind sharing 
their loot with fellow plebeians, but they resent aristocratic efforts to divert 
praeda they feel is theirs towards the treasury. 
From 396 forwards the appropriate division of spoils became a more 
regular bone of contention between Roman soldiers and their commanders. 
Trouble began within the decade after the capture of Cortuosa and 
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Contenebra in 388. When the consular tribunes were slow to claim the loot, 
the men of the army took the initiative and seized the loot for themselves.442 
That the soldiers were willing to pre-empt and then openly defy their chief 
magistrates demonstrates what an issue the division of loot had become and 
how determined the soldiers were to see a portion of the profits of warfare go 
not only to the senate.  
In Livy’s narrative of the wars following the fall of Veii and the sack of 
Rome, some Roman commanders begin to show an understanding of the 
importance of ensuring that their men feel that they have received an 
acceptable degree of benefit from their campaigns. The consul Marcius in 357 
gathered extensive loot devastating the lands of Privernum. ‘ad copiam rerum 
addidit munificentiam, quod nihil in publicum secernendo augenti rem 
privatam militi favit.’ ‘This abundance he administered bountifully, and 
sequestering nothing to the public treasury, encouraged the men to augment 
their private fortunes.’443 That war, a punitive expedition against the rebellious 
Falsci, resulted in the profit only of the men on campaign and brought nothing 
back to the senate. A plebeian himself, Marcius tapped into the long held 
concern of the soldiers that war not be fought at the expense of the plebeians 
for the sole benefit of the aristocracy. Money kept from the troops would 
either be retained by the general as manubiae, for the general to use to 
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enhance his own prestige, or it would be directed into the aerarium, under the 
control of the senate.444 
Such concerns over being properly rewarded for their service could 
sometimes flare into serious breaches of discipline. The mutiny of 342, which 
came very close to open civil war between a Roman army and the government, 
was provoked by dissatisfaction over who was receiving the benefits of Roman 
military action, and that dissatisfaction lead to a dangerous collapse of 
discipline.445 Here the issue was not that the senate was reaping the benefits 
of Roman war. Instead, the mutineers saw the profits of their fighting going to 
the Campanians. 
More canny commanders could even motivate their men by ensuring 
them that they would see to it that they received the lion’s share of the praeda 
taken during a war. Campaigning against the Samnites, the consul Junius 
Bubulcus spurred his men on with an extraordinary declaration: 
consul ad ancipitem maxime pugnam aduectus desilit ex equo et Iouem 
Martemque atque alios testatur deos se nullam suam gloriam inde sed 
praedam militi quaerentem in eum locum deuenisse neque in se aliud 
quam nimiam ditandi ex hoste militis curam reprehendi posse... 
The consul, riding up to the place where the fighting was most critical, 
leaped down from his horse, and called on Jupiter and Mars and the 
other gods to witness that he had come there seeking no glory for 
himself, but only booty for his soldiers: his sole fault, he said, was a too 
great desire to enrich his men...446 
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Such shameless pandering was successful. By reminding his men of the great 
loot victory would bring and by emphasising that he is putting the interests of 
the soldiers ahead of his own, Bubulcus spurred his men on to victory. Publius 
Decius also frames war with Samnites as a venture to increase the fortunes of 
the men under his command.447 The enthusiasm with which the men under the 
command of these two men reacted to their generals’ words demonstrate that 
the consuls well understand how important it was to the soldiers that they feel 
they have been adequately rewarded. Even when commanders do not 
explicitly use the prospect of loot to spur their men on, those who court the 
support of the plebeian soldiers are careful to ensure that their men feel that 
they have benefitted from their service. Livy is careful to note when generals 
gave captured towns over to the men to sack.448  
However, such promises had to be honoured if a general was to retain 
the support of his men. Livy makes this clear in the varying fortunes of the 
consuls Carvilius and Papirius. In a consilium held in 293 following the defeat 
of the Samnite army the two men decided to extend the war in order to attack 
enemy cities ‘quarum per excidia militem locupletare praeda et hostem pro aris 
ac focis dimicantem conficere possent.’ ‘by destroying which they would be 
able to enrich their troops with booty and crush their enemies, who would fight 
for their altars and their hearths.’449 It is telling that the consuls rate the 
rewarding of their soldiers as equally or even more important that final victory 
                                                          
447 Livy 10.17.5-7 
448 E.g. Livy 10.12; 10.20; 10.44 
449 Livy 10.44.8 




against the Samnites. The danger of failing to provide for your troops was to 
suffer political blowback in Rome. Livy contrasts the reception of Papirius and 
Carvilius following their successful campaign. Papirius provoked public anger 
by reneging on his promise to his men and donating the proceeds from his war 
to the treasury. Insult was added to injury as, even as booty flowed into the 
treasury, a tributum with levied on the people to cover the cost of the 
stipendium.450 Carvilius, on the other hand, diverted much of the accumulated 
plunder of his campaign to his men and the soldiers and people look on him 
with more favour than his colleague.451 This favour comes with a direct political 
benefit, as it allowed him to prevent the prosecution of his legate.452 The cases 
of Carvilius and Papirius represent a recurring issue of the proportion of profit 
that plebeian soldiers felt they were due from a campaign. Clearly one consul 
felt they were entitled to a greater proportion than the other. This represents 
a greater understanding of the plebeian military identity on the behalf of 
Carvilius – who is himself plebeian – while the patrician Papirius favours his 
troops. 
As Rome began to fight more profitable wars further afield, the division 
of the profits of those wars became an important aspect in the balance 
between the aristocratic officers and the plebeian soldiers. However, the influx 
of money did not have a significant effect on the plebeian military identity, 
instead, praeda became yet another aspect of the soldiers’ long held 
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expectations that they would benefit from their military service. Much of the 
wrangling over reward was also part of the larger struggle between plebs and 
patres, as when money was diverted away from the soldiers, the primary 
beneficiary was usually the senate-controlled treasury. 
Continuity 
Though the narrative shift from domestic affairs to foreign wars leads 
to an increased emphasis on the division of loot and a decrease in the army’s 
presence in internal political struggles, the portrayal of soldiers in Livy’s 
narrative remains remarkably consistent. They retain their political 
sensibilities. The men are clear that they retain the rights of Roman citizens. 
Their military identity also remains consistent. There is the same emphasis on 
shared experience and official recognition, while Roman soldiers retain their 
distinct rough sense of humour. These factors also ensure that the same 
tension exists within the Roman army, and Roman soldiers are quick to 
communicate to their generals when they feel their interests are not being 
looked after or they feel their rights or status have been challenged. 
Though it gradually decreased in prominence, domestic political 
wrangling does not immediately vanish following Veii. In the first few decades 
after the sack, the army continued to serve as the power-base of the tribunate. 
Tribunes continued to deploy resistance to the dilectus as a tool to force 
concessions from the senate. However, as before, this required the 
cooperation of the plebeian sections of the army to be effective. In 380 the 




tribunes blocked the levy to attempt to force concessions over debts.453 A 
reform of the laws concerning debtors was clearly in the interests of the army 
as many soldiers, even those who had served with distinction, were suffering 
over debts owed to the patres. Livy describes one centurion, lead away by his 
creditor as ‘nobilem militaribus factis’.454 Indeed, Livy explicitly describes the 
resistance to the levy in 380 as a cooperative effort: ‘nam neque duci addictos 
tribuni sinebant neque iuniores nomina dabant.’ ‘for the tribunes would not 
allow those who had been bound over to be led away, nor would the young 
men give in their names.’455 However, in this case the effort fails as a direct 
threat to the city prompts the soldiers to abandon solidarity with the tribunes 
and enlist to fight the enemy.456 
The plebeian military identity also remains clear and consistent 
throughout the second half of Livy’s first decade. The cultural weight of long 
service is present in the description of the centurion freed from debt by 
Manlius Capitolinus. The man incites the crowd by bearing his scars and listing 
the campaigns he had served in.457 More than any other patrician, Manlius 
appears able to convincingly make use of the social capital of a plebeian 
soldier. In his trial he takes steps to claim the status of a plebeian soldier: 
ad haec decora quoque belli non commemorasse tantum sed protulisse 
etiam conspicienda, spolia hostium caesorum ad triginta, dona 
imperatorum ad quadraginta, in quibus insignes duas murales coronas, 
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civicas octo; ad hoc servatos ex hostibus cives inter quos C. Servilium 
magistrum equitum absentem nominatum; et cum ea quoque quae bello 
gesta essent pro fastigio rerum oratione etiam magnifica, facta dictis 
aequando, memorasset, nudasse pectus insigne cicatricibus bello 
acceptis...458 
besides this the military distinctions which he not only enumerated but 
produced for all to see, comprised the spoils of thirty enemies whom he 
had slain, and some forty decorations from his generals, amongst which 
were conspicuous two mural and eight civic crowns; that he told, 
besides, of citizens saved from the enemy, and among these named 
Gaius Servilius, the master of the horse, who was not present. And after 
rehearsing his services in war, in a speech as magnificent as the height of 
his achievements and equalling his deeds with its words, he is said to 
have bared his breast, marked with the scars of battle... 
 
While his success was largely due to the reminder that the Capitol served to 
his deeds, his convincing reframing of his military career in the form of a 
plebeian soldier may also have been part of his success. Certainly, Livy does 
not have him make a similar speech the following day at the Peteline Wood.459 
The centurion chosen to represent the mutinous army of to the dictator 
Sulpicius. Sextus Tullius, Livy tells us he was chosen because he had served 
seven times as first centurion and that he was the most decorated infantryman 
in the army.460 
The men also retain their rough sense of humour and there are 
frequent references to the iocus militaris.461 These are predominantly evident 
in the verses chanted by soldiers during the triumph. Though a ritual activity, 
they appear to have been created by the men themselves; the praise heaped 
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on, for example, Camillus and Manlius Torquatus at their triumphs appears to 
have originated from within the ranks.462 The remark that the men marching 
in Valerius’ triumph were paying too much praise to his colleague would also 
suggest that the trimphatores had little control over the content of the jokes 
themselves. Such joking also stands in stark contrast with the dour, humourless 
demeanours of the soldiers’ aristocratic commanders. 
Beyond the triumph, however, Livy portrays joking as playing an 
important part in the soldier’s interaction with his commilitones. Following a 
poor performance in battle against the Samnites, the soldiers were shamed 
into fighting by their officers. Following the victory they returned to camp 
carrying their loot and ‘militaribus iocis cum apparatum hostium tum suum 
increpantes pavorem' ‘making soldiers’ jokes about the enemy’s preparations 
and mocking their own fright.’463 Joking was not simply a reaction to the 
release of tension; when removing the statue of Juno from the temple at Veii 
one of the soldiers jokingly asked the Goddess if she wanted to go to Rome.464 
When trapped at the Caudine Forks by the Samnites, the men attempted to 
raise morale by grimly joking amongst themselves about their dire situation.465  
As in the 5th century, the soldiers’ concern for their interests, rights 
and status continue to introduce tension in the hierarchy of the army. At 
several points in books Six through Ten this tension spills out into full 
disobedience. The first such case is in 358. When the dictator Sulpicius refused 
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to attack an army of Gauls his decision was made on purely tactical grounds. 
However, the way he commanded lead to the alienation of his army which 
grew into the same disorder suffered by Fabius and Appius Claudius a century 
earlier. Angered by his delaying tactics and by the unilateral way the dictator 
was exerting his imperium, his army became mutinous. The army’s resistance 
to Sulpicius appears to grow out of two sources. First, the dictator was 
attempting to maintain order through threats of ‘gravis poena’.466 Second, by 
refusing to let them fight and exposing them to the insults of the Gauls 
Sulpicius was undermining their identities as soldiers. Finally, by keeping them 
in camp while refusing to offer battle the dictator is rendering their military 
service pointless. Eventually they elected to send the centurion Sextus Tullius 
to communicate their dissatisfaction to the dictator. 
Livy give Tullius a public speech which stresses two of the army’s 
grievances. The emphasis on official recognition is also one of the problems 
with the army under Sulpicius. First, that the army feels humiliated by their 
lack of action, as they see it as evidence that the dictator does not trust in their 
ability to defeat the Gauls and because the enemy offer them regular insults.467 
The majority of Tullius’ speech is devoted to establishing the status of the men 
in the army as soldiers and warning the dictator that his actions are 
undermining their status. He begins his speech by describing the state of the 
army: ‘condemnatum se uniuersus exercitus a te ignauiae ratus et prope 
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ignominiae causa destitutum sine armis...’ ‘The entire army, deeming itself 
condemned in your mind for cowardice and almost deprived of its arms by way 
of humiliation...’468 Later, he describes the effect that the taunting of the Gauls 
has on the morale of the army: ‘nos et hostes haud secus quam feminas abditos 
intra uallum omnibus contumeliis eludunt...’ ‘the enemy flout us with every 
species of insult, as though we were women cowering behind our rampart...’469 
Tullius repeatedly stresses that the dictator is not treating his men as he should 
treat Roman soldiers: ‘tu imperator noster—quod aegrius patimur—exercitum 
tuum sine animis, sine armis, sine manibus iudicas esse’ ‘you, our general —a 
thing far harder to bear —regard us as an army without spirit, without swords, 
and without hands’.470 Towards the end of the speech Tullius offers the general 
a remarkable rebuke: ‘milites nos esse non seruos uestros...’ ‘we are your 
soldiers, not your slaves...’471 The centurion makes the same point in several 
ways – an army without weapons is not an army; soldiers hiding behind walls 
are more like women than soldiers; a soldier without weapons or hands is a 
poor sort of soldier; the dictator is treating the men like slaves. All of these 
stress that Sulpicius’ tactics are serious challenges to the men’s status. 
Another issue seems to be that unless they are going to fight they may 
as well go home. Present in Tullius’ speech is the old resistance that Roman 
soldiers have to service without a purpose. To make his point he even risks a 
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degree of sarcasm with the dictator: ‘si nihil armis opus sit, otium Romae potius 
quam in castris acturos.’ ‘if there be no occasion for our arms, we had rather 
spend our leisure in Rome than in a camp.’472 Tullius public speech is largely an 
entreaty to the general’s sense of honour and fairness. In a private 
conversation after the public meeting, the centurion is much more frank with 
his commander. The stark nature of the language makes the statement worth 
quoting in full: 
illi quoque tamen uidendum magno opere esse ut exercitum in potestate 
haberet; differri non posse adeo concitatos animos; ipsos sibi locum ac 
tempus pugnandi sumpturos, si ab imperatore non detur.473 
He must none the less be very wary himself, to keep the army in hand; 
postponement would not do, where feelings were so exasperated; the 
men would choose for themselves a time and place for fighting, if their 
general did not provide them. 
 
Tullius is careful to distance himself from the army’s will – he prefaces his 
remarks by insisting that he himself will not act without the backing of the 
dictator – but the threat is clear. The army does not see Sulpicius’ tactics as 
being to their favour. Their interests are not served by sitting in the camp 
waiting for the enemy army to disintegrate. The feel that their status as 
soldiers is being challenged by the Gallic taunting. The men wish to attack or 
withdraw to Rome and they are willing to defy their commander to do so. Even 
as Tullius distances himself from the sentiment, the message from the army to 
the dictator is clear. Much like Appius Claudius and the Decemvirs, Sulpicius is 
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being made to understand that his imperium is contingent on the consent of 
his troops.  
The soldiers’ preoccupation with their interests, status, and rights is also 
the cause of the serious mutiny of 342.474 Established in winter camp in 
Campania, the army chafes at the sight of the rewards of their campaign going 
to foreigners:  
cur autem potius Campani agrum Italiae uberrimum, dignam agro 
urbem, qui nec se nec sua tutari possent, quam victor exercitus haberet 
qui suo sudore ac sanguine inde Samnites depulisset?475  
Besides, why should the most fertile land in Italy, and a city worthy of the 
land, belong to the Campanians, who were incapable of defending either 
themselves or their possessions? Why, rather, should it not belong to the 
conquering army, which had toiled and bled to drive the Samnites out of 
it? 
 
The trouble began as the soldiers see others benefiting from their military 
service while they faced penury back in Rome, a complaint of the plebeian 
soldier that dated back at least as far as the trouble over nexum in the early 
5th century.476  
However, once the plot to take Campania by force had been discovered 
and the ringleaders removed from the army the men begin to worry about 
punishment.477 Importantly, however, because of the underhanded way their 
consul has handled the suppression – by removing troublemakers on a 
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pretext– the punishment they fear is not the standard application of military 
justice, not even in the brutal form employed by Appius Claudius. Rather they 
suspect their commander is up to something more sinister: ‘iam quaestiones, 
iam indicia, iam occulta singulorum supplicia impotensque et crudele consulum 
ac patrum in se regnum passuros.’ ‘now they would have to suffer trials, 
discoveries, the secret punishments of individuals, and the tyrannical and cruel 
despotism of the consuls and the senate.’478 The soldiers also seemed to be 
motivated over concerns about their status. When Marcius Rutilus begins 
sending individuals implicated in the conspiracy away from the army it is first 
greeted with happiness by the army. However, when they realised that those 
sent away are not re-joining the army, that they have lost their status as 
soldiers, the trouble begins.479 It is this threat to their status as soldiers and 
citizens that pushed the mutineers to action graver than simply taking 
Campania for themselves. Instead they decided to march on Rome. 
Though they operated in opposition to the state, they continued to 
behave as though they were a legitimate Roman army. The mutineers were 
determined to maintain their status as soldiers: ‘nec quicquam ad iusti 
exercitus formam praeter ducem deerat.’ ‘nothing was wanting to give it the 
form of a regular army except a general.’ They kept their standards and 
organisation and even addressed their lack of commander by shanghaiing a 
patrician to serve as consul of their army.480 The importance of their status as 
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soldiers was also made clear in the resolution of the trouble. When the 
mutinous army encounters the force the senate had scrambled together to 
stop them, it was their appearance as Roman soldiers that reminded the 
mutineers of their loyalties: ‘ubi primum in conspectum ventum est et arma 
signaque agnovere, extemplo omnibus memoria patriae iras permulsit.’ ‘As 
soon as they came into view and recognised the arms and standards, the 
thought of their country instantly calmed the passions of them all.’481 In his 
speech to the mutineers, Valerius Corvus was careful to reassure the men of 
their status as soldiers, addressing them repeatedly as ‘milites’ and as 
‘exercitus Romanus’.482 The ersatz consul Titus Quinctius also addressed the 
mutineers as soldiers when he urged them to abandon their plans.483 These 
efforts were successful. Reminded of their status as citizens and reassured that 
their status as soldiers is recognised by authority, the soldiers abandon their 
plans to march to Rome and attempt another secession. This also gives 
evidence that Livy saw the soldiers of the republic as different from those of 
his own time, as unlike the armies of the 1st century, they cannot justify 
marching on the city.484 
Following their humiliation at the Caudine forks, the Roman army was 
so desperate to avenge their humiliation that they regularly sparred with their 
commanders. Throughout the campaign the army behaved with a degree of 
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fury that the generals had trouble containing. When the men were recalled 
from sacking a Samnite camp they expressed great anger at having their 
chance at vengeance frustrated.485 Even when the general and the army 
agreed on the goal – to give battle to the Samnites – the soldiers were so keen 
to fight that they deprived the consul Publilius of his ability to command. 
Before the battle the general’s traditional exhortations were drowned out by 
the shouts of the men, clamouring for a chance to get to grips with the 
enemy.486 Once the battle began they paid no attention to the plans of their 
commander and issued their own orders to the standard bearers.487 
In each of the three major outbreaks of disorder in Books Six through 
Ten, the trouble arose from the soldiers understanding of their interests, 
status, and rights. Sulpicius’ men came close to mutiny because they feel their 
status was under threat, and because they felt they were kept in service 
without purpose. The mutineers of 342 began plotting because they felt they 
are not benefiting from their service and once exposed they saw their status 
and rights threatened by the actions of their commanders. The army that 
survived the Caudine forks was frustrated by the restraint shown by their 
commander. In each case the soldiers were willing to ignore the authority of 
their commander in an effort to promote their interests and to protect their 
status. Sulpicius’ army warned him that they would stop obeying him if they 
did not follow their advice, the mutineers of 342 rejected the authority of their 
                                                          
485 Livy 9.10-13 
486 Livy 9.13.1 
487 Livy 9.13.2-3 




general and replaced him with an aged puppet. Publilius was side-lined by his 
own men and given little chance to direct the battle. 
The strong sense of shared identity is also alluded to in Livy’s account 
by the attempts made by politicians to exploit that identity for their own 
purposes. Manlius Capitolinus directly connects his own service against the 
Gauls with the military service of the centurion he rescues and regularly makes 
references to his actions on the Capitoline. At his trial he mimics the actions of 
the centurion he had saved by showing his scars and listing his campaigns and 
military decorations. Though he is eventually condemned and executed, the 
intense popularity Manlius was able to cultivate during his attempted coup 
demonstrates that appeals to common identity were not futile. 
Livy has the consul Valerius Corvinus appeal regularly to his soldiers as 
their former commander, though he never uses the term ‘commilites’. In his 
exhortation to his army during a battle with the Samnites he cast himself as a 
common soldier: 'nostrum inquit, peditum illud, milites, est opus.’ ‘Soldiers,’ he 
said, ‘this is the job for we infantry.’488 Similarly, in a speech to the mutineers 
of 342, he addressed them as soldiers and reminded them twice of the 
campaigns they had served together, as well as the care he took to ensure that 
he treated them fairly.489 
Facing punishment from the dictator for disobeying orders, Quintus 
Fabius appeals to his men for their protection. Speaking of their shared 
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campaigns and dangers he convincingly paints himself as someone who has 
fought and laboured alongside the men.490 He is so successful in his attempts 
that the whole army is raised almost in mutiny against the dictator when he 
attempted to arrest Fabius. The triarii scuffle with the lictors and even his own 
staff beg him to leave off his attempt before he loses complete control of his 
army.491 The efforts of Manlius, Corvinus, and Fabius demonstrate that in the 
4th century the soldier’s shared identity remained strong, and that politicians 
were beginning to recognise the benefits of exploiting it. Just as a politician’s 
career could be damaged by misunderstanding the soldiers, others could 
benefit from recognising the situation. An increased knowledge and 
manipulation of the soldier’s identity is understandable in the context of the 
4th century, as more plebeians reached positions of command. 
While the siege of Veii and the sack of Rome are an important turning 
point in Livy’s history and mark a shift in focus away from domestic towards 
foreign affairs, neither the events themselves nor the shift in narrative has any 
substantial effect on Livy’s portrayal of the plebeian soldier. The men had 
always been determined that their service serve a purpose, be it defending the 
state or protecting Roman honour, and the importance of adequate partition 
of praeda was simply another aspect of that. Roman soldiers retained their 
strong perceptions of their status, rights and interests, and when their 
commanders were felt to be ignoring or acting in opposition to those, the army 
was willing to communicate its dissatisfaction to the general, up to and 
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including outright mutiny. Further, in their position as representatives of the 
plebeian order, the tension between the soldiers and their aristocratic officers 
demonstrates that while domestic struggles recede from Livy’s narrative, the 
tension that he detected in the republican system remains present in the 
camp. The relationship between aristocrat and plebeian remained fraught and 
this would continue to be the case when Livy’s narrative picks up again eight 
decades later at the beginning of the Hannibalic War. 
The War with Hannibal 
The most remarkable fact about the Livian soldier during the war with 
Hannibal is that despite the dire situation there is little change to their 
behaviour. The plebeian soldiers remain in a state of tension with their 
aristocratic commanders. The troops are still determined that they benefit 
from their service. They are still willing to agitate in their interest, remain 
politically engaged, and jealously guard against any threats to their status as 
soldiers. The shared identity that arose from service together is as evident 
throughout the war as it was before and after. Rather than being an exception, 
the Hannibalic War instead provides another canvas on which to study the 
Livian soldier as a constant in the historian’s account of the republic. 
The drastic situation Rome found itself in following the defeat at 
Cannae prompted an unusual demonstration of patriotism from parts of the 
Roman army: ‘non eques, non centurio stipendium acciperet, 
mercennariumque increpantes vocarent qui accepisset’ ‘no horseman or 
centurion would accept of his pay, and those who would accept it were 




reproached with the appellation of mercenary men.’492 This gesture, the 
voluntary refusal of pay and the general condemnation of those who do is 
particularly interesting in light of those who do not make the gesture. The miles 
gregarius of the Roman army appears to have exempted himself from the 
expectation. Indeed, throughout the war the senate is careful to ensure that it 
has the means to continue to pay its troops. In 216 the senate was forced to 
lean on its allies to raise enough money to keep paying the stipendium to the 
army and the fleet.493 The following year the senate doubled the tax levied on 
the allies to provide enough money to continue to pay the troops, with the 
exception of the survivors of Cannae, who were to be punished by having their 
pay cut off.494 Even after the centurions and knights made a point of refusing 
pay, the senate responded to shortages of recruits by passing a law 
guaranteeing that any underage recruits would receive the same level of pay 
as their older comrades.495 Their right to the stipendium, and effort taken to 
ensure that soldiers were not impoverished by long campaigns, had become 
so ingrained in the soldier’s mind, and so necessary in periods of long service, 
that recruits were unwilling to serve without payment even with the republic 
under threat. In the case of the Cannae survivors, being paid for service was a 
large enough part of the arrangement that a denial of that pay constituted 
punishment, not only because it denied money to serving soldiers, but because 
it challenged their status. 
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Roman soldiers remained determined to ensure that they received the 
benefits that they believed they deserved even at a risk to their own military 
effectiveness. A Roman expedition to the coast of Africa suffered a serious 
defeat because the men had abandoned their military duties to plunder the 
countryside.496 Even the men in the field against Hannibal were preoccupied 
with the prospect of loot. Finding Hannibal’s camp unguarded they pressured 
their commanders to permit them to plunder it. ‘clamore orto a militibus, ni 
signum detur, sine ducibus ituros’ ‘a shout arose from the soldiers that if the 
signal was not given they would go on without their generals.’497 Giving in to 
the inevitable, the consul Varro gave the order and when he was convinced to 
revoke it by his colleague, he was unable to bring the men back under control. 
Only when they are offered proof that the Carthaginian was lying in wait for 
them was command able to get them to focus on the task at hand.498 Once 
again, soldiers who felt their general is not acting for their benefit were willing 
to ignore his imperium and take action on their own initiative. 
Even in the desperate early days of the war, Roman generals recognised 
that the importance of providing their men with the benefits of the campaign. 
While Rome was scrambling to raise the funds to pay its armies, all of the loot 
taken from the rebellious Hirpini was given over to the soldiers.499 The same 
concession, excepting the proceeds from the sale of captives, was given to the 
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victorious troops at Beneventum the following year.500 Later in the war, Scipio 
faced a mutiny at Sucro in Spain caused, in part, by the fact that the soldiers 
had neither steady pay nor the chance to extract booty from the territory they 
were occupying.501 With Rome in such dire financial straits these concessions 
appear at first to be extraordinary. But given that throughout the republic one 
of the quickest ways for a commander to alienate his men was to divert praeda 
they felt they had earned into the control of the senate, it was perhaps sound 
tactical thinking. 
Soldiers during Livy’s account of the Second Punic War also carefully 
watched for any threats to their status as soldiers. This is perhaps most evident 
in the struggle Fabius Maximus had to keep his army under his control 
following the defeat at Lake Trasimeno. Watching Hannibal devastate Roman 
territory infuriated Fabius’ entire army, and the men make it clear they would 
prefer to be led by the more aggressive Magister Equitum than the dictator 
himself.502 The Magister Equitum exacerbated the situation by comparing the 
actions of Fabius’ army unfavourably with those of earlier Roman armies.503 He 
finishes by telling the men: ‘stultitia est sedendo aut uotis debellari credere 
posse. arma capias oportet et descendas in aequum et uir cum uiro 
congrediaris.’ ‘It is folly to think that a war can be won by sitting still or making 
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vows; you must arm and go down into the field, and do battle, man to man!’504 
By comparing Fabius’ delaying tactics to the daring and successful actions of 
preceding Roman armies Minucius is suggesting to the army that Fabius is not 
allowing his men to behave as a Roman army should, he is, in effect, 
undermining their status as soldiers. Livy records that this sentiment was 
popular within the army, though Fabius was able to retain control of his men. 
Similar sentiment is evident in the army during the lead up to the battle of 
Cannae where the unruly army is described by the historian as ‘iratis et 
pugnare cupentibus.’505 Later, only the restraining influence of the consul 
Paullus stops the army from engaging Hannibal.506 As we have seen with the 
men taunted by the Gauls under Sulpicius and those in the 5th century trapped 
in their camp and relieved by Cinncinatus, Roman soldiers who do not fight 
when battle is offered are worried that they are losing their status as soldiers. 
As the social status of Livian plebeians was asserted through military 
service and the recognition of their actions on campaign, soldiers are sensitive 
to any perceived slights to their status. This sensitivity is evident in the 
domestic political sphere, where the accumulated social capital of military 
service gave plebeian men a right to speak. But it is also evident when soldiers 
felt that their status was threatened or had been diminished. On the battlefield 
concern over status could complicate the work of a cautious general. Such 
cautiousness could be seen as an indication that the ability or virtues of a 
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soldier was not being recognised. When an enemy was able to offer insult to 
Roman soldiers – either by action or by words – the insult were particularly 
effective at provoking responses from soldiers who already felt that their 
status had been undermined by the uncertainty of their general. Roman 
soldiers did not agitate for aggressive tactics out of bravado or bloodlust, but 
because they were concerned about their status in the community.  
Even if there were no enemies to taunt them, soldiers whose status was 
threatened or degraded for an extended period began to agitate for a change 
in policy from command. A singularly interesting example of soldiers 
concerned with their status is provided by the forces composed of the 
survivors of the battle of Cannae. The men, refused pay and banished to Sicily 
for the duration, elected amongst themselves a series of representatives to 
petition their commander. Granted an audience, they lay out a series of 
arguments in favour of allowing them to fight again.507 Beyond the restitution 
of their stipendium, the men are keen to regain the chance to prove 
themselves as Roman soldiers, rather than the reduced status they seem to be 
under in Sicily. In the only serious breakdown of military discipline during the 
war, the mutineers in 206 also demonstrate concern that their military service 
should serve a purpose, much as their ancestors did centuries before: ‘si 
bellum in prouincia esset, quid sese inter pacatos facere? si debellatum iam et 
confecta prouincia esset, cur in Italiam non reuehi?’ ‘What they were doing 
among people who were at peace with them, if there was a war in the 
                                                          
507 Livy 25.6 




province? If the war was terminated and the province completely subdued, 
why were they not conveyed back into Italy?’508 The mutiny was spurred as 
much by concerns that they were being kept in service without purpose as it 
was about the lack of financial recompense. But it was also caused by a lack of 
action within the province. Length of service was only one way that a 
republican soldier proved his status, and there would be little chance of 
earning official recognition, dividing loot, or even gaining scars in a peaceful 
theatre.  
The self-identification of the soldier also remains unchanged during 
Livy’s account of the Punic war. This is perhaps most clear in the case of the 
survivors of the battle of Cannae. In their speech petitioning the senate to pay 
their ransom, those captured by Hannibal identify themselves as soldiers 
twice, once drawing a connexion between themselves and the soldiers that 
escaped capture after the battle, those other survivors are ciues and 
commilitiones.509 The survivors are painted as being of equal skill, and the 
prisoners argue that they differ only in motivation: ‘sed illis et bonis ac fortibus 
militibus utemini et nobis etiam promptioribus pro patria’ ‘Both in them and in 
us you shall have good and valiant soldiers; but we shall be even more eager 
than they to defend our country’.510 The guarantee of quality service from both 
the prisoners and the survivors of Cannae is particularly clear when compared 
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to their silence about the effectiveness of the troops being recruited from both 
poor citizens and slaves.511 
The other group of survivors – those who evaded capture – also stress 
their status as soldiers when petitioning the senate to allow them to return to 
the fight. They place themselves in the tradition of the Roman soldier, invoking 
the examples of the troops captured by Pyrrhus and those humiliated at the 
Caudine Forks as precedents for Roman soldiers permitted to regain their 
honour by fighting against those who had defeated them.512 The men’s primary 
argument is that they are not being afforded the rights they feel Roman 
soldiers ought to have. They stress that they are not looking for special 
treatment or the removal of their shamed status, but simply the same chance 
to redeem themselves that earlier men had.513 The soldierly nature of their 
request is clear: ‘laborem et periculum petimus, ut uirorum, ut militum officio 
fungamur.’ ‘We seek for labour and danger that we may discharge the duty of 
men and soldiers.’514 The situation in Sicily mirrors that in Spain. Though the 
soldiers were being kept in military service, as they were not allowed to fight, 
they had no chance to perform any of the actions that would confirm their 
status. Even worse, with their stipendia withheld, their status is even more 
thoroughly undermined that that of the soldiers in Sucro.  
The Hannibalic War also provides an example of how Livy understands 
the development of plebeian military identity. Worried about unit cohesion in 
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his army, which was composed mostly of slave volunteers and veterans, 
Sempronius Gracchus takes advantage of a lull in the fighting to drill his men, 
careful to warn his officers that there is to be no disparagement of men 
because of their social status. The men happily follow these instructions 
‘brevique tanta concordia coaluerant omnium animi ut prope in oblivionem 
veniret qua ex condicione quisque esset miles factus’ ‘and in a short time the 
men had become so fused together that it was almost forgotten what 
condition of life each man had been in before he became a soldier.’515 The 
implication is clear, through military training and service the men, are 
transformed from their earlier low status into experience soldiers – men who 
hold the status of a plebeian citizen. While the events in Spain and Sicily show 
men who felt that their status had been reduced by the conditions of their 
service, the men of these new legions were able to earn the status of citizen-
soldiers – with their commander carefully ensuring that none of his officers 
behaved in a way that would challenge it. After their first fight, the soldiers 
began to exhibit the markers of the plebeian military identity. This 
transformation is evident in the narrative, as after their first victory Gracchus’ 
army indulges in the rough humour of the Livian soldier.516 
The soldiers in Livy’s account of the Second Punic War are no less prone 
to quibble with their commanders, no matter how drastic the situation was. 
The men retain their determination that they benefit from service, their 
political sensibilities, their dedication to their own interests, and their fixation 
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on their status. Though outbreaks of serious disorder are less common than in 
the earlier period – though the dire situation and the relatively short period 
covered in the third decade may contribute to this instability – tension 
between the soldiers and command still emerges when soldiers feel their 
status has been threatened or undermined. The plebeian military identity also 
remains strong, men still place weight on length of service and official 
recognition and share a common bond. While soldier’s jokes fade out of the 
narrative briefly – after all, men in the Roman army in the years 217-216 had 
little to joke about – once the tide began to turn their humour returned. The 
Livian soldier, constant in his motivations and behaviour since the very 
foundation of the republic remains much as he was before and as he will be 
for the rest of Livy’s account. 
The Conquest of the Mediterranean 
 
In book forty-two of his histories, during an account of a levy held for war with 
Macedonia, Livy inserts the speech of the retired centurion Spurius 
Ligustinus.517 The speech touches on two key issues of plebeian military 
identity in Livy’s history. Ligustinus primarily discusses his status as a soldier in 
relation to the recognition he has received from famous generals he served 
under and the length of his service: 
miles sum factus P. Sulpicio C. Aurelio consulibus. in eo exercitu quo in 
Macedoniam est transportatus, biennium miles gregarius fui adversus 
Philippum regem; tertio anno virtutis causa mihi T. Quinctius Flamininus 
decimum ordinem hastatum assignavit. devicto Philippo 
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Macedonibusque cum in Italiam reportati ac dimissi essemus, continuo 
miles voluntarius cum M. Porcio consule in Hispaniam sum profectus. 
neminem omnium imperatorum quo vivant acriorem virtutis 
spectatorem ac iudicem fuisse sciunt, qui et illum et alios duces longa 
militia experti sunt. hic me imperator dignum iudicavit cui primum 
hastatum prioris centuriae assignaret. tertio iterum voluntarius miles 
factus sum in eum exercitum qui adversus Aetolos et Antiochum regem 
est missus. a M'. Acilio mihi primus princeps prioris centuriae est 
assignatus. expulso rege Antiocho subactis Aetolis reportati sumus in 
Italiam; et deinceps bis, quae annua merebant legiones, stipendia feci. 
bis deinde in Hispania militavi, semel Q. Fulvio Flacco, iterum Ti. 
Sempronio Graccho praetore. a Flacco inter ceteros, quos virtutis causa 
secum ex provincia ad triumphum deducebat, deductus sum; a Ti. 
Graccho rogatus in provinciam quater intra paucos annos primum pilum 
duxi; quater et tricies virtutis causa donatus ab imperatoribus sum; sex 
civicas coronas accepi.518 
I became a soldier in the consulship of P. Sulpicius and C. Aurelius. For 
two years I was a common soldier in the army, fighting against Philip in 
Macedonia; in the third year T. Quinctius Flamininus gave me in 
consideration of my courage the command of the tenth company of the 
hastati. After Philip and the Macedonians were vanquished and we were 
brought back to Italy and disbanded, I at once volunteered to go with the 
consul M. Porcius to Spain. Men who during a long service have had 
experience of him and of other generals know that of all living 
commanders not one has shown himself a keener observer or more 
accurate judge of military valour. It was this commander who thought 
me worthy of being appointed first centurion in the hastati. Again I 
served, for the third time, as a volunteer in the army which was sent 
against Antiochus and the Aetolians. I was made first centurion of the 
principes by Manius Acilius. After Antiochus was expelled and the 
Aetolians subjugated we were brought back to Italy. After that I twice 
took service for a year at home. Then I served in Spain, once under Q. 
Fulvius Flaccus and again under Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. I was brought 
home by Flaccus amongst those whom, as a reward for their courage, he 
was bringing home to grace his triumph. I joined Tiberius Gracchus at his 
request. Four times, within a few years, have I been first centurion in the 
triarii; four-and-thirty times have I been rewarded for my courage by my 
commanders; I have received six civic crowns.  
 
Ligustinus’ account makes it clear that his success as a soldier is due to his 
virtus, but his virtus is measured by the degree of recognition he has received 
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from his commanders. For his promotions he is careful to mention the 
commander that promoted him and to stress the personal attention paid by 
the general. He closes his account with a list of the rewards he has received 
from his commanders over the course of his career. Lacking from his account 
is any specific detail of his own accomplishments. Ligustinus speaks in general 
terms about his virtus, we are given no examples of what he did that brought 
him to the attention of his commanders. Nor are we given any detail of the 
circumstances that lead to his receiving rewards from his commanders thirty-
four times. He also tells us that he has received six civic crowns. The civic crown 
was rewarded for saving the life of a citizen in battle.519 Yet we are offered 
neither the names of the men saved nor the contexts that lead to those 
rewards. Those details are immaterial to Ligustinus’ point, the only detail that 
matters and the one he is careful to provide, is the name of the general who 
recognised his bravery and promoted him for it. He also praises Cato, not for 
his own military skill or virtus, but rather for his ability to recognise the quality 
of the men under him and ensure it is adequately rewarded.520 
The importance of recognition is emphasised as Ligustinus finishes his 
speech. Despite providing a superlative record of service, he is willing to enter 
the army at any rank: ‘quo ordine me dignum iudicent tribuni militum, ipsorum 
est potestatis; ne quis me virtute in exercitu praestet, dabo operam; et semper 
ita fecisse me et imperatores mei et qui una stipendia fecerunt testes sunt.’521 
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‘What rank the military tribunes think that I deserve is for them to decide; I will 
take care that no man shall surpass me in courage; that I always have done so, 
my commanders and fellow-campaigners bear witness.’ He is willing to enter 
the army again at any rank, confident that his quality will be recognised and 
rewarded by his new commander. Importantly, he also stresses that not only 
his commander, but also his fellow soldiers will soon come to recognise his 
status as a superlative soldier. 
Ligustinus also appeals to the crowd of potential recruits as fellow 
soldiers. He begins his speech by addressing the men as ‘quirites’, perhaps 
fittingly since the opening remarks begin with brief allusions to his family and 
farm.522 Ligustinus asserts his bona fides as a Roman citizen by evoking the 
same fundamental aspects that Livy himself does in book two, here again we 
hear of ‘pignera coniugum ac liberorum caritasque ipsius soli’.523 However, the 
old centurion makes only passing reference to his wife, children, and land. The 
primary focus of his speech is not his status as a citizen but his status as a 
soldier. After listing his campaigns, decorations, and commanders, he again 
directly addresses the crowd. Yet this time he addresses them not as quirites 
but as commilites.524 Brief references to his children and farm allow him to 
speak to the men as fellow citizens. Before he can convincingly address them 
as commilites he must establish his status as a soldier, as others have 
                                                          
522 Livy 42.34.2-4 
523 Livy 2.1.5 
524 Livy 42.34.15 




throughout Livy’s history, by speaking in terms of the social capital of long 
service, shared experiences and official recognition. 
Though Livy makes it clear that the prospect of financial gain was the 
primary motivation of those enlisting: ‘multi voluntate nomina dabant, quia 
locupletes videbant, qui priore Macedonico bello aut adversus Antiochum in 
Asia stipendia fecerant.’ ‘many enlisted voluntarily, because they saw that 
those who had served in the former Macedonian campaign or against 
Antiochus in Asia had become rich.’525 Livy only explicitly ascribes the desire 
for profit to the new soldiers, but, the numbers of returning soldiers and 
centurions were too large to guarantee that all would serve at their previous 
ranks.526 These large numbers suggest similar enthusiasm for the war was 
equally high among veterans as among the new recruits. Ligustinus makes no 
mention of his financial gain because it is irrelevant to his assertion of status. 
Livy’s conception of the plebeian military identity places no weight on one’s 
personal fortune, but rather on the fact that their military service has been 
recognised by their fellows and by their commanders. Instead, Ligustinus 
claims the right to lecture his fellow veterans once he has asserted his status 
by emphasising the length of his service and his official recognition. 
  Of particular interest to the soldiers in the half century after the end of 
the Second Punic War was the care that Roman generals take to ensure that 
their men are fairly rewarded for their service. Yet while the amounts of money 
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have increased, the soldiers were always careful to ensure that their 
commanders give them a fair share of the proceeds, and many generals from 
the beginning of the republic were generous to the men they commanded.527 
The situation was the same in the 2nd century. When Lucius Apustrius 
captured Antipatrea, he gave all of the loot taken to his men.528 Quinctius 
Flaminius similarly ensured that part of the booty captured after 
Cynoscephalae was distributed to his men.529 When commanders did not 
appear to have handed out plunder while on campaign, the soldiers were 
granted a portion of the proceeds on their return to Rome during the general’s 
triumph, as Cato did in 194.530 Particularly lucky soldiers would receive both, 
as was the case with the army of Quinctius, which received loot in the field and 
donatives during the triumph.531 But such large amounts were by no means 
guaranteed, and generals throughout this period continued to divide loot at 
their discretion, as they had done in earlier periods.532 
That the benefits of campaign are seen less as a happy bonus than as a 
right is evident from the trouble Aemilius Paullus had following his campaign 
against Perseus of Macedon. The war had been very profitable for his men. Livy 
twice describes the large amount of loot gained by the common soldiers while 
fighting Perseus.533 Despite this, the men remained unhappy and were easily 
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persuaded to agitate to deny their commander a triumph.534 The historian 
frames the primary complaint of the men as due to an understanding that a 
profitable war should translate into a more profitable share given to the men: 
their complaint here is explicit: ‘de praeda parcius, quam speraverant ex tantis 
regiis opibus, dederat...’ ‘he had made smaller donations out of the spoil than 
they hoped to receive, since the treasures of the king were so large...’535 Livy is 
scathing about the men here, claiming that they would have been satisfied 
with nothing less than the entirety of the King’s treasury.536  
When the whole of Paullus’ time in command is considered, however, 
the issue appears to be more complicated. The consul conducted himself with 
an aloofness and a severity that seems unusual for a Livian general. Indeed, on 
assuming command he attempted to pre-empt exactly the sort of tension 
present in the campaigns discussed above, instructing his men that they were 
only to obey orders, and not to question or comment on his tactical or strategic 
decisions.537 This was a remarkable and highly unusual speech for a Roman 
general.538 It is particularly striking in Livy’s history where, as we have seen, 
Roman soldiers feel they have the right to question the decisions of their 
generals and withdraw their support when they disagree. Livy’s narrative of 
the Macedonian War makes several references to the fact that Paullus had 
alienated both his rank and file and his officers through his authoritarian 
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behaviour.539 The trouble over the triumph between Paullus and his soldiers is 
evidently more than a simple disagreement over their reward, rather it is the 
culmination of an acrimonious campaign. 
A comparison between Paullus’ men and the men serving under Anicius 
also suggests that the issue is about more than simply the amount of money 
the men have received. Those men, returning from a far less profitable war 
with the Illyrians were happy with their smaller donative. In terms of actual 
numbers, Paullus’ men profited far more than those of Anicius. Besides the 
plunder granted to them on campaign, each miles gregarius was awarded 200 
denarii for the sack of Epirus and a further 100 when his triumph was finally 
allowed to proceed.540 Those of Anicius were granted, beyond anything they 
might have taken on campaign, the more modest amount of 45 denarii 
apiece.541 Yet despite the relative paucity of their reward, it is clear that 
Anicius’ troops were far more satisfied with their recompense. Livy compares 
their behaviour with that of Paullus’ men: ‘laetior hunc triumphum est secutus 
miles, multisque dux ipse carminibus celebratus.’ ‘The soldiers marched more 
joyously in this triumph, and the general himself was the subject of many 
laudatory songs.’542  
The issue turned not on the amount of money distributed to the men, 
but the proportion in comparison with the success of the war. Anicius’ men are 
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satisfied with a relatively small amount of money received for their part in a 
relatively unprofitable war.543 Paullus’, on the other hand, feel that they have 
been short changed by their general based on the massive profits brought back 
from their campaign. To put it another way, their contribution to the benefits 
that Rome has received from the conquest of Macedonia has not been 
adequately recognised. Livy lends credence to their complaints that Paullus is 
not behaving fairly by reporting that it was rumoured that he had cut their 
donative in half to punish them for attempting to block the triumph.544 Once 
again, like Fabius in the 5th century and Papirius in the Fourth, an aristocratic 
commander has defrauded his men to assert his authority but also to benefit 
the senate’s finances. Aemilius Paullus appears as a 2nd-century echo of the 
likes of Appius Claudius or Camillus, aristocratic and domineering, more 
interested in promoting the interests of the senate than the plebeian class, and 
with a knack for alienating his own soldiers. 
While Livy focusses heavily on the soldier’s concern that they benefit 
from service in his account of the wars of the 2nd century, the other aspects 
of the Livian soldier do not fall out of the narrative. These soldiers are also 
willing to agitate for their interests, rights, and status if they feel they are not 
being protected. There is near mutiny amongst the army in Macedonia, arising 
from a body of soldiers who feel their terms of service are up and they should 
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be discharged.545 Indeed, the Cannae legions had by this point been enrolled 
for the legally required 16 years.546 In 193 there is resistance to a dilectus from 
among the veterans within the city that, like those from the fifth and fourth 
centuries, is only put aside when an uprising in Liguria endangers the city.547 
During an unpopular and unprofitable campaign in Istria the soldiers take their 
officers’ part in a dispute between their commander and those officers. They 
go so far as to threaten to refuse obedience if the commander continues in his 
course.548 During the war with Perseus the army under the consul Marcius 
Philippus were unhappy with their general’s cautious nature and pressed him 
to commence an attack on the Macedonians.549 
Their political engagement is also evident from both their resistance to 
the dilectus in 193, supported by the tribunes, and their attempt to derail the 
political career of Aemilus Paullus by denying him a triumph. Besides this, the 
troops also resist another dilectus to raise reinforcements for the Macedonian 
war in 169.550 This in itself is interesting, considering the enthusiasm of the 
recruits at the outset. However, after several years of setbacks and little 
prospect of victory, there seems to be little interest in service. 
Ligustinus’ speech provides a fairly clear summary of plebeian military 
identity, but the strength of the identity in the decades after the Hannibalic 
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War is also evident in the efforts that various commanders make to appear as 
fellow soldiers to their men. Philippus was careful to be seen performing all 
the duties of a soldier, even though he was of advanced age and hardly 
possessed of a soldier’s physique.551 Though the trouble over his triumph 
would suggest that he was not successful, even the dictatorial Paullus makes a 
point of sharing the dangers and labours of his men.552 
Though Livy pays more attention to the division of spoils between men 
and commander in the years following the Second Punic War, this is likely due 
to the vast sums of money being generated by Rome’s eastern conquests. The 
other aspects of the soldier in Livy’s account, the self-interest, the political 
engagement, the shared identity, remain as a constant. The soldier of 167 is 
not noticeably different in outlook and behaviour than the soldier in 507. 
Further, though there are no serious outbreaks of mutiny or disorder, the 
tension between Roman soldiers and their generals remains, and when that 
tension is present in the narrative it is being caused, as it always is, by the same 
dynamic as throughout Livy’s history, the feeling that their interests, rights, 




This chapter began by noting the similar way two armies challenged the 
power of their commanders. These examples were drawn from Books Two and 
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Forty-Five, from the 5th and the 2nd century. Both hinted at the consistent 
way that plebeian soldiers related to their commanders. This relationship was 
always grounded in the soldiers’ keen understanding of their own statuses and 
their determination to assert it and defend it. Having begun the chapter with 
two examples of status asserted to a commander, we can end by providing two 
examples, again from Books Two and Forty-Five, again from the fifth and the 
2nd century, that demonstrate the consistent way that Livian soldiers relate to 
each other. In the 5th century the centurion Volero Publilius faced prosecution 
when he refused to serve in the army unless he retained his rank as centurion. 
In 176 a group of former centurions refused to enlist in the Macedonian 
campaign unless they too could retain their rank. The resolution of both 
situations was very different, Volero incited a mob and forced legislative 
change in Rome, while Spurius Ligustinus was able to convince his fellow 
soldiers to enlist at a lower rank. But the way the two situations were resolved 
were similar. Both ended not with the intervention of a magistrate or 
aristocratic grandee, but by a plebeian soldier asserting his status to his peers 
and then convincing them to side with him. 
The figure of the soldier in Livy’s account of the early and middle 
republic remains remarkably similar despite separation of time. His self-
identity, his political engagement, his devotion to his own interests all remain 
constant from the beginning of book two to the end of Book Forty-Five. With 
the introduction of financial incentives as Rome began to fight profitable wars 
this figure was less changed than augmented. The prospect of financial benefit 
did not introduce tension into the hierarchy of the Roman army because that 




tension had been there from the beginning. This was a result of the dual 
identities in Roman society. That of the aristocratic élite and that of the 
plebeian class. In Livy’s understanding of the republic, the plebeian class was a 
military class. Generally, all plebs present in his narrative either are, have been, 
or have the potential to be soldiers.  
As a result, from the outset Roman soldiers were politically engaged, 
understood their rights and interests, jealous of the status, and aware of their 
power. There is throughout always the possibility of tension between a Roman 
commander and his army. This was because the soldiers understood the same 
issue that Appius Claudius’ officers had attempted to teach him in the early 
decades of the republic, that a Roman general’s imperium depended on the 
consent of his men. If Claudius’ actions undermined the status of his soldiers, 
either by refusing them the chance to fight or by denying them their fair share 
of profits from a conflict, they would withdraw that consent. This was the same 
lesson that the entire plebeian class – organised and lead by the army – had 
taught the senate during the secessions. The consent of the soldiers was 
predicated on the understanding that a Roman general understood his men’s 
interests and status, and that he acted to their benefit. Though subject to a 
powerful military hierarchy, the soldiers still saw themselves as citizens and 
free men. This introduced a tension into the military dynamic that could, if left 
unchecked, could result in mutiny – the wholesale rejection of the military 
hierarchy. Mutiny was a serious step, and could result in ferocious punishment, 
but it remained a powerful tool of negotiation and a reminder that even under 
the standards, Roman soldiers were citizens with rights. 




When Livy’s narrative shifted from the domestic troubles of the early 
republic to Rome’s wars abroad, first in Italy an then across the Mediterranean, 
the plebeian class becomes less prominently involved in the domestic political 
sphere. However, in their rôle as soldiers, the plebeian class remained engaged 
and often at odds with the aristocracy – represented by the commanders of 
Rome’s army. As the plebs and their tribunes reminded the aristocracy during 
the tumultuous 5th century, the republic required the cooperation of the 
orders. That same cooperation was necessary throughout Livy’s history if a 
general was to retain the support of his men. When a general failed to do that, 
or if he acted against the interests of his men, violated the rights the soldiers 
believed they had, or undermined their status, that support would be 
withdrawn and the cooperation would be lost. Many of the generals in Livy’s 
account, such as Valerius Corvus or Porcius Cato, made use of this to the 
benefit of their careers and their reputation. Those who preferred to interact 
with their soldiers with aristocratic arrogance, such as the Fabii, the Appii 
Claudii, Postumius Albinus, Aemilius Paullus, could expect to be reminded by 
their men of this republican dynamic. 
Properly understood, the Livian conception of the plebeian soldier has 
lasting ramifications for our understanding of Livy as an historian. It 
contributes to recent scholarship that refutes the longstanding narrative that 
Livy’s portrayal of military matters was shaped by incompetence or 
disinterest.553 Just as recent work by Koon and Roth have shown that Livy is 
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consistent, competent, and convincing in his handling of battles scenes and 
siege technology, this chapter has demonstrated a similar care when 
portraying the Roman soldier and the experience of military service. Further, 
by establishing that Livy’s plebeian soldier should be read as representative of 
the larger plebeian order and by demonstrating the constant political 
engagement the soldiers show throughout Livy’s history, this understanding 
problematizes attempts to read the Roman people as essentially apolitical 
across large sections of the work, or the tendency to read the first pentad as a 
‘political’ section distinct from the ‘foreign and military’ later books.554 
Livy was, of course, not writing during the early or middle republic. His 
context was Augustan.555 Yet the army he presents in his histories is not that 
of the Augustan age or the civil wars. Rather, when writing about a republican 
Rome, Livy has reconstructed a republican army. The fluid hierarchy – where 
centurions have to earn their rank in each new campaign, men serve for 
intermittent periods, and soldiers occasionally agitate to be discharged – is a 
far cry from the permanent force established by Augustus. Neither is it the 
army of the last decades of the republic. The men show little attachment to 
individual generals, at best they earn the passing praise that Ligustinus gives 
Cato the Elder. There is no cadre of veteran centurions following a commander 
from campaign to campaign, and when mutiny breaks out, it is usually for 
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reasons beyond a desire for loot or land. Livy’s army is something else, 
something different from the armies presented by other ancient historians. 
 
  





Republican Mutiny and Imperial Discipline in Pannonia and Germany 
 
In the early stages of Tacitus’ account of the Pannonian mutiny, the 
commander of the mutinous soldiers, Junius Blaesus, attempted to dissuade 
his men from their seditious path. The words that Tacitus gives the commander 
seem at first glance both sensible and reasonable: 
Blaesus multa dicendi arte non per seditionem et turbas desideria 
militum ad Caesarem ferenda ait; neque veteres ab imperatoribus priscis 
neque ipsos a divo Augusto tam nova petiuisse.556 
Blaesus, with great eloquence, affirmed that the wishes of a soldier 
should not be brought to Caesar by disorder and mutiny; the veterans of 
old never made such unprecedented demands of their commanders and 
neither had they themselves done so of the divine Augustus. 
 
Although Tacitus prefaces the commander’s statement by telling his readers 
that he spoke ‘multa arte’, he refrains from providing the reader with direct 
speech. Instead we are given the bald facts of the speech in an accusative 
infinitive construction. Even with the curtailed version, it is clear that 
something is wrong with Blaesus’ claim. If the reader considers Blaesus’ words 
with even a cursory knowledge of the armies of the Roman republic, his claim 
that the actions of his men had no precedent is demonstrably false.  
The history of Rome’s wars was littered with examples of soldiers 
mutinying in order to communicate their dissatisfaction or demands to their 
commander or the government at Rome. The sources record thirty mutinies in 
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the last fifty years of the republic alone.557 The disingenuous statement ‘neque 
veteres ab imperatoribus priscis’ directly refutes events when veteres did in 
fact address their concerns to their commanders. The previous chapter has 
established the many times that armies in Livy mutinied to express their 
unhappiness. Besides this, the troublesome armies of the Social War, Lucullus’ 
campaigns in the East, and even Caesar’s legions mutinied when they were 
unhappy. Tacitus himself states from the outset that the mutiny arose ‘nullis 
novis causis’ ‘for no new causes’.558 The change of emperor offered a new 
context for mutiny, but, if the circumstances were novel, the grievances were 
those that Roman soldiers had complained about for centuries: the work was 
too hard, the pay too low, and the length of service too long.  
Blaesus’ claim of unswerving obedience under the republic was as 
untrue as his subsequent claim that Augustus had never faced any trouble from 
his troops; Octavian faced his first mutiny in the aftermath of the Sicilian 
War.559 In 31 BC, following the battle of Actium, troops stationed in Brundisium 
mutinied demanding pay and discharge. According to Suetonius, the situation 
was serious enough that Octavian was forced to return quickly to Italy to 
personally satisfy the demands of his men.560 In Dio’s account, the mutineers 
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were recently discharged troops unhappy with their reward and Octavian 
dispatched Agrippa to Brundisium rather than handle the matter himself.561 
Whether the trouble was dealt with personally or by Octavian’s chief general, 
the situation was clearly serious enough to delay the campaign. From the 
beginning, the relationship between Augustus and his troops was not as 
harmonious as Blaesus would have us believe. Nor was the rest of his reign 
placid, in 19 BC Agrippa faced a mutiny while on campaign in Spain and, after 
repressing it, stripped the rebellious legion of the honorific Augusta.562 
Troublesome legions were not even a novelty in Pannonia; in 10 BC Tiberius 
was moved by rumours of mutiny to station his legions in separate camps.563  
What, then, is the reader to make of Blaesus’ disingenuous claims? 
Were they merely a sign of a desperate commander, who, having futilely 
offered his own life to quell the revolt, resorted to bald-faced lies to sway his 
men? Or was Blaesus intentionally attempting to rewrite the history of the 
Roman army to deny his men a traditional avenue of resistance? The answer 
lies in the second part of his claim – that mutiny was not an acceptable way to 
bring grievances to the attention of the princeps. Blaesus’ speech both swept 
away the long republican tradition of mutiny and asserted that under the 
empire soldiers had no recourse to a similar last resort. This new status quo 
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would later be established forcibly and brutally by the sons of Tiberius at the 
end of the mutinies. 
This chapter argues that the interplay between the miles, who 
remember the republic, and the officers, who understand the new context of 
the principate, is central to Tacitus’ account of the Pannonian mutiny.564 
Tacitus has Blaesus state a clear mistruth – that the Roman army had never 
faced serious mutiny – in order invoke those very republican mutinies that he 
is denying. This allows the historian to depict the mutineers as exercising rights 
that soldiers of the republic believed they held and were willing to use to 
protect themselves. The message that Tacitus conveys with the mutiny is that, 
in the new imperial context, the dangers posed to the state by a mutinous army 
invalidated the rights that legionaries had enjoyed under the republic. 
This will be demonstrated by establishing that the events of AD 14 more 
closely resemble mutinies under the republic that the later imperial mutinies 
that Tacitus describes in the Historiae. By placing the events in Pannonia and 
Germany in their republican context, the long Roman tradition of mutiny as a 
form of protest against command will be analysed, alongside the ambiguous 
view of mutiny that prevailed in the republic. This will demonstrate that 
republican soldiers and the men serving under Augustus believed that they had 
the right to oppose command, and even mutiny, when they felt their 
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circumstances were unbearable. Tacitus’ portrayal of the mutiny will then be 
examined to show that while he saw the behaviour of the mutineers as 
republican, he connected it not with the early or middle republic but with the 
chaotic 1st century BC and saw it as inextricably linked to civil war. Finally, an 
exploration of the imperial reaction to, and suppression of, the mutiny will 
establish that the principate understood that mutinous legions posed a threat 
to the new status quo. This led to a response that was distinctly imperial, more 
decisive and brutal than was common under the republic, and allowed the 
imperial authorities to provide an object lesson: that the new status quo could 
not and would not allow Roman soldiers to use mutiny as a form of protest. 
 
The Mutinies of 14 AD as a Republican Moment 
 
The opening of Tacitus’ account of the Pannonian mutiny establishes two 
facts about the event. First, it declares from the beginning that this was a case 
of seditio. Then it states that this was, at the same time, something new and 
something old: 
Pannonicas legiones seditio incessit, nullis novis causis nisi quod mutatus 
princeps licentiam turbarum et ex civili bello spem praemiorum 
ostendebat. 
Mutiny struck the Pannonian legions, prompted by no new causes except 
that the change of emperor offered the license for disorder and the hope 
of profit from a civil war.565 
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This outbreak of mutiny is different from all previous such events in Roman 
history because it arises out of a unique context. The transmission of power 
from one princeps to another had never happened before.566 At the same time, 
by stating that it arose from nullis novis causis Tacitus suggests that the 
soldiers’ grievances were themselves not new.567 The motivations for the 
mutiny are less obvious than Tacitus’ opening statement suggests. The reader 
of this passage has two options. They can accept the authority of Tacitus, who 
ascribed the mutiny to a desire for license and a hope for the profits of civil 
war. Alternatively, they can take the soldiers at their word. In both Germany 
and Pannonia, the soldiers claimed that their actions were prompted by more 
practical and immediate concerns: the men chiefly complained of the length of 
their service, the level of pay, and the quality of their conditions. In Pannonia, 
the ringleader Percennius outlined the poor conditions of legionary service in 
his address to the troops:  
satis per tot annos ignavia peccatum, quod tricena aut quadragena 
stipendia senes et plerique truncato ex vulneribus corpore tolerent. ne 
dimissis quidem finem esse militiae, sed apud vexillum tendentes alio 
vocabulo eosdem labores perferre. ac si quis tot casus vita superaverit, 
trahi adhuc diversas in terras ubi per nomen agrorum uligines paludum 
vel inculta montium accipiant. enimvero militiam ipsam gravem, 
infructuosam: denis in diem assibus animam et corpus aestimari: hinc 
vestem arma tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes 
munerum redimi. at hercule verbera et vulnera, duram hiemem, 
exercitas aestates, bellum atrox aut sterilem pacem sempiterna.568 
Enough wrong had been done through shirking for so many years: old 
men, their bodies very often maimed from wounds, were tolerating 
thirty or forty years’ service; not even discharge put an end to their 
soldiering, but, pitched by the banner, they endured the same toils under 
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a different designation; and anyone who survived so many hazards with 
his life would still be dragged off to different and distant countries to be 
given swampy marshes or uncultivated mountains called ‘land.’ Indeed 
soldiering itself was heavy in cost and unprofitable: soul and body were 
reckoned at ten asses a day, and out of this came their clothing, arms, 
and tents; out of this the savagery of centurions was bought off, the 
exemptions from responsibilities bought. On the other hand, as Hercules 
was his witness, the whippings and woundings, the hard winter, gruelling 
summers, frightful warfare, and barren peace were everlasting.  
 
On the Rhine the mutineers declared that their mutiny was driven by the same 
concerns as the men in Pannonia: ‘venisse tempus quo veterani maturam 
missionem, iuvenes largiora stipendia, cuncti modum miserarium exposcerent 
saevitiamque centurionum ulciscerentur.’ ‘the time had come for veterans to 
demand their due discharge, young men more lavish wages, and everyone a 
limit on their pitiable conditions and to avenge the centurions’ savagery.’569 
Percennius never once mentioned the more sinister motivations alluded to by 
Tacitus; he did not urge civil war or suggest they supplement their meagre pay 
with loot. Rather, he suggests a list of changes to service that they should 
attempt to wrest from Tiberius’ government. 
At no point does Tacitus contradict the soldiers’ claims about their 
conditions, indeed the historian’s narrative independently confirms the 
deprivations of the soldiers independently. Describing the reaction of the 
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soldiers to the speech of Percennius, the historian states that: ‘hi verberum 
notas, illi canitiem, plurimi detrita tegmina et nudum corpus exprobrantes.’ 
‘some remonstrating about the marks of their beatings, others their white hair, 
most of them their worn out coverings and naked bodies.’570 When 
Germanicus arrived in camp many of the mutineers also thronged around him 
to demonstrate their advanced age.571  
The alleged pitiful levels of pay are confirmed elsewhere in Tacitus’ 
narrative. He records that the imperial administration was aware of the effect 
that low wages was having on military service and that this situation was 
constant throughout the early Julio-Claudian period. Bemoaning the lack of 
quality amongst the soldiers a decade later, Tiberius considered resorting to 
conscription to bring the army up to strength:  
voluntarium militem deesse, ac, si suppeditet, non eadem virtute ac 
modestia agere, quia plerumque inopes ac vagi sponte militiam 
sumant.572 
Volunteer soldiery was lacking, and if a supply existed, they did not 
behave with the same courage and restraint, because for the most part 
it was only the impoverished and vagrants who took up soldiering 
spontaneously.  
 
Military service was so unpleasant and unrewarding that by 14 AD that only 
the truly desperate were willing to volunteer for the legions. Such refrains 
about the misery of military service – low pay, distance from home, poor 
conditions and unfair length of service – were, as we shall see, also commonly 
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voiced by soldiers of the republic as justification for their own mutinies. If these 
are the nullis novis causis that lead to the events in Pannonia and Germany in 
AD 14, they are simply another part of an old republican tradition of mutinying 
as way to protest their lot. 
However, even if the reader chooses to accept Tacitus’ judgement that, 
regardless of their conditions, the men were primarily motivated by the desire 
for licence and a hope for the opportunities of civil war, this judgement does 
not necessarily remove the mutiny from the republican tradition. By AD 14 civil 
war and the license that it granted would have been distant memories for the 
soldiers on the frontiers.573 The Battle of Actium was four decades in the past 
and even the men kept under service past their twenty years would likely have 
no personal memory – and certainly no military experience – of civil war. If the 
soldiers on the Rhine and the Danube are mutinying for the opportunities 
offered by civil war then they are doing so because of the opportunities 
enjoyed by their republican forbears.  
Imperial soldiers were inadvertently reminded of the opportunities of 
civil war by the principate itself. The spectre of civil war looms large in the 
official narrative of the Augustan and Tiberian periods. It is invoked early in the 
Res Gestae as one of Augustus’ most important achievements.574 This 
narrative, in which the Julio-Claudian family is all that stands between the state 
and civil strife, was continued under Tiberius. Velleius Paterculus stresses that 
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Tiberius repressed any civil disorder and preserved the pax Augusta.575 The 
Senatus Consultum de Cn Pisone Patre explicitly stated that only the divine will 
of Augustus and the virtues of Tiberius protected Rome from evils of civil 
war.576 The man condemned by the decree, Calpernius Piso, was portrayed as 
a man who attempted to plunge the state into chaos by defying the imperial 
family.577 While such propaganda was intended to legitimise imperial rule and 
reassure the civilian populace, it must also have served to remind the soldiers 
suffering in squalid conditions on the Rhine and the Danube that, during the 
civil wars, their predecessors had enjoyed far better prospects for profit and 
promotion.578 
The republican nature of these mutinies will become clear if we 
compare the mutinies described by Tacitus and periods of military disorder 
under the republic. These, as mentioned before, are the mutiny repressed by 
Scipio in 206 BC and the mutinies of the Social War. The similarities between 
Tacitus' account of the mutinies in AD 14 and Livy’s account of the Spanish 
mutiny of 206 BC have been noted before.579 In the context of my 
interpretation of the republican themes of Tacitus’ account several of these 
similarities are striking and worth consideration. 
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The mutiny of Scipio’s army at Sucro in 206 BC is relatively well 
documented in the ancient sources.580 Appian and Livy provide full accounts 
and there is a fragmented account by Polybius and Dio’s account is epitomised 
by Zonaras.581 As far as can be constructed from the remaining parts of his 
account, all three later sources followed Polybius’ version.582 However, each 
account differs in the details, and it is those details that are most interesting 
when compared to Tacitus account of AD 14. 
The strong linguistic connexions between Livy and Tacitus’ accounts of 
the mutinies have already been analysed by Woodman, and he has shown 
convincingly that both Tacitus and Livy are using the language of medical 
malaise to describe mutiny.583 In this they are preceded by Polybius, who also 
describes the mutiny of 206 BC in medical terms.584 All three approach mutiny 
as a form of disorder, for Polybius the illness is internal, while Tacitus and Livy 
use the language of mental illness. However, Woodman focused carefully on 
the language used and less on the events of the mutinies themselves, and 
restricts his analysis to the accounts of Livy and Tacitus. By considering Tacitus’ 
account of the mutiny of AD 14 alongside all of the accounts of the events of 
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206 BC, we can demonstrate the strong republican flavour he gives the 
mutineers, as well as the way he emphasises the changed imperial context. 
First, excepting Dio, all of the sources describe the mutiny as arising due 
to the idleness and greed of the soldiers, and incited by Scipio’s illness.585 Livy’s 
account is the most detailed:  
motae autem eorum mentes sunt non tum primum cum de uita 
imperatoris rumores dubii allati sunt, sed iam ante licentia ex diutino, ut 
fit, otio conlecta, et nonnihil quod in hostico laxius rapto suetis uiuere 
artiores in pace res erant. 586 
Their disloyalty, however, was not just beginning when unsubstantiated 
reports of the general's imminent danger reached them, but existed even 
before, owing to the usual licence resulting from long inaction. It was also 
to some extent because men accustomed to live unrestrainedly on 
plunder in an enemy's territory felt the pinch of peace-time. 
 
The outbreak of disorder is thus due to three factors: the soldiers’ inherent 
desire for wealth, the deleterious effects of otium, and a gap in the command 
structure caused by Scipio’s illness. According to Tacitus the mutinies of 14 AD 
were caused by the same issues: license given to the soldiers, a desire for loot, 
and a gap in the command structure – the death of Augustus.587 Tacitus’ 
account takes on a more sinister aspect, at least to a Roman reader, as the 
mutineers in Pannonia and Germany consider civil war as the most profitable 
source of loot.588 
Second, like Tacitus, each account’s opening statement of base motives 
is somewhat undermined by its own narrative. As in Pannonia and Germany, 
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Livy has the mutineers voice concerns about their terms of service and the 
narrative confirms that their complaints are based in fact: 
si bellum in provincia esset, quid sese inter pacatos facere? si debellatum 
iam et confecta provincia esset, cur in Italiam non revehi? flagitatum 
quoque stipendium procacius quam ex more et modestia militari 
erat...589 
If there was a war in the province, what were they doing among people 
already pacified? If the war was over now and the province set in order, 
why were they not transported back to Italy? They made demands also 
for their pay with more petulance than accorded with the customary self-
control of the soldier... 
 
In Livy’s account the grievances of the Spanish mutineers are essentially the 
same as those voiced in AD 14: That the men are being kept under the 
standards longer than is necessary, that their service has taken them far from 
home, and that they are not being properly compensated for their time and 
toil. Appian also describes the poor conditions of the soldiers in Spain, though 
he presents it as a result of their own profligate spending.590 These complaints 
are never refuted by Livy. In fact, the mutineers’ two chief demands are 
supported by the narrative. The men are stationed far from home and in an 
area where there is little chance for action, and therefore see no reason why 
they must remain in Spain.591 The men are also correct when they claim that 
they haven’t been paid, and even Scipio does not dispute the accuracy of the 
men’s complaints.592. One of the first steps Scipio takes to address the mutiny 
is to send out tax collectors to the Spanish tributary states and raise the money 
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necessary to pay the men what they are owed.593 The other accounts all make 
reference to the fact that the soldiers are owed pay by their generals.594 
Polybius has Scipio refer to the situation in a meeting with his tribunes.595 Like 
Tacitus’ account of the mutiny of AD 14, the narratives of 206 BC lend credence 
to the mutineers’ demands, even as they dismiss the mutiny as merely the 
result of the soldiers’ greed and desire for otium. 
There are, however, differences in the accounts of the mutiny, and one 
of these is worth discussing here: Livy alone names the ringleaders of the 
mutiny. They are two milites gregarii: C. Albius and C. Atrius.596 The impobable 
names he gives them – Mr. White and Mr. Black – should give the reader 
pause.597 However, by personifying the leaders of the mutiny, Livy ground the 
mutiny in the personal experiences of common soldiers, not simply in the 
general dissatisfaction presented by the other sources. Like Percennius and 
Vibulenus, Livy presents the men responsible for the mutiny are of humble 
origins: both are milites gregarii and neither are from the city of Rome.598 The 
presence of named individual soldiers amongst the mutineers has the effect of 
grounding these events in the practical concerns of the individual miles 
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gregarius. Speaking from the bottom rung of the army, Albius and Atrius, like 
the chief Pannonian mutineers Percennius and Vibulenus, make it clear to the 
reader that the mutiny has its origins in, and is driven by, the desires and 
dissatisfaction of the common soldier. As we shall see later, this has important 
ramifications for the Tacitean mutinies in the context of the shift from the 
republic to the principate.  
Another issue Tacitus raises in his account of the mutinies of AD 14 is the 
urban origin of the troublemakers. In both Pannonia and Germany, the mutiny 
is incited by soldiers who were recruited from the city of Rome. Percennius, 
whose speech marks the shift from disorder to outright mutiny, is described in 
unflattering terms by Tacitus in a way that connects him not only with the city 
but also with a section of the urban populace inclined toward public disorder:  
erat in castris Percennius quidam, dux olim theatralium operarum, dein 
gregarius miles, procax lingua et miscere coetus histrionali studio 
doctus.599 
In the camp was a certain Percennius, once the head of a theatre claque, 
then a common soldier, who had an insolent tongue and had been taught 
by actors how to stir up a crowd. 
 
Tacitus also stresses that the trouble in Germany began among troops 
recruited from the city: ‘vernacula multitudo, nuper acto in urbe dilectu’ ‘a pack 
of freedmen, who had been recently conscripted from Rome’.600 This 
correlation between city recruits and trouble in the ranks appears to have been 
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a recurring issue in the late republic, when there were often disputes between 
armies recruited in the city of Rome and their commanders.601  
Livy’s account of the social war does not make urbans soldiers the 
ringleaders – Albius and Atrius are ‘Calenus’ and ‘Umber’ respectively. 
However, the Social War provides an example of the troublesome nature of 
soldiers recruited from the city. In 89 BC, the consul Porcius Cato struggled to 
keep order in an army that had largely been recruited at Rome.602 The 
objections of Cato’s men also echo one of the primary complaints voiced in AD 
14, that the men under in his army are too old for service and unable (or 
unwilling) to bear hard labour.603 The mounting tension culminates with a 
mutiny in which the army attempt to stone their commander. Cato is only 
saved by the softness of the ground; his men are unable to do more than pelt 
him with mud. There is another striking connexion between this mutiny and 
that described by Tacitus. Dio provides a name to the chief mutineer, Gaius 
Titius.604 This Titius, is described in a way that is remarkably similar to 
Percennius: ‘ἀνὴρ ἀγοραῖος καὶ ἐκ δικαστηρίων τὸν βίον ποιούμενος, τῇ τε 
παρρησίᾳ μετὰ ἀναισχυντίας κατακορεῖ χρώμενος ‘, ‘a man who hung about 
the Forum, making his living in the courts, and abused his freedom of speech 
excessively and shamelessly.’605 He appears to be almost a republican 
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counterpart to Percennius, occupying the public space of the republic – the 
courts and the forum – where Percennius occupies that of the principate – the 
theatre.606 The troublesome nature of soldiers recruited from Rome was 
demonstrated again by another mutiny in 89 and a further one in 83.607 By 
emphasising that the ringleaders of both Pannonian and German mutineers 
were recruited from the city, Tacitus is connecting his account with the 
republican tradition of troublesome urban soldiers.  
Tacitus also strengthens the republican nature of the events of AD 14 
by the use of an unusual adjective used in his description of Percennius. The 
mutineer, Tacitus tells us, ‘contionabundus interrogabat’.608 The verbal 
adjective contionabundus is rare in the ancient sources and appears only once 
in Tacitus.609 Besides that, it only occurs a single time in the SHA and five times 
in Livy.610 Tacitus’ meaning here is ‘he asked, as if he was speaking at a 
contio.’611 This is essentially the same meaning that Livy uses, that of speeches 
made unofficially in the manner of a formal address to the Roman people. The 
usage appears in both political and military contexts and is ascribed both to 
serving magistrates and private citizens. Livy uses it twice in a civilian context 
to describe unofficial addresses to the people of Rome. The first describes the 
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centurion Verginius pleading for his daughter under the decumvirs.612 The 
second describes the former dictator Furius Camillus condemning the 
behaviour of both the senate and tribunes during a period of civil disorder.613 
In both cases the speaker holds no magistracy and the speeches given appear 
to be impromptu and unofficial.  
In a military context Livy deploys it to describe attempts by 
commanders to persuade their men to action. The adjective is used to describe 
the actions of the consul Sempronius took to convince Scipio and the men to 
attack Hannibal at the River Trebia.614 Livy also uses it to describe the actions 
of Aemilius when he was attempting to rally his men to defend the camp.615 
The word appears to describe a way of speaking that is inherently republican; 
speaking to a crowd in an attempt to persuade them to agree to a course of 
action. Its other two uses, once in Livy and once in the SHA, reinforce this 
sense; both describe situations where local politicians attempt to sway the 
people of their city.616 Tacitus’ use of the adjective contionabundus 
strengthens the republican atmosphere of the mutinies by describing 
Percennius’ speech as of a sort more common under the republic than the 
principate and also one that linguistically echoes the contio, both the public 
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gatherings of the republican city and military assemblies of the military 
camp.617 
If Percennius speaks as contionabundus, then it is worth clarifying what 
kind of contio Tacitus means to evoke; the contio could be either a civilian 
gathering or an organised military muster.618 Aulus Gellius, writing under the 
empire, suggests that contio had three meanings: the location and tribunal of 
the speaker, the members of the audience, and the speech itself.619 The word 
was used both for gatherings of citizens within the city of Rome and for 
assemblies in castris. The civilian contio was a public assembly that had three 
defining characteristics: it had to be called by a sitting magistrate, it allowed 
speakers to directly address the public, and it did not have any power to pass 
legislation.620 It generally served one of two purposes. It was primarily used to 
allow a debate on legislative action before it was put to a vote in the tribes.621 
Otherwise, it would be used by candidates to canvas before an election.622 The 
military contio, on the other hand, was summoned by the commander of the 
army, usually to allow him to address his troops.623 
The gatherings of mutineers in both Pannonia and Germany more 
closely resemble the civilian form of the contio than those convened in camp 
by a general. Crucially, during a military contio the troops being addressed 
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stood before their commander in formation.624 During the mutinies the 
soldiers gather together in a disorganized mass, without any separation 
between cohorts or even legions.625 Similarly, during civilian contiones the 
audience was not grouped by tribe or century but rather simply gathered 
around the rostra.626 This has interesting implications for the events of AD 14. 
When first facing the mutinous soldiers, both Blaesus and Germanicus attempt 
to impose some military organisation on the gathered troops. To no avail, 
Blaesus first orders and then begs his men to separate the legionary aquilae 
and cohort standards that the men have grouped together to demonstrate 
their common purpose.627 At first, Germanicus would not even listen to the 
mutinous men until they organised before him in their maniples; eventually, 
the men compromised by gathering roughly by cohort.628 When marching from 
winter quarters to Cologne, the I and XX legions don’t appear to have done so 
in any formation, as Tacitus tells us that they grouped their loot together with 
all of their standards.629 
Since the audience of a military contio paraded in formation and that 
of a civilian contio gathered as a crowd, the attempts by generals to organise 
their men represented an attempt to change these gatherings from disorderly 
civilian activities to something governed by military hierarchy. Germanicus and 
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Blaesus want the legionaries to stand before them as soldiers, but the men 
themselves are determined to speak to their commanders as citizens. The lack 
of any order or hierarchy in the troops listening to Percennius’ speech 
precludes it from being seen as a form of military assembly, rather it matches 
much more closely a civilian contio.630 Here it is serving in both the deliberative 
and electoral senses. Percennius is working to both persuade the men to action 
and to present himself as their leader. Further, the deliberative nature may 
also reflect the republican period as although contiones continued to be held 
under the principate, their primary function was as a way for the imperial 
administration, or the emperor himself, to convey information to the people 
of Rome.631 Prompted by Percennius, the legions in Pannonia are making a 
statement; they, like their forebears in the republican armies, are citizen-
soldiers and retain the rights belonging to Roman citizens. 
Tacitus links the Pannonian and German mutinies back to the mutinies 
of the republic by depicting in his account the same motivations, causes, and 
class of individuals that marked the pattern of mutinies in earlier centuries. 
The republican aspects of the mutinies will become even clearer when 
compared to the distinctly imperial mutinies in Germany in AD 69. 
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The Mutinies of 69 AD as an Imperial Moment 
 
The degree of connexion between the mutinies described in the first 
book of the Annales and those in the first book of the Historiae is complex; 
both narratives involved the outbreak of disorder amongst frontier troops. 
Both also occurred early in their respective works and both were, at least 
partially, set in the German provinces. This has led some scholars to read the 
events of 14 as a precursor to the events of 69. Doing so, however, has the 
possibility of overstating the importance of 69 in the narrative Tacitus’ gives of 
14.632 
Beyond the superficial similarities, however, the mutinies shared little 
in common. The revolt under Galba had different causes, motivations, and 
goals. In the Annales the legions in Germany and Pannonia mutinied during a 
peaceful – albeit uncertain – transition of power between two emperors. In 
the Histories the German legions rebelled in the aftermath of a coup that has 
deposed not just a princeps but the ruling dynasty. The stated motivations of 
the men were also different. While the Tiberian troops mutinied in protest at 
their pitiful pay and poor conditions, the rebellious legions’ motivation in 69 
arose primarily out of concerns about imperial favour.633 The mutineers also 
expressed doubts about the capability of their legate.634 Nowhere in the 
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account of their uprising is any discussion of their dissatisfaction with pay or 
conditions. 
The mutineers in both cases also presented their demands differently. 
The mutineers’ stated goal, as described in the Annals, was to force reform 
within the army. The demands Percennius made in his speech were concrete 
and practical: an increase in pay, a limit to the length of service, and a payment 
on retirement.635 These echo similar demands made by mutineers in the 
republic and under Octavian, which were related to the conditions of the 
soldiers.636 The hopes of the German mutineers in 69 were far grander. While 
Tacitus ascribes a desire for civil war and licence to both mutinies, only the 
mutineers in Germany were explicitly determined to start a civil war.637 In AD 
14 the German legions did offer Germanicus their support should he choose to 
challenge Tiberius, but when he demurred they returned to attempting to 
improve their conditions.638 Even this fits a republican context as a change of 
commander was often one of the demands voiced during a mutiny.639 In 69 the 
men of the German legions were bent not merely on forcing concessions from 
the government, but actually causing a change in that government, with the 
hope that their actions would lead to a new princeps better disposed to the 
German legions.640 
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The mutiny in the Historiae also lacked other aspects shared between 
those in the Annals and during the republic. There was no named individual 
who corresponds with Percennius in Pannonia, the two Caii in Spain, or Titius 
during the social war. The anonymous nature of the unrest in 69 is significant 
as the men were more concerned with the status of the army as a whole and 
the destiny of the empire than the individual complaints of the miles gregarius.  
Absent too was any link between the mutineers and the city of Rome. 
Indeed, Tacitus stresses on multiple occasions how alien the soldiers of the 
German legion appeared to inhabitants of the city. The German legionaries are 
described as ‘tergis ferarum et ingentibus telis horrentes’ ‘bristling with the 
skins of wild beasts and with huge lances’ and Otho’s praetorians deride them 
as ‘peregrinum et externum’ ‘foreigners and outsiders’.641 The men were so 
unfamiliar with Rome that the large crowds of people disturbed them.642  
While Tacitus’ narrative of AD 14 is superficially similar to the imperial 
mutinies he describes in the Histories, in all of the important details it shares 
much more with earlier mutinies occurring under the republic. The urban 
connexion, the complaints about conditions, and the presence of individual 
mutineers all give the Pannonian and German mutinies a much stronger 
republican flavour.  
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Percennius’ Right to Speak 
 
Writing in the nineteen-fifties, Erich Auerbach described the account in 
the Annales of the Pannonian mutiny as totally grounded Tacitus position as a 
man of the highest rank who classified and judged the actors in the narrative 
based on his social position.643 According to Auerbach’s reading Tacitus saw 
the revolt as originating amongst the worst sort of soldier and due merely to a 
suspension of the customary discipline and labour of military service.644 
Following on from Auerbach, Jacques Rancière continues with the idea 
that Percennius is an illegitimate speaker. He claims that Tacitus gainsays 
Percennius before giving him a place to speak both by undermining the 
motivations of the mutineers and by placing it in a period when military duties 
had been suspended.645 Rancière argues that Tacitus sees the motivations of 
the mutineers as suspect not because they are untrue, but because they are 
voiced by a common soldier: ‘Their illegitimacy is not due to their content but 
to the simple fact that Percennius is not in the position of legitimate speaker. 
A man of his rank has no business thinking and expressing his thought.’646 
Certainly, as Auerbach says, Tacitus’ ‘profound contempt’ for 
Percennius is clear from the text.647 The historian takes pains to de-legitimise 
both the mutiny and the speaker before the mutineer speaks. At the opening 
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of the narrative, as we have seen, Tacitus ascribes the revolt to base motives. 
He calls into question the soldiers’ own justifications for the disobedience. He 
attacks the character of Percennius by clarifying his lowly rank, connecting him 
with the theatre, by depicting him as a demagogue, and by referencing his 
‘procax lingua’ ‘insolent tongue’.648 Percennius is clearly the sort of person the 
historian doesn’t want speaking in public. What Auerbach and Rancière have 
missed, I will suggest, is that despite Tacitus’ attempts to discredit him it was 
by no means a settled fact that Percennius was prohibited from speaking in 
public. 
Given the nature of our sources, our understanding of the Roman 
concept of libertas is heavily dominated by aristocratic sensibilities. My focus 
here is not to examine general Roman conceptions of liberty or freedom of 
speech.649 Outlining a universal Roman understanding of Freedom of Speech is 
complicated by the lack of a specific term for it in the Roman sources.650 
Instead, I hope to examine the degree to which Roman soldiers considered 
themselves able to speak back to authority. Two factors complicate the issue. 
Firstly, the Roman conception of libertas has been described as ‘the non-
subjection to the arbitrary will of another person or group of persons.’651 
Secondly, the republic lacked any legal mechanism to repress the speech of its 
citizens.652 When on campaign a soldiers behaviour was regulated by the 
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sacramentum and he was subject to the imperium of his commander, these 
factors would suggest that the citizen serving in the army exercised his libertas 
in a very different context than the man in the street. However, the following 
discussion will demonstrate that there is little difference in the way that 
common Romans conducted themselves in the civilian sphere and the same 
class of citizen behaved when in the camp. 
Certainly, there is a sense in some of the later sources that the lower 
classes were expected to moderate their tone in the presence of their betters. 
Writing under the empire, Quintillian warned that men without illustrious 
ancestry should guard their tongues, ‘nam quae in aliis libertas est, in aliis 
licentia vocatur’ ‘for what is regarded as liberty in some is called licence in 
others.’653 However, Quintillian’s statement should be approached with 
caution, coming as it does from the changed context of the principate. 
Further, if the state lacked any mechanism to repress the speech of its 
citizens, it also lacked a mechanism to protect those who spoke against the 
powerful. Valerius Maxiums provides examples of outspoken men of lower 
status who criticised Pompey Magnus. This is presented, although again by an 
imperial writer, not as reflections on common license but as examples of 
Pompey’s forbearance. Valerius lists a number of occasions when Pompey was 
insulted by men of all ranks: ‘omnis generis hominum licentiae ludibrio esse 
quieta fronte tulit.’ ‘with unruffled countenance he let himself be a mockery to 
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the license of all sorts of men.’654 The anecdotes record citizens of all ranks 
speaking their mind to the great man, from illustrious consuls to a lowly actor.  
Two particular occasions bear examination, the cases of Helvius Mancia 
and the tragic actor Diphilus. While Helvius Mancia, the rustic son of a 
freedman, was denouncing Scribonius Libo before the censors, Pompey 
interrupted the proceedings to mock Helvius’ advanced age and lowly station 
by quipping that he must have come from the underworld. Helvius Mancia 
turned on him and replied that he had indeed come from the underworld, and 
proceeded to list all of the illustrious men he had encountered there who had 
been sent to their deaths by Pompey during Sulla’s proscriptions. He ends his 
rant by stating that ‘omnesque eos una voce indignantes quod indemnati sub 
te adulescentulo carnifice occidissent.’ ‘and all of them, with a single voice, 
indignant that they had been killed without sentence by you, the adolescent 
executioner.’655 Valerius is shocked that such a man, ‘servitutem paternam 
redolenti’ ‘reeking of his father’s slavery’656, felt able to insult Pompey publicly.  
As deplorable as Valerius Maximus finds the impertinence of Helvius 
Mancia, he is even more horrified at the thought of the actor Diphilus, who 
repeated the line ‘miseria nostra magnus es’ ‘to our miseries you are great’ 
while gesturing at Pompey, sitting in the audience. Later in the performance, 
Diphilus repeated the trick, this time with the more sinister warning ‘virtutem 
istam veniet tempus cum graviter gemes’ ‘But that same valour bitterly in time 
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to come shalt thou lament’.657 Once again Valerius expresses shock about such 
a public berating of a grandee of the republic.658 Two things are worth bearing 
in mind. Valerius Maximus is writing in the changed circumstances of the Julio-
Claudian regime and, as he says, his purpose here is to provide anecdotes that 
illustrate Pompey’s forbearance. As Valerius Maximus sees it, the common 
men that talk back to Pompey are only protected from punishment because 
Pompey is willing to permit such challenges to his authority.  
A similar account of the same story is preserved by Cicero in a letter to 
Atticus, though this account lacks the scandalised tone of the later version.659 
Cicero is more concerned with the hostility of the crowd toward Pompey that 
the license shown by the speaker, though he does describe Diphilus as 
speaking ‘petulanter’.660 Unlike Valerius Maximus, Cicero shows no surprise at 
Diphilus’ behaviour, rather the event is reported as part of a discussion of the 
ways that the Roman people have been making their dissatisfaction towards 
Pompey known. Indeed, the disrespect from the actor, the crowd’s positive 
reaction to Diphilus’ improvisation, and hisses at earlier gladiatorial games are 
all cast as the people’s natural reaction to Pompey’s policies. ‘populi sensus 
maxime theatro et spectaculis perspectus est.’ ‘The feeling of the people was 
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shown as clearly as possible in the theatre and at the shows.’661 However, the 
dynamic here is different, certainly crowds making their dissatisfaction known 
was a common occurrence in Rome, and to an extent the anonymous nature 
of a mob offered protection, as reflected in Caligula’s famous remark to the 
crowd at the circus.662 
In the context of individuals speaking publicly to powerful men, Cicero’s 
account of the praeco Granius in the years before the Social War is also 
illustrative. 
consuli P. Nasicae praeco Granius medio in foro, cum ille edicto iustitio 
domum decedens rogasset Granium quid tristis esset; an quod reiectae 
auctiones essent: 'immo vero,' inquit, 'quod legationes.' idem tribuno pl. 
potentissimo homini, M. Druso, et multa in re publica molienti, cum ille 
eum salutasset et, ut fit, dixisset: 'quid agis, Grani?' respondit: 'immo 
vero tu, Druse, quid agis?' ille L. Crassi, ille M. Antoni voluntatem 
asperioribus facetiis saepe perstrinxit impune.663 
Granius, the crier, replied to the consul Publius Nasica in the middle of 
the forum, when he, after a suspension of all judicial proceedings had 
been proclaimed, as he was returning home, had asked Granius ‘why he 
was sad; was it because all the auctions were postponed?’ ‘Rather,’ said 
he, ‘because they have sent back the ambassadors.’ The same man made 
this answer to a tribune of the people, Marcus Drusus, a most influential 
man, but one who was causing great disturbances in the republic. When 
Drusus had saluted him, as is the fashion, and had said, ‘How do you do, 
O Granius?’ he replied, ‘I should rather ask, O Drusus, what are you 
doing?’ And he often reproved with impunity the designs of Lucius 
Crassus and Marcus Antonius, with still harsher witticisms. 
 
As a public praeco, Granius occupied a position higher than that of Diphilius or 
Mancia, however he still ranked below the men he was speaking to.664 The 
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impunity with which an auctioneer was able to publicly lampoon the great men 
of the republic, including tribunes and even a consul, demonstrates the lack of 
restriction placed on the speech of a Roman citizen. At the same time, these 
exchanges appear to happen conversationally, though in public, and as with 
Pompey there is perhaps a sense that Granius was tolerated by the great men, 
after all, both Nasica and Drusus chose to engage him in conversation despite 
his reputation.  
What the stories of Helvius Mancia, Diphilus, and Granius show, 
however, is that these men felt that they had the right to speak frankly against 
the great men of the republic, not just from the safety of a crowd but in openly 
and in public. Cicero goes further. In de Oratore he has Marcus Antonius the 
orator argue that citizens not only have the right to disagree and even disobey 
their superiors, but that they may go further ‘etsi omnes semper molestae 
seditiones fuissent, iustas tamen fuisse non nullus et prope necessarias.’ ‘even 
if all civil disorders were always dangerous, they had on occasion been just and 
almost necessary.’665 
The differing accounts that Cicero and Valerius Maximus give of the 
impudent Diphilus highlight two differing strains of thought concerning the 
people of Rome. The élite sources are all but unanimous concerning the right 
of a republican aristocrat to speak.666 However, it is unclear whether the lower 
orders enjoyed the same right. While this can be explained on account of the 
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élite sources lack of interest in the issue, there is another possibility: the issue 
is not clear to modern scholars because it was not clear to the Romans 
themselves.  
Certain sources, most prominently the early imperial authors Valerius 
Maximus and Quintillian, suggest that the lower orders were supposed to be 
spoken to, not speak for themselves. Others, such as Livy and Cicero, appear 
to view the relation of the people to those of a higher social status more as 
dialogue than dictation. In these narratives it is evident that some Roman 
citizens believed that they had the right to speak up in response to the actions 
of magistrates. 
This difference of opinion concerning whether the relationship between 
the people and the élite was a dialogue or a dictation carried over into the 
Roman military. At the start of his campaign against Perseus of Macedon, the 
famously strict Aemilius Paullus called a contio in the camp and gave a speech 
to his men. In it, he made clear that he did not expect to hear any opinions 
from common soldiers for the duration of the campaign:  
unum imperatorem in exercitu providere et consulere, quid agendum sit, 
debere, nunc per se, nunc cum iis, quos advocaverit in consilium; qui non 
sint advocati, eos nec palam nec secreto, consilia sua. 667 
There should be a single general in an army who foresees and plans what 
should be done, sometimes by himself, sometimes with the advisers he 
calls into council. Those who are not called into council should not air 
their own views publicly or privately.  
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This speech is unique in the ancient sources; in no other recorded instance did 
a Roman general place a similar interdiction on his men.668 His instructions 
were extraordinary; he banned not only public complaints from his soldiers but 
even private griping within the tent lines.  
To Paullus, his men’s only duty was to keep themselves fit to follow his 
commands: ‘militem haec tria curare debere, corpus ut quam validissimum et 
pernicissimum habeat, arma apta, cibum paratum ad subita imperia;’ ‘A soldier 
should concern himself with the following: his body, to keep it as strong and as 
nimble as possible; the good condition of his weapons; and the readiness of his 
food-supply for unexpected orders.’669 Paullus was going to issue orders and 
the men were going to follow them without question or complaint. His 
justification for this is practical, and it highlights how unusual his commands 
are: ‘in quo exercitu milites consultent, imperator rumoribus vulgi 
circumagatur, ibi nihil salutare esse.’ ‘In an army in which the soldiers 
deliberate and the general is led about by the gossip of the rank and file, 
conditions are utterly unsound.’670 The very situation which he decries as nihil 
salutare appears to have been the usual practice in Roman armies. Indeed, Livy 
alludes to this when he states that not only the recruits but also the veterans 
were taught the correct way to conduct a campaign, suggesting that the armies 
in which those veterans served involved much more participation from the 
soldiers.671 
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Aemilius Paullus appears here as the military context for the mind-set 
demonstrated by Valerius Maximus and Quintillian. To Paullus, the Roman 
army ought to be a strict hierarchy and decisions were made from the top 
down with no input from the lower ranks. The serving soldiers were not to 
concern themselves with matters beyond their immediate battlefield 
responsibility and were to refrain from discussing the campaign either publicly 
or in private. 
We are lucky that we have the first-hand accounts of a general who 
appears to have subscribed to the opposing view, or at least wished to signal 
his sympathy for it. Caesar’s Commentarii show an army that accepts and even 
occasionally encourages dialogue between a commander and his men, both 
during the conquest of Gaul and the Civil Wars. They contain passages in which 
Caesar’s men expressed their opinions about his command, both good and 
bad. Interestingly there are also accounts of moments when the demands of 
his men forced Caesar to modify his plans, and even several occasions when 
Caesar is represented actively seeking out the opinion of his men. 
During his campaign in Spain, Caesar was locked in a stalemate with 
Pompey’s legates Afranius and Petreius. When the two armies had been facing 
each other for some time, Caesar was surrounded by his officers, who were 
conveying a message from the army: ‘ne dubitaret proelium committere. 
omnium esse militum paratissimos animos’ ‘urging him not to delay the 
engagement, the soldiers were all eager for a battle.’672 In this case Caesar did 
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not bend to the will of his army and refused to attack Pompey’s forces, hoping 
to force their surrender without bloodshed.673 
At other points in his commentaries, Caesar describes moments when he 
was swayed by the demands of his soldiers and acted against his own 
judgement. Following the capture of the rebellious Gaul Gutruatus, Caesar 
intended to offer the man clemency but his army had other ideas. As his men 
blamed Gutruatus for the dangers and losses of the recent rebellion, they 
insisted that he be punished. Caesar relented, ‘contra suam naturam’, and has 
the man executed.674 It may be that this episode exists in the Commentarii in 
order to exonerate Caesar for the death of a captive, but even so the inclusion 
suggests an audience that was willing to believe that a general’s actions could 
be governed by his men.675 Caesar even shows that, on occasion, the common 
soldiers influenced his tactical decisions. During the same Spanish campaign 
discussed above, Caesar found his army separated from the retreating Afranius 
and Petreius by a swollen river. 
totis vero castris milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti, 
bellum necessario longius duci, centurionesque tribunosque militum 
adire atque obsecrare, ut per eos Caesar certior fieret, ne labori suo neu 
periculo parceret; paratos esse sese, posse et audere ea transire flumen, 
qua traductus esset equitatus.676 
At this sight, the legionary soldiers, running up and down the camp, 
complained that the enemy would escape out of their hands, and the war 
necessarily be prolonged. They addressed themselves to the centurions 
and military tribunes, and desired them to beg of Caesar not to spare 
them; that they feared neither danger nor fatigue, and were ready to 
pass the river as the horse had done. 
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Caesar’s soldiers here were acting in exactly the way Aemilius Paullus tried to 
pre-empt in Macedon. Dissatisfied with their general’s policy, they were 
determined to influence his tactical decisions. In this case they succeeded, 
Caesar again let his men dictate his policy by going against his own misgivings 
and move his army across the river.677 
Even more unusually, Caesar would on occasion gather his men and ask 
their opinion. During the siege of Avaricum, when enemy action left the Roman 
army undersupplied and nearing starvation, Caesar toured the siege lines, 
addressing each legion in turn and making an offer: ‘si acerbis inopiam ferrent, 
se dimissurum oppugnationem diceret’ ‘if the burden of scarcity were too 
bitter for them to bear he would raise the siege.’678 Caesar’s men refused, 
insisting that they could handle the hardship. Of course, it is unlikely that 
Caesar would have either asked or reported the event had he not been sure of 
the answer. He even decided to portray his decision to cross the Rubicon as a 
dialogue between himself and the men. In a twisted reflection of a military 
contio in which a general might call on his men to fight for Rome, Caesar listed 
the many wrongs he had suffered and asked his men to march with him on 
Rome. The men of the 13th Legion agreed.679 
As in the civilian sphere, there appears to have been disagreement 
amongst the élites over whether or not a miles gregarius had the right not only 
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to express his opinions about the conduct of a campaign and the degree to 
which a commander was obliged to listen to those opinions. These opinions 
ranged from a total ban on private complaining under Paullus to even the 
possibility that the men might influence the commander’s decisions, as Caesar 
relates. As with their civilian counterparts discussed above, what emerges 
consistently in the campaigns of both Paullus and Caesar is that the Roman 
soldiers themselves believed that they had a right not only to discuss their 
commanders’ actions and policies amongst themselves but also to express 
concerns and complaints up the hierarchy.  
A soldier within a Roman legion was a Roman citizen and brought with 
him a tradition of independent thought and action. Even when Paullus ordered 
his men not to discuss his orders or policies publicly or in private, they 
immediately began to talk amongst themselves about what a sensible policy 
they found it to be, in direct violation of their general’s decree.680 Detailed 
accounts of Roman military actions show a soldiery that expected to be kept 
abreast of the intentions of their commanders and even on occasion influence 
them.681 The previous chapter illustrated the extent to which Livy’s soldiers 
were willing to debate and protest aspects of their service, but other historians 
of the wars of the republic often show Roman soldiers freely and openly 
discussing aspects of the campaigns, including the orders they have been 
given, religious omens, and even the mood of their commander.682 Most 
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relevantly here, republican soldiers clearly felt they had the right to discuss 
their conditions amongst themselves and with their commanders. Besides the 
examples discussed above, Lucullus had continual trouble with his soldiers in 
the East.683 Even a commander as popular as Caesar felt the need to address 
his men’s grievances on occasion.684 
Just as the mutiny of AD 14 fits the pattern of republican mutinies, so 
Percennius fits into a pattern of troublesome soldiers serving as ringleaders 
and mouthpieces for the dissatisfaction and unrest of their fellow soldiers. 
There seems to be some confusion in the sources about how far the soldiers’ 
rights as citizens protect them in the event of mutiny. Of the thirty recorded 
mutinies at the end of the republic, the sources suggest that only seven were 
successfully repressed by command and in only three did the perpetrators face 
serious punishment.685 When such outbreaks were punished, the sources all 
represent it as working within the framework of the state or the army and 
happening in an organised way. Albius and Atrius, the ringleaders in Spain, 
were executed while Titius was taken to Rome for trial but subsequently left 
unpunished.686 The most troublesome mutineers in Sicily were discharged 
from the army without donative or land grant.687 The situation in Pannonia and 
Germania ended differently. Both mutinies were repressed unofficially and 
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with a degree of personal violence more reminiscent of the imperial capital 
than the republican army. 
A Catiline in the Camp 
 
If Tacitus is portraying the mutinies of AD 14 as an outbreak of 
republicanism amongst the soldiers on the frontier, then his has something to 
say about his opinion of the republic. Certainly he is making a practical point: 
that the events in Pannonia and Germany demonstrated that the republic had 
permanently ended and the principate was irreversibly established. The fact 
that the republic is long past and never to return is a common theme in Tacitus’ 
works.688 However, throughout his works, Tacitus seems to hold an ambiguous 
opinion of the republic.689 An examination of the language Tacitus uses in his 
account of the events of AD 14 suggests that beyond a simple practical point, 
the historian is using the mutiny to make a moral point about the republic in 
general. Tacitus does this in three ways. He delegitimises the mutineers by 
attacking their motives and their personal social and moral status. He also 
discusses the mutineers by using language that associates them with disorder 
and disunity. Finally, he uses language that evokes the conspiracy of Catiline, 
one of the more famous and dangerous moments in the late republic. These 
methods, combined with the graphic violence that ends the mutiny, cast 
republican sentiment amongst the troops as an inherently disruptive force that 
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led inevitably to violence between Roman citizens, and even risked plunging 
the empire into civil war. 
From the moment Tacitus introduces the mutiny he takes pains to 
delegitimize the motives and characters of the men involved. As discussed 
above, the reader is warned from the outset that the men were motivated by 
a desire for the profits available during periods of civil war.690 The ringleaders 
in Pannonia are discredited by their introduction. Percennius is a former 
theatre worker and ‘procax lingua’.691 The soldier Vibulenus is depicted stirring 
up the crowd with blatant lies and exaggerated histrionics.692 As a group the 
Pannonian mutineers were fickle and superstitious, easily led by the lies of 
their ringleaders and cowed by an unexpected eclipse. While Tacitus’ account 
of the mutiny in Germany lacks the defined personalities of the events in 
Pannonia, from the start it is scathing about the men involved. The ringleaders 
are ‘vernacula multitudo, nuper acto in urbe delectu, lasciviae sueta, laborum 
intolerans’ ‘it was – after a levy held recently in the city – an crowd of 
freedmen, inured to recklessness and intolerant of toil. .’693 The older soldiers 
they infect with mutiny are dismissed by Tacitus as men with ‘rudes animos.’694 
Tacitus wants the reader to be clear; the men leading the mutiny and those 
following them were neither respectable nor admirable. These were not 
worthy centurions like Verginius or Sextus Tullius.695 
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O’Gorman has shown that a pervasive feature of the mutiny episodes 
in the first book of the Annales is the repetition of the language of separation 
and conjunction. This is most clear with the use of the competing prefixes of 
dis- and con-, as well as the less common se-. O’Gorman sees this as a stylistic 
choice that allowed the narrative to echo the conflicting definitions of the 
mutineers and the figures of authority.696 Examined in the context of the 
mutineers as representatives of the republic and the officers as those of the 
principate, however, this language suggests a more political point is being 
made. While the narrative and the speeches of the officers use both divisive 
and conjunctive language, the mutineers never use the language of cohesion 
in their speeches.697 Every statement and action taken by the mutineers 
increases the divisive sense of the passages. 
Even in moments when they come together as a group there is a sense 
of disorder. When the mutineers in Pannonia attempted to merge their three 
legions into one, the project immediately collapsed due to infighting as each 
soldier wished to retain the number of his former legion.698 With this plan 
abandoned, the men began piling turf to form a platform for their standards, 
only to abandon the effort when it was half complete at the entreaties of their 
commander.699 Disunity also surfaced when the men begin to punish their 
officers. There is nearly violence between VIII and XV legions over whether the 
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centurion Sirpicus is to be killed. Finally the men of IX are able to diffuse the 
situation with entreaties and threats.700 Even in Germany, where there does 
not appear to have been as severe a breakdown in the discipline of the camp, 
Tacitus is quick to warn his readers not to misunderstand the situation. What 
appeared to be discipline, he warns, was merely a manifestation of the intense 
fury of the soldiers: ‘pariter ardescerent, pariter silerent, tanta aequalitate ut 
regi crederes.’ ‘they were unanimous in their fury and equally unanimous in 
their composure, with so uniform a consistency that one would have thought 
them to be under command.’701 Even when the mutineers appeared 
disciplined it was merely an indication of the danger they pose. Tacitus 
portrays the mutineers as dangerous agents of disorder both through their 
behaviour and through the language used by and about them. This is directly 
connected to the outbreak of mutiny; the soldiers are not described this way 
when acting under orders. 
In Pannonia, Clemens and other popular centurions went about the 
camp attempting to undermine the commitment of the mutinous soldiers. 
Their argument to the troops began with a familiar rhetorical phrase: ‘quo 
usque filium imperatoris obsidebimus?’ 702 ‘How long will you besiege the 
emperor's son?’ This echoes the famous opening of Cicero’s speech against 
Catiline: ‘quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?’703 The 
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connexion is strengthened by the series of questions that follow the opening 
line, which mirror the pattern of Cicero’s speech.704 If Tacitus is linking 
Clemens’ position during the mutiny, and by extension that of Drusus and 
ultimately Tiberius, with Cicero’s during the Catiline conspiracy, then he would 
appear to be granting the moral high ground to the agents of the principate. 
However, as Pagán points out, Clemens’ speech is also remarkably similar to 
the speech Catiline makes in Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae, complicating a simple 
moral reading of the situation.705 In Sallust’s account, Catiline asks his 
followers: ‘Quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissumi viri?’706 If Clemens 
is Cicero then Percennius is Catiline, and the mutiny is simply a rebellion 
against the legitimate authority. If, however, Clemens is to be read as Catiline, 
then the situation become more nuanced. By blurring the positions of 
mutineer and officer, Tacitus paints the mutiny less as a rebellion against 
legitimate authority and more as a civil war. 
The spectre of civil war haunts the episodes of mutiny in AD 14 from the 
beginning. The soldiers’ primary motivation, Tacitus tells us, was the hope of 
profits only available to soldiers during a civil war.707 Even the term he uses for 
mutiny, seditio carries a sense of civil disorder beyond the military context. For 
example when Scipio berates his troops following the mutiny of 206 BC he 
paints the mutiny as both a military and a civilian crime: 
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apud vos quem ad rodum loquar, nec consilium nec oratio suppeditat, 
quos ne quo nomine quidem appellare debeam scio. cives? qui a patria 
vestra descistis, — an milites? qui imperium auspiciumque abnuistis, 
sacramenti religionem rupistis, — hostes?708 
But how to speak to you —for that both thoughts and language fail me. I 
do not know even by what name I ought to address you. Citizens? When 
you have revolted from your country? Or soldiers? When you have 
rejected the high command and the auspices, have broken the sanctity 
of your oath? Enemies? 
 
Under the republic, where soldiers were citizens on temporary campaigns, the 
differentiation between mutiny and civil revolt seems to have been less clear. 
So too with the mutinies in Pannonia and Germany, where the mutineers 
presented themselves as aggrieved citizens. Percennius, then, speaks less as a 
soldier disobeying his commander than a citizen protesting his conditions. 
Scipio’ sentiments are echoed by Germanicus in his speech to the 
mutinous men of I and XX. As in Spain, Germanicus conceived of mutiny as an 
act of both civil and military disobedience, but his phrasing had significant 
differences: 
Quod nomen huic coetui dabo? Militesne appellem, qui fillium 
imperatoris vestri vallo et armis circumsedistis? An cives, quibus tam 
proiecta senatus auctoritas?709 
What name am I to give a gathering like this? Shall I call you soldiers — 
who have besieged the son of your emperor with your earthworks and 
your arms? Or citizens — who have treated the authority of the senate 
as a thing so abject? 
 
Germanicus’ choice of words is illustrative. Whereas republican soldiers were 
soldiers under the imperium of their generals and citizens who owed loyalty to 
                                                          
708 Livy 28.27.3-4 
709 Tac. Ann. 1.42.2 




the patria, imperial soldiers served under an Imperator, no longer an abstract 
political concept but a man with descendants. Here Germanicus was trotting 
out the official line of the Tiberian régime: both Velleius Paterculus and the 
SCPP were clear that it was the person of the emperor that stood between the 
state and civil war.710 The primary pillar of this new order was the allegiance 
owed by the Roman army to the Princeps. Augustus had made this situation 
explicit in the Res Gestae: ‘millia civium Roma(norum adacta) sacramento meo 
fuerunt circiter (quingen)ta.’ The number of Roman citizens who bound 
themselves to me by military oath was about 500,000.’711 The language was 
explicitly personal. Every soldier of the Roman state owed his personal 
allegiance to the emperor. 
That republican sentiment amongst the soldiers would lead to civil war 
seems to have been a foregone conclusion to Tacitus. By AD 14, the Civil Wars 
were thirty-five years past. Even the long-suffering veterans on the Pannonian 
and German frontiers had no personal memory of civil conflict or its 
possibilities for profit. Rather Tacitus is showing that civil war is the natural 
inclination of a republican soldier. Indeed, in both Pannonia and Germany the 
mutiny ends with open conflict between Roman citizens. Tacitus explicitly 
describes the violence at the end of the German mutiny as civil war.712 This is 
the essential point that Tacitus makes by portraying the mutinies as republican 
moments. While the mutineers may have been following the examples of their 
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republican forebears, the exempla they choose were not worthy of admiration. 
The republic that these mutineers represented was dangerous, driven by 
emotion and desire for personal gain, and destined inevitably for civil conflict. 
Percennius evoked the republic as he incited mutiny, but the republic he 
evoked was that of Catiline and the civil wars. 
The Imperial Resolution of the AD 14 Mutinies 
 
The mutinies in AD 14 ended in a markedly different way from their 
republican counterparts. The accounts of the mutinies during the social war 
are too brief to form a detailed picture of their suppression, but Livy describes 
the repression of the Spanish mutiny in great depth. In 206 BC Scipio quelled 
the trouble in three steps. First, he mollified his men, addressing their concerns 
by sending out collectors to the tributary states in Spain to raise the money 
necessary to supply his men with their back pay.713 Then he had the ringleaders 
of the mutiny arrested and brought out of the army camp under guard. He then 
cowed the rest of the mutineers with the presence of troops under 
discipline.714 After addressing the men and castigating them for their 
behaviour, he had the ringleaders executed.715 
This was a straightforward case of the military hierarchy re-establishing 
order. Everything was done officially and out in the open on the orders of the 
army’s commander. The chain of command was involved in the suppression of 
the mutiny as it was the tribunes who were responsible for arresting the 
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mutineers before the commander’s speech. Though we lack the details, the 
sources suggest that the mutiny of Porcius Cato’s army during the social war 
was supressed officially as Dio reports that the ringleader Titius was sent back 
to Rome to face trial, though was not in the end punished.716 As it was a regular 
problem, the republic had methods and means for handling mutiny. Indeed, 
the fact that Titius was tried and acquitted for his part in a mutiny rather than 
summarily executed suggests that there was a legal process that was meant to 
be followed. Mutinies under the republic were resolved within the framework 
of the republic, either through the exercise of a general’s imperium or the legal 
apparatus of the state. 
There was nothing republican in the way the Pannonian and German 
mutinies was finally suppressed. Though both AD14 mutinies ended similarly, 
with order restored through chaotic violence, the early responses to the 
trouble from the sons of Tiberius differed in interesting ways. From the outset 
the response to the Pannonian mutiny was distinctly imperial. Tiberius 
dispatched his son Drusus to deal with the trouble. The young Claudian was 
accompanied with the manifestations of his father’s power; two praetorian 
cohorts, a large detachment of Praetorian cavalry, and some of Tiberius’ 
German bodyguards. The future prefect Aelius Sejanus,  the man who would 
preside over the brutal manifestation of Tiberius’ imperial power in later books 
of the Annales, was also present.717 Throughout his interaction with the men 
Drusus stressed his position as a conduit between the soldiers and their 
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emperor. Further, he informed them that any changes to the conditions of the 
soldiers would go through the imperial family. Tiberius’ own letter reinforced 
this point: 
Ubi primum a luctu requiesset animus, acturum apud patres de 
postulatis eorum ; misisse interim filium ut sine cunctatione concederet 
quae statim tribui possent ; cetera senatui servanda...718 
The first moment his spirit rested from its grief, he would discuss their 
demands before the fathers; meanwhile he had sent his son to concede 
without hesitation whatever could be granted immediately; the rest had 
to be kept for the senate...  
 
Tiberius’ letter, however politely written, firmly informed the troops that they 
had no direct recourse to the senate. He and his son would handle their 
complaints, and bring them before the senate when the emperor thought it 
appropriate. 
When an eclipse began to erode the confidence of the Pannonian 
mutineers, Drusus seized the opportunity and ordered the centurions 
regarded as reliable, led by Julius Clemens, to go out and undermine the 
mutiny. This process looked nothing like the public speech given by Scipio in 
Spain or even the public complaints of the mutineers themselves: 
accitur centurio Clemens et si alii bonis artibus grati in vulgus. hi vigiliis, 
stationibus, custodiis portarum se inserunt, spem offerunt, metum 
intendunt.719 
The centurion Clemens was summoned with those others whose good 
qualities had endeared them to the troops. These men mingled with the 
pickets, sentries, and gate guards, offering hope and stoking fears. 
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While Percennius’ speech was made in public – contionabundus, – to a 
gathering of men, the message of the centurions is portrayed almost as 
rumour, with no clear speaker or listener.720 Here Tacitus provides a glimpse 
of the old Rome and the new. Percennius, speaking openly and publicly, 
evoked the republic. Clemens, whispering in the dark and appealing to 
individual hopes and fears, was an agent of the principate. 
The final moments of the mutiny were also marked by deceit and 
personal violence. Drusus had the ringleaders of the mutiny, Percennius and 
Vibulenus, summoned to headquarters and then quietly killed. Tacitus says 
that this was done so secretly that some accounts record that the bodies were 
buried inside the tent.721 Percennius’ career as a mutineer began with a public 
speech before the camp and ended with a private killing in his commander’s 
tent. The final suppression of the remaining mutineers was equally unofficial 
and violent: 
Tum ut quisque praecipuus turbator conquisiti, et pars, extra castra 
palantes, a centurionibus aut praetoriarum cohortium militibus caesi: 
quosdam ipsi manipuli documentum fidei tradidere.722 
Search was then made for all the chief mutineers. A part, roaming 
outside the camp, were cut down by the centurions or by soldiers of the 
praetorian cohorts. Some others the maniples handed over in proof of 
their loyalty. 
 
It is true that neither the chief mutineers in Spain nor those in Pannonia faced 
trial; as Imperator Scipio held the right to summarily execute his men. 
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However, the executions in Spain were handled publicly, before the assembled 
troops, and proceeded in an orderly manner. In AD 14 there was no official 
procedure or organised executions. While the Spanish mutiny was ended 
through the public reestablishment of military hierarchy, the Pannonian 
mutiny ended with a series of private killings and betrayals. Conspicuously 
taking an active part in the bloody suppression were the praetorians, the 
household guards of the emperor, responsible on the frontiers at the beginning 
of Tiberius’ reign for the extrajudicial killing of Roman citizens, a purpose they 
would later serve in his reign back in Rome. The connexion with the later dark 
days of Tiberius is further strengthened by the presence of the Sejanus, 
attached to Drusus’ staff as an advisor.  
Germanicus’ early response to the mutiny in Germany was substantially 
more moderate than that of Drusus.723 Unlike Drusus, Germanicus did not 
arrive in camp surrounded by the trappings of imperial power. His early 
statements to the mutineers also adopted a different tone from that of his 
adoptive brother. While Germanicus connected Tiberius to Augustus, he 
primarily painted Tiberius as their former commander, not as their princeps. 
His statement concerning the reaction of the empire to Tiberius’ ascension is 
also interesting: ‘Italiae inde consensum, Galliarum fidem extollit: nil usquam 
turbidum aut discors.’ ‘He praised the concord in Italy and the loyalty of the 
Gauls; nowhere else was there disorder or dissent.’724 The consensus required 
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in Italy was made clear in contrast to the situation in the provinces; as 
provincials, the Gauls were expected to be loyal, as citizens the Italians 
supported the government. This framing is important as the men of the 
German legions were citizens and, in AD 14, still predominantly recruited in 
Italy.725 What Germanicus expected from his men was the consensus of 
citizens, not the fides of provincials. When he addressed the mutiny directly, 
he framed their behaviour as a breakdown of military discipline: ‘ut seditionem 
attigit, ubi modestia militaris, ubi veteris disciplinae decus.’ ‘when he touched 
on the mutiny he asked where was the military subordination, where the 
famous traditional discipline?’726 Like Blaesus, as we saw at the beginning of 
the chapter, he unfavourably compared their behaviour to that of their 
predecessors, but he spoke in abstract concepts. Unlike the Blaesus, 
Germanicus made no mention of either the current or the former princeps. 
As the situation in German failed to improve, there was a hardening of 
tone from command when they addressed the recalcitrant soldiers. This shift 
appears to have originated not with Germanicus but lower down the military 
hierarchy. Fearing a mutiny amongst his own troops, the commander of a 
detachment, Marcus Ennius, ended up outraging his own troops by executing 
two of their number. Facing down an angry mob, the prefect warned his men 
that violence against his person was also violence against the imperial system: 
‘non praefectum ab iis, sed Germanicum ducem, sed Tiberium imperatorem 
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violari.’ ‘It was not their prefect, but Germanicus, their general, but Tiberius, 
their emperor, they were insulting.’727 Ennius’ actions marked a shift in 
approach in comparison to the early stage of the mutiny. The cooperative, 
conciliatory approach that Germanicus began with had been replaced with 
unilateral action taken, Tacitus writes, ‘concesso iure’.728 
By the time of his harangue of the I and XX in Cologne, Germanicus’ tone 
had changed completely. As he instructed the reliable soldiers to distance 
themselves from the mutineers he spoke not of co-operation but of obedience:  
si legatos senatui, obsequium imperatori, si mihi coniugem et filium 
redditis, discedite a contactu ac dividite turbidos : id stabile ad 
paenitentiam, id fidei vinculum erit.729 
If you restore the legates to the senate, your obedience to the emperor 
and my wife and son to me, if you break association with and point out 
the mutineers, this will be the foundation your repentance and make 
clear your loyalty.  
 
The language of conciliation was by now long gone. The only recourse for the 
soldiers was to submit fully to the authority of the imperial family. The mutinies 
in Germany were quelled in an equally unofficial and bloody fashion as those 
in Pannonia. Germanicus’ speech managed to shame the men into obedience, 
and he allowed them to demonstrate their loyalty by punishing the mutineers 
themselves. This leads to a scene of mob violence where the ringleaders were 
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thrown to a crowd of vengeful soldiers without any semblance of order or legal 
process.730 Tacitus himself calls it an act of invidia and saevitia.731  
The commander of the second mutinous camp supressed his men 
before Germanicus could arrive with loyal troops. Much like in Pannonia, 
Caecina secretly summoned his officers and sent them out into the camp to 
quietly alienate the mutineers. When the disloyal ones had been identified, 
they were massacred at a secret signal from command.732 Here again the 
command structure re-established itself not with a public imposition of justice 
but with a series of extra-judicial killings. Tacitus framed this as a new variety 
of civil war. ‘diversa omnium quae umquam accidere civilium armorum facies.’ 
‘This was unlike any other civil war.’733 
The mutinies of AD 14 had begun as a republican moment, but their 
suppression was purely imperial. The images of soldiers denouncing their 
fellows, of men quietly killed by government representatives, and of 
praetorians stalking the camp with the blood of citizens on their swords evoked 
the later years of Tiberius’ reign. This was how the imperial state would 
respond to challenges to its authority. By emphasising the brutality of the 
government in re-establishing order, Tacitus firmly shows that soldiers of the 
principate do not hold the rights of their forebears. The fundamental message 
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of Tacitus’ account of the mutinies of AD 14 is one that he returns to again and 
again in his work: the republic is gone for good. 
Conclusion 
 
What, then, is Tacitus telling the reader happened with the troops in 
Pannonia and Germania? Part of the answer lies in his statement that the 
mutiny arose nullis novis causis. That answer is complicated by the apparent 
difference between what Tacitus tells the reader and what his narrative shows. 
As discussed in the opening of this chapter, Tacitus’ account ascribes two sets 
of causes to the mutiny of AD 14. At the outset of the mutiny he informs the 
reader that the trouble came from the opportunity for disorder offered by the 
death of an emperor and the hope of a profitable civil war. In his narrative of 
the episode and in the speeches of the troops themselves, their dissatisfaction 
with the conditions of their service plays a far more prominent part.  
The simplest way to read this episode would be to decide which of the 
causes Tacitus’ nullis novis causis refers to. If the mutiny sprang from 
frustration at the circumstances of military service, as Percennius claimed, 
then the events of AD 14 fell within the tradition of the republic. It was a revolt 
against military authority to express the men’s dissatisfaction at their 
conditions. If, as Tacitus states, the revolt was caused by the interregnum 
following the death of Augustus and the prospect of loot, then the mutiny 
challenged the legitimacy of the government and risked civil war. At first 
glance, then, the reader is forced to decide whether to believe the voice of the 
historian or his narrative. 




Such differing interpretations of events are also present in the 
perceptions of the actors. The soldiers behaved as if their actions were justified 
and within their rights as Roman soldiers. As we have seen, their mutiny fits 
within a long tradition of disorder and protest in the armies of the republic. 
They also behaved as though they were working within the structure of the 
Roman state, even as they rejected the immediate military hierarchy. When 
the Pannonian mutineers threatened violence against a senatorial 
representative it was because they feared that the representative will oppose 
their cause in the senate.734 
The violent response from the imperial authorities suggests that 
command interpreted the situation in a markedly different way. They saw the 
mutiny as inherently revolutionary and warned the men repeatedly that they 
were operating in opposition not only to their commanders but also to the 
political order. Both Germanicus and the prefect Ennius told the men that their 
actions were tantamount to violence against the imperial family. The 
centurions in Pannonia, led by Clemens, even suggested that the mutineers 
intended to replace the imperial family with Percennius and Vibulenus, though 
the mutineers themselves had made no such suggestions.735 
The confusion in the narrative stems from the misinterpretation of the 
situation by the mutineers. In the opening sentence of his account of the 
events of AD 14, Tacitus states that the mutiny arose from no new causes 
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except that the change of emperor offered the chance for disobedience.736 This 
statement provides two vital pieces of information about the mutinies: that 
the cause was similar to mutinies in the republic and that the context was the 
new process of the transmission of imperial power. The tension between the 
old cause and the new context was ultimately irreconcilable. Percennius, 
Vibulenus, and the other mutineers have failed to understand the new context 
for their mutiny.  
By mutinying against their terrible conditions, the legionaries in 
Pannonia and Germany followed in the same tradition as their forebears. 
Those republican citizen-soldiers had, or believed they had, the right to protest 
their conditions during their military service. As we have seen, such protests 
were common under the republic and frequently resulted in open mutiny. 
Particularly in Livy’s conception of the republic, while the act of mutiny could 
significantly affect the republic’s ability to prosecute a war, but it did not in 
itself pose a threat to the stability of the state. That mutiny did not offer Rome 
an existential threat may account for the ambiguous republican attitude to 
mutiny, the result of which was that Cicero felt able to describe the mutinous 
behaviour of Lucullus’ legions in the East as little more than an understandable 
desire to return home.737 
By AD 14 the context had changed. Rebellious soldiers no longer 
challenged the authority of generals appointed by the senate, they challenged 
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the authority of Tiberius, the head of the imperial state itself. For the outset 
the mutiny is portrayed by Tacitus as inherently violent, disordered, and 
headed inevitably towards civil war. The loyalty of the soldiery was crucial to 
the imperial regime and the social order. Simply by exercising their traditional 
rights the armies in Pannonia and Germany threatened to return Rome to the 
violence of the last decades of the republic. 
The threat that disorderly troops posed to the state influenced the 
rhetoric of discipline and punishment during the principate. Writing under the 
republic, Sallust describes the correct approach to maintaining discipline. To 
his mind punishment was best tempered with moderation and employed 
alongside good examples from command and appeals to the honour of the 
men.738 In the imperial sources there is a much stronger emphasis on strict 
discipline enforced with brutal punishment. Tacitus speaks with approval of 
the brutal methods used to quell the mutinies in AD 14, describing even extra-
judicial executions as bona exempla.739 He speaks similarly well of the extreme 
severity employed by Corbulo to toughen his troops in Syria.740 Velleius 
Paterculus celebrates the severitas employed by Germanicus and Drusus in the 
suppression of the mutinies.741 Also writing under Tiberius, Valerius Maximus 
puts it bluntly: ‘aspero...et absciso castigationis genere militaris disciplina 
indiget’ ‘military discipline requires a direct and cruel form of punishment.’742 
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As discussed above, the fact that the Julio-Claudian family was the only 
thing that stood between Rome and a return to the civil wars was a common 
narrative in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius. It is present in both official 
proclamations and the writings of Velleius Paterculus. Tacitus himself begins 
the Annales with an account of the republic’s descent into civil war and the rise 
of Augustus and the establishment of peace.743 If the principate was the 
primary bulwark against civil conflict, then to challenge the authority of the 
system was inevitably to court civil war. Any such challenge must be dealt with 
swiftly and decisively.  
In this new context, the act of mutiny was no longer an acceptable way 
for soldiers to express their grievances, no matter whether those grievances 
were or where not legitimate. Germanicus demonstrated this in Germany. 
Even as he was preparing to supress the mutineers, he made what concessions 
he could by paying donatives and discharging those held past their length of 
service.744 This was not merely an attempt to play for time, as he made the 
same concessions to the loyal and ordered legions of Upper Germany.745 
Further, as soon as the mutiny had been repressed, Germanicus immediately 
took steps to address another of the complaints that had provoked the 
disorder by discharging any centurions known to be greedy or brutal.746 
Germanicus accepted the legitimacy of their complaints, and once order had 
been restored and the leading mutineers punished, once the men had learned 
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that mutiny was not going to be tolerated, those complaints could be 
addressed. The message from the imperial family was clear; the men no longer 
enjoyed the same rights as their republican predecessors. The Roman army 
was no longer one that would tolerate mutiny as a form of protest from the 
lower ranks. 
Primarily, this and the following chapter push back firmly against the 
tendency to assume in Tacitus a dismissive and wholly negative conception of 
the Roman soldier as simply an armed vulgus.747 The soldier depicted in the 
mutiny of AD 14 is a nuanced individual, with practical interests and capable of 
organising in order to agitate for them. It is certainly not the case that Tacitus 
does not consider him a citizen, as others have asserted.748 Rather, the 
mutinous soldiers of Pannonia and Germania are keenly aware of their status 
as citizens, and attempt to assert that they retain the rights that their 
predecessors of the Republic held.  
Velleius Paterculus’ brief account of the Pannonian and German 
mutinies explicitly accuses the mutineers of wanting to destroy the state: 
‘novum ducem, novem statum, novam quaerebant rem publicam.’ ‘They 
wanted a new leader, a new order, and a new republic.’749 Except for a half-
hearted attempt by the German legions to offer the throne to Germanicus, 
Tacitus does not depict the mutineers as hoping for regime change. Indeed, 
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even if their inclination was towards civil war, it was driven by the hope of loot, 
not a change of government.750 They did not desire a new republic because 
they had failed to understand that they no longer served the old republic. 
Percennius, Vibulenus, and the ringleaders of the German mutinies believed 
that they, as citizen soldiers, still retained the rights that the new social order 
had made obsolete. This was the purpose of Blaesus’ lie. He warned his men 
that Roman soldiers no longer had the right to mutiny in protest of their 
conditions, then he attempted to soften the blow by suggesting that they never 
did anyway. Germanicus and Drusus established with steel and blood what 
Blaesus had failed to do multa arte: that ‘non per seditionem et turbas 
desideria militum ad Caesarem ferenda ait’ ‘the wishes of a soldier should not 
be brought to Caesar by disorder and mutiny.’ 
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Tacitus’ Historiae and the Loyal Soldier 
 
As is to be expected during a civil war, the army of the Historiae is a 
fractured army. Obviously, it is fractured between the major factions backing 
the emperors Otho, Vitellius, and Galba. In this chapter, these factions will 
largely be referred to by the Latin term used by Tacitus: Othoniani, the 
Vitelliani, and the Flaviani.751 It should be stressed, of course, that membership 
in these factions is not necessarily set in stone, may of the Othoniani – in 
particular the Praetorians and the Danube Legions – ended up supporting 
Vespasian after Otho’s death, and there was a general defection of officers 
from Vitellius to Vespasian as their emperor’s fortunes waned. The degree of 
fracturing that Tacitus portrays goes deeper. The army described in the 
Historiae is one with destructive – or at least disruptive – rivalries and mistrust 
between units. Even within those units the army remains fractured even down 
to the individual soldier. Further, it is evident from the Annales that, though 
the civil war was an exceptional period, the dynamics that contributed to the 
fracturing of the army were present in the earlier period. The cause of this 
fracture was the fact that that the primary social and political bond that drove 
a Roman soldier was not his relationship to his comrades, nor his place in the 
hierarchy of the legion. It was not even his position as a Roman citizen, it was 
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his personal loyalty to his emperor. According to Syme, as discipline broke 
down ‘the soldiery recaptured, as it were, the rights of citizens.’752 Yet the 
soldiers of AD 69 show few of the traditional traits of Roman citizen-soldiers. 
An analysis of the way that these soldiers interacted with their emperor, the 
military hierarchy, and the larger Roman state will establish that these soldiers 
had very little in common with the soldiers of the republic. 
The army described by Tacitus in the Historiae is an army of individuals 
and each of these individuals is motivated by his own ambitions and fears.753 
Sallust’s understanding of military service paints it as a grand, unifying 
experience – at least so long as it is done under an old-fashioned, vigorous 
general – that brings plebeian and aristocrat together and reaffirms Roman 
values. To Livy, military service unified the plebs but maintained their position 
– carried over from the civilian sphere – in opposition to the patres. In both the 
communal nature of military service is emphasised. To Sallust the army was a 
unified entity, good or bad depending on the ability and diligence of their 
general. In Livy the plebeian soldiery acted in unison, sharing the same values 
and motivations. This sense of common feeling is present in the opening of the 
Annales, where Tacitus frames the mutinies of AD 14 as an echo of the 
republican soldier’s willingness to assert himself. 
                                                          
752 Syme (1959: 169) 
753 There is a tendency among scholar’s to play up Tacitus’ disdain for the soldiery and suggest 
a universal pattern of behaviour characteristic of the miles gregarius E.g. Mellor (1993: 56-57); 
Chilver (1979: 101); Flaig (1992: 25-26). However, Tacitus’ account does not support this. He 
regularly refers to both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ elements among the soldiery (e.g. Hist. 1.16.3) and 
the worst behaviour of the soldiers comes when the ‘good’ are absent or cowed. 




In the Historiae, soldiers are somewhat different. The milites gregarii 
distrust their officers and hate their centurions and even amongst themselves 
there is little evidence of common sentiment and almost no evidence of any 
organised communal action. The rhetoric of commilitio is common in the civil 
war of AD 69, often invoked by aristocrats hoping to win support from the 
men.754 Despite this, actual displays of common feeling between soldiers of 
different units are rare in the Historiae. Again, this can be compared to the 
Annales, where Corbulo’s men display common feeling when meeting the 
survivors of Paetus’ army.755  
This chapter will argue that unlike the army conceived of by Sallust and 
Livy – and indeed the army he himself presented in AD 14 – Tacitus’ army of 
the Historiae is an army of individuals, and that military service never truly 
unifies the men under the eagles. Rather military service results in a strong 
personal bond between the emperor and the soldier, which overrides other 
bonds the soldier might have. In AD 69, when the state is fractured between 
multiple emperors, the overriding loyalty individual milites have to their 
emperor leads in places to the collapse of military hierarchies, but in other 
times to the fracturing of armies not only from each other, but from the civilian 
society of the empire. It is this fracture that results in violence towards other 
armies and civilians and marks the soldiers of the civil war. 
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An Army of Individuals 
 
Tacitus often portrays soldiers as acting in different ways and from 
different motives, without common cause and with little organisation. He 
emphasises this nature by having them susceptible to individual persuasion 
and private subversion. By doing so he presents a picture of the Roman army 
that is much more atomised and fractured than those provided by Livy and 
Sallust. This image of the miles gregarius as an individual part of a larger 
organisation is made clearer by Tacitus’ regular focalisation, which provides 
the reader with a sense of the emotional state of the soldier, particularly in 
dramatic moments, including on the eve of battle and outbreaks of mutiny. 
Further, Tacitus regularly records the names of the common soldiers who 
populate his narrative. 
The chaotic events in Rome leading up to the assassination of Galba 
provide an excellent case study of the Roman army as a force composed of 
men of differing motivations, aims, and interests. When Otho was carried off 
to be proclaimed emperor, Tacitus makes it clear that the soldiers were not 
acting communally and with a singular purpose: 
ibi tres et viginti speculatores consalutatum imperatorem ac paucitate 
salutantium trepidum et sellae festinanter impositum strictis 
mucronibus rapiunt; totidem ferme milites in itinere adgregantur, alii 
conscientia, plerique miraculo, pars clamore et gladiis, pars silentio, 
animum ex eventu sumpturi.756 
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There three and twenty soldiers of the body-guard saluted him as 
Emperor, and, while he trembled at their scanty number, put him hastily 
into a chair, drew their swords, and hurried him onwards. About as many 
more soldiers joined them on their way, some because they were in the 
plot, many from mere surprise; some shouted and brandished their 
swords, others proceeded in silence, intending to let the issue determine 
their sentiments. 
 
This picture of the mutinous soldiers coming together as a mob, almost by 
chance as the procession moves through the city underscore how little 
organisation and planning had gone into the soldiers’ plot to overthrow Galba. 
It also mirrors the coming together of the mutineers in the Annales and 
demonstrates that Tacitus’ army was much more atomised than that of Sallust 
or Livy. This is clarified if the scene is compared to the actions of the Plebs in 
the first secession, where all were acting in harmony and with a communal will 
and purpose. Here, instead, Tacitus provides an image of a group of soldiers, 
some of whom were committed, some of whom were merely waiting to 
commit until the outcome is clear, and many who were simply confused. 
This mixed bag of soldiers, with different loyalties and motivations is 
also evident in the reaction to Piso’s speech. There too some of the soldiers 
were ignorant of the plot, while others – it is suspected – were merely play-
acting loyalty.757 Tacitus makes the same point about the Vitelliani as they 
begin to rise against Galba: ‘multi in utroque exercitu sicut modesti quietique 
ita mali et strenui.’758 ‘As there were many in both armies who were loyal and 
restrained, so there were many who were unprincipled and unruly.’ The chaos 
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that marked Otho’s proclamation at the Praetorian camp was also part of this, 
there was no control or direction. The army behaved as a mob, seizing 
individual soldiers and bringing them before the pretender to swear allegiance. 
Even Otho was unable to exert any control or organisation.759 Unlike in other 
accounts of Roman soldiers, the soldiers in Tacitus were much more likely to 
take action individually and on their own initiative, such as when individual 
soldiers took it on themselves to spy on senators suspected of insufficient 
loyalty to Otho.760 Similar initiative was shown by the praetorians 
accompanying the embassy to Valens, who took care to watch the senators for 
any suspicious behaviour.761 
People within Tacitus’ account were aware of the Roman army as a 
collection of individuals and used it to further their own ends. When soldiers 
were corrupted, as by Otho and his cronies, the corruption often began at the 
individual level, indeed, Tacitus names the individuals who first began to act in 
Otho’s name: Barbius Proculus and Veturius.762 Similarly when important 
Romans were denounced under Tiberius or Claudius, they were often accused 
of conspiring with individual members of the Praetorian Guard.763 During 
Vitellius’ march to Italy, the people of Lugdunum took advantage of the 
individual sensibility of the Vitelliani to prompt them to attack the rival city of 
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Vienna: ‘Lugdunenses extimulare singulos militum et in eversionem 
Viennensium impellere.’764 ‘the people of Lugdunum began to work on the 
passions of individual soldiers, and to goad them into destroying Vienna.’ This 
tactic was particularly successful, so much so that the officers of the legion 
doubted that they could restrain the men.765  
Fortunately, the people of Vienna also understood how to manipulate 
the soldiery, and were able to divert the army also by appealing to them 
individually: ‘cum haud ignari discriminis sui Viennenses, velamenta et infulas 
praeferentes, ubi agmen incesserat, arma genua vestigia prensando flexere 
militum animos.’766 ‘the people of Vienna, aware of their danger, assumed the 
veils and chaplets of suppliants, and, as the army approached, clasped the 
weapons, knees, and feet of the soldiers, softening their hearts.’ This constant 
appeal to the greed or emotion of individual soldiers was in contrast to the 
attempts to subvert or persuade soldiers of the republic, described by Livy, 
where the men were approached in public, and as a group.767 The Tacitean 
soldier was much more susceptible as an individual to personal persuasion, and 
was often worked on in private. 
Tacitus also uses internal focalisation to provide the reader with insight 
into the personal feelings and motivations of the common soldier, something 
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uncommon to other historians.768 He makes explicit the mixed opinions, 
feelings and motivations of the Othoniani during the plot against Galba, 
demonstrating that it was hardly a concerted or unified action: ‘isque habitus 
animorum fuit ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes 
paterentur.’769 ‘Such was the temper of men's minds, that, while there were 
few to venture on so atrocious a treason, many wished it done, and all were 
ready to acquiesce.’ He also often uses battle narratives as a chance to present 
the feelings of the individual soldier.770 There are many examples of this. The 
reader is given a sense of the mood of the soldiers about to fight Tacfarinas’ 
soldiers in Africa.771 So too does Tacitus describe the insulted anger of 
Germanicus’ men when Arminius’ soldiers tried to convince them to defect by 
offering wealth and land.772 During the Iceni revolt, Tacitus vividly describes 
the fury and savagery of the Roman soldiers following the destruction of 
Londinium and Camoludonum.773 In the Historiae, Tacitus gives an account of 
the thinking of the common soldiers before the battle of Cremona: ‘illa sibi 
quisque...’774 ‘each one to himself said this...’ Here Tacitus is not reporting the 
rumours or mutterings of the camp, but rather providing the reader with 
insight into the thoughts and motivations of the soldiery. Further, it is framed 
not as the general mood of the army, but as the individual thoughts of 
                                                          
768 Ash (1999: 21-22, 27-28) 
769 Tac. Hist. 1.28 
770 Formicula 2013: 148 
771 Tac. Ann. 3.25.3 
772 Tac. Ann. 2.55.3-6 
773 Tac. Ann. 14.37.1 
774 Tac. Hist. 3.19.1 




individual men. In comparison, neither Sallust nor Livy use focalisation 
regularly if at all.775 
One final aspect of Tacitus’ works that contributed the sense of the 
Roman army as a collection of individuals is his tendency to provide the reader 
with the names of common soldiers far more often than other historians. 
Whereas centurions are regularly named by the ancient historians, it is 
uncommon for the names of milites gregarii to be given.776 Livy does give the 
names of Albius and Atrius, the ringleaders of the mutiny as Sucro, but this is 
an exceptional case.777 Sallust does not name a single miles in his work. 
Tacitus, on the other hand, often provides the name of common 
soldiers. Through him we know the names of the ringleaders of the Pannonian 
mutiny, Percennius and Vibulanus, and the men first approached by Otho, 
Barbius Proculus and Veturius. Tacitus also gives the name of the soldier who 
signalled the assassination of Galba, Atilius Virgilio and his assassin, either 
Terentius or Camurius.778 He also names the killers of Vinius, and Piso, and 
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names a deserter, Aemilius Longinus.779  He records the Praetorian Cocceius 
Proculus, whom Otho helps with a legal dispute.780 Though the roll call is 
mostly dominated by mutineers and assassins, Tacitus also occasionally names 
more respectable soldiers, such as Rufus Helvius, a miles gregarius who 
received the civil crown for service in Africa.781 Unlike Sallust or Livy, Tactius’ 
Roman army is populated with milites gregarii whom the historian has turned 
into named individuals. 
This presentation of the Roman army as a group of individuals has 
effects on the surrounding narrative. The way that Tacitus presents Roman 
soldiers as distinct from their fellows by quality, motivation, mood and name 
has been discussed. Just as individualising the Roman soldier separates him 
from his fellows, it also dislocates him from the army hierarchy. The next 
section will discuss how Tacitus’ model of the Roman soldier shapes his 
relationship with his emperor, strengthening it or weakening it depending on 
how the emperor relates to the individual interests of the soldiers in his army.  
The Soldier and His Emperor 
 
With the exception of Galba, whose military support was confined to a 
handful of tribunes and centurions, each of the contenders in AD 69 was able 
to build strong military support structures that proved to be considerably loyal. 
Each of these factions were built by explicit appeals to the individual interests 
and motivations of the soldiers in their armies. While each faction had at its 
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core the personal loyalty of each soldier to his chosen emperor, these factions 
were recruited in markedly different ways and formed of differing coalitions, 
and as a result the soldiers in the armies interacted in differing ways with the 
fellow soldiers, the military hierarchy, and with the emperor himself. 
I have touched briefly on the origin of the Othonian conspiracy above, 
but a vital aspect to Tacitus’ presentation is the fact that though the plot was 
instigated by Otho and a confidant of the praetorian prefect, the organisation 
was quickly placed in the hands of the milites themselves and the soldiers soon 
became the driving force behind Otho’s cause. Importantly, it was common 
soldiers, not centurions or tribunes who were responsible for recruiting their 
fellows.782 From that point the initiative remained with the soldiers until the 
death of Galba. The scene of Otho’s proclamation demonstrates that he was 
exercising very little control.783 Further, as the plot progressed without the 
direction of the tribunes or centurions, in the narrative they either offered 
resistance, and risked imprisonment or violence, or stood aside and let the 
soldiers have their way. Though Tacitus suggests that the majority of them 
were in favour of the plot, they took no active part in the preparation.784 When 
Otho was made emperor by his men, the tribunes and centurions were 
excluded from the ceremony by the legionaries: ‘nec tribunis aut centurionibus 
adeundi locus: gregarius miles caveri insuper praepositos iubebat.’785 ‘Neither 
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tribunes nor centurions could approach. The common soldiers even insisted 
that all the officers should be watched.’ 
That the cause of Otho is the cause of the common soldier was made 
evident in the lead up to and aftermath of Galba’s death. The soldiers – Otho’s 
only source of support – were in favour of the coup because they had been 
alienated by Galba. It was his unwillingness to pay the donative the soldiers 
expect that prompted them to support Otho.786 Following his death, Tacitus 
reports that the soldiers were in total control of the situation at Rome.787 Otho 
understood this and was careful to demonstrate his affection and respect for 
the soldiers, and to ensure that they recognised that his interests and theirs 
were aligned. Even before the plot began, Tacitus reports the lengths Otho 
went to in order to ingratiate himself with the men: ‘in itinere, in agmine, in 
stationibus vetustissimum quemque militum nomine vocans ac memoria 
Neroniani comitatus contubernalis appellando; alios agnoscere, quosdam 
requirere.’788 ‘On the march, on parade, and in their quarters, he would 
address all the oldest soldiers by name, and in allusion to the progresses of 
Nero would call them his tentmates. Some he would recognise, he would 
inquire after others.’ Otho made a serious effort to cast himself as commilito 
to the soldiers who support him and here he went further, using the term 
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contubernalis, a term of close affection.789 No other Roman emperor is 
recorded as having addressed his men as contubernalis. This carefully 
cultivated image of himself as commilito was also reflected in Tacitus’ 
description of Otho marching to war: ‘lorica ferrea usus est et ante signa pedes 
ire, horridus, incomptus famaeque dissimilis.’790 ‘He wore an iron breastplate 
and marched on foot before the standards, ill-shaven, unkempt and belying his 
reputation.’ Otho adopted the appearance of a miles gregarius as part of his 
program to identify himself as commilito with his supporters.791 
Commilito was a common part of the military rhetoric of the civil wars, 
and particularly favoured by Julius Caesar, who preferred to use it to address 
his men rather than milites.792 Augustus refused to use it, feeling it was 
deleterious to morale and discipline.793 Over the course of the Julio-Claudian 
period, however, it appears to have become a regular part of imperial 
propaganda.794 By the late 1st century it had become ubiquitous enough that 
it was lampooned in graffiti on the guard posts at Pompeii.795 In the Historiae 
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the only other men who addressed the soldiery as commilitiones were Galba 
and Piso.796 Even then Otho stands out as he used it five times over the course 
of two speeches.  
Otho’s engagement with the personal emotions of his men went beyond 
simply using a flattering term of address. In his rebuke to the Praetorians, Otho 
presents his men as true Romans and the Vitelliani as Germans:  
caput imperii et decora omnium provinciarum ad poenam vocare non 
hercule illi, quos cum maxime Vitellius in nos ciet, Germani audeant. 
ulline Italiae alumni et Romana vere iuventus ad sanguinem et caedem 
depoposcerit ordinem, cuius splendore et gloria sordis et obscuritatem 
Vitellianarum partium praestringimus? nationes aliquas occupavit 
Vitellius, imaginem quandam exercitus habet, senatus nobiscum est sic 
fit ut hinc res publica, inde hostes rei publicae constiterint.797 
To clamour for the destruction of what is the head of the Empire, and 
contains all that is distinguished in the provinces, Hercules! it is a thing 
which not even those Germans, whom Vitellius at this very moment is 
rousing against us, would dare to do. Shall any sons of Italy, the true 
youth of Rome, cry out for the massacre of an order, by whose splendid 
distinctions we throw into the shade the mean and obscure faction of 
Vitellius? Vitellius is the master of a few tribes, and has some semblance 
of an army. We have the Senate. The country is with us; with them, the 
country's enemies. 
 
The contrast between the two factions is stark. The Othoniani are true Roman 
youths and sons of italy, supported by the senate and the state. The Vitelliani, 
by contrast, are a mere image of an army, a gathering of hostile tribes and 
Germans at that. Otho’s casting of the Rhine legions as roving bands of hostile 
Germans is often dismissed as rhetorical exaggeration.798 Yet the rhetorical 
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point was a powerful one, and framed the Othonian side as legitimate while 
repainting the Vitelliani not simply as Romans of another faction but as a 
foreign enemy. It was also one of the few moments where Otho presented his 
cause as larger than simply him and his men. It was likely driven by recent 
tension between his soldiers and the senate. Even here, though, there is 
evidence that Otho was playing to the sensitivities of his men. His framing of 
the army as divided between proper Italian soldiers and foreign legions may 
have reflected the mentality of the Guard. In an inscription, a centurion boasts 
that the century he commanded was ‘cohortis...praetoriae fidus non 
barbaricae legionis’ ‘of loyal praetorian cohort not of barbarian legion’.799 
Tacitus’ narrative suggests that Otho’s attempts to frame himself as 
commilito to the soldiers in his army were successful, in a way that neither 
Galba nor Otho’s were. Part of the issue is that neither Galba nor Piso used it 
correctly. Throughout the opening of the Historiae, Galba was consistent in his 
misunderstanding of the relationship between himself and his soldiers.800 His 
sole use of commilito during the narrative demonstrates this, Galba addressed 
one of the praetorians using the term, but this was part of a rebuke: 
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obvius in Palatio Iulius Atticus speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans, 
occisum a se Othonem exlamavit; et Galba ‘commilito’, inquit ‘quis 
iussit?’801 
Encountering him on the Palatine, the bodyguard Julius Atticus, showing 
a bloody sword, claimed that he had killed Otho and Galba asked 
‘Comrade, who gave you the order?’ 
 
As he has before, Galba presumed the loyalty and affection of his men that he 
felt his due, though, as Tacitus states earlier, he had done nothing to earn it.802 
Even worse, the complaints from the men of the legio classica suggest that 
Galba’s actions had undermined his status of fellow soldier. They, Tacitus says, 
made common cause with the praetorians against Galba out of anger against 
the emperor: ‘infestae ob caedem commilitonum, quos primo statim introitu 
trucidaverat Galba.’803 ‘enraged by the massacre of their comrades, whom 
Galba had slaughtered immediately on his entry into the capital.’ It would have 
been difficult for Galba to successfully frame himself as a comrade to those 
whose comrades he had ordered killed, even if he was later willing to be more 
lenient and generous. Galba’s use of the word commilito points to the 
tyrannical exercise of military authority and his complete failure to take steps 
to win over his soldiers.804 This total failure is emphasised by Tacitus’ account 
of Galba’s death, where he was totally abandoned by his soldiers.805 This is in 
contrast to Plutarch who has him defended by a single centurion, and 
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Suetonius, who describes a party of German bodyguards rushing to his aid but 
arriving too late.806  
There is less here to say about Piso, a man of no military or 
administrative experience.807 Though he uses the term twice in his speech to 
the praetorians it is without effect and unconvincing, precisely because it was 
so obviously a rhetorical fiction.808 Unlike Galba he had no military career to 
establish the military credentials that term laid claim to. Unlike Otho he had 
no personal connexion with the men to build affection, and he took no steps 
to rectify either of these flaws. Piso’s use of the word may have been politically 
correct: an emperor or his representative should be able to speak that way to 
the troops in a near civil war situation. But such usage would be meaningless 
without some effort to cultivate or purchase the individual affections of the 
soldiers. That neither emperor nor his heir did so emphasises in another way 
the imprudence and incompetence of the Galban regime. Piso, in spite of all 
his qualities, was unable to change that political reality. 
This strong connexion between the Othoniani and Otho himself is much 
more prominent in Tacitus’ narrative than the accounts of Suetonius or 
Plutarch. Neither of them describe the efforts that Tacitus’ Otho goes to in 
order to present himself as a comrade to the soldiers, and description of the 
loyalty of the Othoniani are present only in their accounts of his death.809 
Though both the efforts of Otho to paint himself as a commilito and the 
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Othonian cause’s origins as a soldiers’ rebellion lead to a strong degree of 
loyalty towards the emperor, they also introduced a flaw into the Othonian 
army. As neither the centurions nor the tribunes played much part in Otho’s 
rise, as far as the army was concerned they remained of questionable loyalty. 
Of the three factions, the Othoniani retained the greater distrust and hostility 
towards their centurions, officers and generals. The traditional social hierarchy 
of the legion was pushed aside as Otho forged such a strong bond with the 
milites gregarii under his command. Though Tacitus is clear that Otho’s forces 
contained centurions, tribunes, and legates loyal to their emperor, to the 
soldiery the ranks between them and Otho continued to be seen as disloyal 
interlopers, their every action and motivation open to second guessing and 
suspicion. The great weakness of the Othonian cause is that it never truly 
moves beyond its beginning as a military mutiny. It never develops – as the 
Flavian and Vitellian sides do – the larger social structures of either an army or 
a state. Otho’s only source of power is the milites gregarii, regardless of their 
individual loyalty, the officers, provincials and citizens are seen as outsiders 
and threats. As Otho’s army lacks the hierarchy of a Roman army it remains 
divided and undermined by lack of cohesion.   
The proclamation of Vitellius occurred in a significantly different way. In 
Germany there was much more cooperation between the ranks. Tacitus makes 
it clear that there were no legates or tribunes willing to act to preserve Galba’s 
power, and that some were active in the conspiracy from the beginning.810 
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Vitellius himself was largely absent from the early stages of the conspiracy, and 
Tacitus describes him as being the figurehead for an almost entirely unified 
mutiny, from Fabius Valens down to the milites gregarius, though it is evident 
that the initiative belongs to the milites.811 Surprised – and delighted – to find 
himself proclaimed emperor Vitellius played little part in the recruitment or 
development of the plot. There is no evidence of any attempt to engage with 
his men as commilitones. Indeed, the Vitellius presented by Tacitus was a 
decidedly un-martial figure, more often on the dining couch than in the saddle, 
and largely disinterested in military planning.812 Significantly, when he is 
described in his military gear, he is presented: ‘insigni equo, paludatus 
accinctusque,’ a very different style of self-presentation from Otho, on foot 
with his iron breastplate.813  
The higher officers of the Vitellian army were much more enthusiastic 
participants than they were in Rome, certainly they were more active. It was 
the inaction of the tribune Martialis that led Tacitus to suggest that he was 
involved.814 In contrast, the legates Valens and Alienus Caecina were prime 
actors in the conspiracy.815 The only group not explicitly described as 
enthusiastic partisans for Vitellius was the centurions. Indeed, the only 
resistance to the mutiny came from four centurions and as Tacitus gives each 
of their names, they perhaps were the only men who resisted the plot.816 As a 
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result, the military hierarchy remained largely intact, and though there was 
some tension between the men and their centurions, the Vitelliani did not 
show the same open and constant distrust of the Othonian milites. The 
connexion between Vitellian tribunes and milites gregarii is shown following 
the first Battle of Bedriacum, where the soldiers and officers were equally 
delighted in their victory:  
iam tribuni praefectique, sua quisque facta extollentes, falsa vera aut 
maiora vero miscebant. vulgus quoque militum clamore et gaudio 
deflectere via, spatia certaminum recognoscere, aggerem armorum, 
strues corporum intueri mirari.817 
The tribunes and prefects extolled their individual achievements, and 
mixed together fictions, facts, and exaggerations. The common soldiers 
also turned aside from the line of march with joyful shouts, and 
recognized the various scenes of conflict, and gazed with wonder on the 
piles of weapons and the heaps of slain. 
 
The two main pillars of Vitellian support – the milites and the senior officers –
took heart from their victory. Indeed, in his account of the aftermath Tacitus 
mentions all of the various parts of the Vitellian army: the generals, the legions, 
the cavalry and auxilia, the tribunes, prefects, and milites gregarii. Missing 
from the narrative is any mention of centurions, the only section of the 
German army not unified in its support for their contender.  
The Vitellian faction presented a much more cohesive structure than 
that of Otho. Excepting a handful of centurions, Vitellius’ army was unified and 
committed to the cause – even if there was less evidence of the intense 
personal loyalty shown by the average Othonian soldier, the milites gregarii 
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were the only part of the army that remained loyal to the end. Vitellius entered 
the civil war less as the leader of a mutinous army than as the head of an 
imperial state. He had his own army – not simply a loyal corps of soldiers but 
full military units commanded by legates and tribunes equally invested in the 
success of the venture. Unfortunately, Tacitus shared with Sallust and Livy the 
belief that the quality of a Roman army was directly related to the quality of 
its commander. As Tacitus makes clear, under the command of the dissolute 
and disinterested Vitellius, the efficacy of his army quickly began to dissolve. 
The individual vices and weaknesses of the emperor became mirrored in the 
individual weaknesses and vices of the soldiers.818 
The beginnings of the Flavian cause are markedly different than either 
of the other factions. When it comes to the Flavians, Tacitus explicitly states 
that: ‘tribuni centurionesque et vulgus militum industria licentia, per virtutes 
per voluptates, ut cuique ingenium, adsciscebantur.’819 ‘The tribunes, the 
centurions, and the common soldiers, were brought over to the cause by 
appeals to their energy or their love of license, to their virtues or to their vices, 
according to their different dispositions.’ This passage is fundamental to 
demonstrating the relatively cohesive nature of the Flavian army. Each 
member of the army had been approached in a way that allowed them to 
connect their individual fortunes with the success of the Flavian endeavour. 
Due to his almost total absence from the narrative, the personal relationship 
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between Vespasian and his men is harder to articulate than that of Galba, 
Otho, or Vitellius. However, in his introduction Tacitus suggests that Vespasian 
was exactly the kind of general that Otho took such great pains to emulate: 
‘Vespasianus acer militiae anteire agmen... veste habituque vix a gregario 
milite discrepans...’820 ‘Vespasian was an energetic soldier; he could march at 
the head of his army...his dress and appearance hardly distinguished him from 
the common soldier.’ Tacitus presents as habit for Vespasian what was 
carefully constructed theatre from Otho. Both marched at the head of their 
armies and both dressed as common soldiers. Vespasian does not speak to his 
soldiers in the extant books of the Historiae, but if he did he would be justified 
in calling them commilitones. They loyalty of his men suggests that they would 
not have quibbled with his phrasing. 
Otho primarily cultivated affection of the milites, and created a force 
that saw centurions and officers as possible interlopers, while the Vitellian 
rebellion was carried out partially in cooperation between the tribunes and the 
soldiery. The Flavians were recruited individually, and none of the ranks were 
privileged over the others. Thus, Vespasian’s army presented a more cohesive 
face than the Othoniani or Vitelliani, not due to any difference in quality or 
dedication – indeed, it is clear throughout Tacitus’ account that the soldiers of 
each of the factions were capable both of extraordinary bravery and of 
unjustified panic.821 Further, while the Othonian and Vitellian plots are rushed, 
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nearly spontaneous affairs, Tacitus gives the impression that the formation of 
the Flavian power base was a more cautious, methodical affair.822 Missing from 
the Flaviani, as a result, are any outbreaks of violence between ranks. Tacitus 
records no centurions or tribunes attacked or lynched by their men, unlike the 
forces of Vitellius or the Otho. The Flavian army entered the war as a cohesive 
group, with their ambitions and interests aligned with Vespasian and with each 
other. The only officers seen as suspect by the Flavian legions were late-coming 
legates or governors – such as Flavianus and Aponius Saturnius – who were 
regarded by the men as unacceptably connected to Vitellius.823 The social 
hierarchy of the Flavian army remained intact. 
 
The Miles and the Social Structure of the Legion 
 
Tacitus himself clearly viewed the military hierarchy of the army as a 
mirror to the social structure of the Roman world, during the republic, at least. 
He laments the new policy of forming colonies of veterans from different units, 
by comparing it to the earlier practice of settling whole legions together: ‘olim 
universae legiones deducebantur cum tribunis et centurionibus et sui cuiusque 
ordinis militibus ut consensu et caritate rem publicam efficerent.’824 ‘Of old 
whole legions were settled with their tribunes and centurions, and soldiers of 
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every rank so that, by their harmony and mutual affection, they would form a 
republic.’ Other ancient commentators compared the legion to the social order 
of the republic, with the Emperor at the top as commander in chief, the 
aristocracy providing the officers and the miles at the bottom.825 In this 
framing, the miles became the military counterpart to the plebs.826 This 
structure had built into it certain fracture points, the most obvious one being 
the gulf between the mass of soldiery and the officers of the legion.827 
Recruitment into the Roman army also meant a long term separation from the 
civilian sphere that would last decades, until the soldier’s retirement.828 Absent 
from the social hierarchy of the civilian world, the maintenance of the military 
hierarchy was essential to the correct running of the Roman legion, although 
the day to day mechanisms of the army could be preserved for brief periods 
during periods of mutiny.829 These hierarchies were, however, largely self-
contained in each legion. In periods of stability, each legion shared the same 
emperor but the lower strata – the officer-aristocracy and the miles-plebs – 
were separated from those of the other legions, usually by distance as well as 
by unit loyalty. This meant that each legion functioned, as Tacitus said, as a 
separate quasi-state, with its own aristocracy and populace. In times of peace, 
the only connexion that Roman soldiers of all armies shared was the emperor. 
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Roman historians and Roman generals both were aware of the danger posed 
by keeping legions in shared quarters for extended periods.830   
Each of the three military factions of AD 69 is presented by Tacitus as 
having an internal social structure largely governed by the military hierarchy of 
the Roman army. These three factions, the Othoniani, the Vitelliani, and the 
Flaviani, were separate quasi-states, now no longer unified by a common 
emperor. For each the internal social structure broke down to a degree and for 
a period, but the severity of the break-down varied. Amongst the Othoniani 
there was a complete and largely permanent collapse, with the centurions, 
tribunes, and legates consistently viewed as disloyal and untrustworthy by the 
milites. The Vitelliani had little trouble with their legates, and the majority of 
tribunes and centurions were accepted as comrades. The Flaviani were marked 
by two distinct groups: the Eastern legions operated with the military hierarchy 
intact, while the Danube legions remained distrustful of their legates, though 
the remaining social structure of the legions remained intact. What remained 
consistently unchanged, however, was the link between each factions and its 
emperor. Whatever the remaining social structure, the fundamental loyalty of 
the soldier to his emperor remained unchanged. This chapter will demonstrate 
the status of the internal hierarchy of the three factions, beginning with the 
Othoniani. 
Serious breakdowns of the internal discipline of the army in Tacitus’ 
works almost always resulted in the death of centurions and often of tribunes 
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or even legates. The previous chapter discussed how centurions were targeted 
by the mutineers in both Pannonia and Germany. This same hostility was 
present in the cascade of mutinies that began the civil war of AD 69. Although 
Tacitus portrays the Othoniani as almost entirely subverted by Otho – officers 
and milites alike – there was clear tension between the men and their 
centurions. There was, of course, outright violence directed to any officers who 
remained loyal to the previous regime: the centurion Sempronius Densus was 
killed defending Piso.831 Yet even once the plot was in motion the soldiers 
consistently distrusted and side-lined their officers, who were unable to 
control their men during the coup. When Otho was proclaimed emperor at the 
Praetorian Camp, the soldiers’ distrust of their officers was clear: ‘nec tribunis 
aut centurionibus adeundi locus: gregarious miles caueri insuper 
praepositos.’832 ‘The tribunes and centurions were allowed to access to the 
spot, and in any case the common soldiery warned him about the officers.’ This 
was despite the fact that Tacitus has told the reader that the majority of the 
centurions were either in sympathy with Otho’s plot or unwilling to 
interfere.833 
Later, when a group of drunken soldiers, incorrectly, suspected a plot 
against their chosen princeps, their suspicion fell immediately upon their 
centurions and tribunes: ‘fremit miles et tribunos centurionesque proditionis 
arguit, tamquam familiae senatorum ad perniciem Othonis armarentur.’834 
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‘The troops raised a clamour and accused the tribunes and centurions of a 
treasonable plot to arm the household slaves of the senators and murder 
Otho.’ This sudden panic soon spiralled out of control, the praetorians were 
deep into their cups – ‘vino graves’ Tacitus tells us – and the tribune on hand 
was killed, along with those of the nearby centurions most disliked by the 
soldiery. The mob stormed the palace, interrupting Otho at banquet, and 
denounced their entire officer corps to the emperor, accusing them of making 
common cause with the senate against the soldiers and their princeps.835 This 
event is particularly illuminating, as is suggests that the soldiers saw their 
centurions not merely as disloyal soldiers, but rather as connected to a 
separate interest group, aligned not with the men themselves, but with the 
military hierarchy – the tribunes – and the larger political establishment – the 
senate. The threat that his soldiers fears of this ‘deep-state’ alliance between 
centurions, tribunes and the senate posed to Otho’s cause was addressed in 
his speech at the praetorian camp the following morning. There Otho 
attempted to reframe his military revolt in terms of a grand struggle against a 
foreign enemy, with the Othoniani, the senate, and the res publica fighting in 
concert against Vitellius’ German hordes.836 
That the social structure of the Othonian military had completely 
broken down was demonstrated by the fact that they are the only faction who 
were consistently hostile not only to their centurions, but to the senior officers 
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and generals.837 Tribunes are often grouped with centurions in Tacitus’ 
narrative, and usually appeared as a restraining force on the worst excesses of 
the men.838 Indeed he appears to use variations of the phrase tribuni 
centurionesque as shorthand of the legionary officers throughout his works.839 
They were also clearly linked together in the minds of the milites gregarii, as 
they were often ignored – and on occasion attacked – together as a group 
when discipline was breaking down. It should be stressed from the outset that, 
unlike centurions, Tacitus makes it explicit that there were tribunes involved 
with each of the contenders from the very beginning.  
In the Flavian and Vitellian armies the tribunes were willing participants 
in the uprising, or at least did nothing to stop it. In Rome, the loyalties of the 
tribunes appear to have been divided. The first individual mentioned as part of 
the Othonian plot is a tribune, Julius Martialis, who Tacitus suggests was either 
actively involved or allowed the conspiracy to develop.840 At the same time 
there were tribunes who remain loyal to Galba; when three tribunes entered 
the Praetorian barracks in an attempt to quell the incipient Othoniani, two 
were turned away by threats, but Pomponius Longinus was imprisoned by the 
men as his personal connexion to Galba was seen as particularly suspicious.841 
This indicates an important difference between the interaction between 
milites and tribunes when compared to the interaction between the soldiery 
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and the centurions. With a few exceptions, angry soldiers tended to confine 
tribunes rather than kill them. Besides Longinus, the tribune Julius Fronto was 
arrested and put in chains by the Othoniani, who suspect him due to the fact 
that his brother was serving under Vitellius.842 A single tribune was killed and 
another is wounded during the panic of the Othoniani in book one.843 Here, 
however, the circumstances appear to be exceptional. Tacitus mentions that 
the soldiers were drunk and he stresses their agitated state: ‘lymphatis caeco 
pavore animis’ ‘with minds maddened by blind panic.’844 While the killing of 
the tribune was unusual, this panic demonstrates the greater hostility felt 
towards the centurions, Tacitus reports that the ‘severissimos centurionum’ 
were also killed.845 
Such relatively restrained actions towards tribunes should not be taken 
as an indication of a lesser degree of distrust towards the tribunes. Rather, it 
echoed the actions of the mutinous legions of AD 14. Tribunes were mentioned 
alongside centurions as agents of the soldiers’ misery by the ringleader 
Percennius: ‘interrogabat cur paucis centurionibus paucioribus tribunis in 
modum servorum oboedirent’846 ‘he demanded why, in the manner of slaves, 
they submitted to a few centurions and even fewer tribunes.’ Despite this, 
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while they mistrusted the tribunes, the mutineers did harbour the same 
intense enmity towards them. While the centurions in Pannonia were attacked 
and beaten, the tribunes and camp prefect were simply driven beyond the 
palisades.847 Similarly, when Germanicus bemoaned the state of the 
mutineers’ camp, he alluded to the differing fates of centurions and tribunes: 
‘hic tantum interfici centuriones, eici tribunos...’848 ‘here only are centurions 
murdered, tribunes driven away.’ Instead, it appears that some measure of 
restraint or respect moderated the violence done to tribunes in periods of 
mutiny or military anarchy. 
Vestricius Spurinna, holding Placentia for Otho, opted not to lead is 
small force into battle against Vitellius’ German legions. His efforts were 
resisted by his men in a way that would be familiar to any republican general: 
‘sed indomitus miles et belli ignarus correptis signis vexillisque ruere et retinenti 
duci tela intentare, spretis centurionibus tribunisque...’849 ‘But the 
undisciplined and inexperienced soldiery seized their standards and colours, 
and rushed to the attack, brandishing their weapons in the face of their general 
when he sought to restrain them, after rejecting the centurions and tribunes...’ 
Spurinna was forced to enter into negotiation with the mutinous soldiers in an 
effort to restrain them, though he is unsuccessful. It is only when facing the 
prospect of entrenching on open ground that the careful counsel of the 
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tribunes and centurions was able to convince the soldiers to return to 
Placentia.850  
Similarly, Annius Gallus, leading I to relieve the besieged Placentia, did 
not fancy his men’s chances against the Vitelliani and halted at Bedriacum. 
Tacitus describes his difficulty in enforcing his orders: ‘aegre coercitam 
legionem et pugnandi ardore usque ad seditionem progressam Bedriaci 
sistit.’851 ‘though the legion could hardly be restrained, and in its eagerness for 
action, even went to the length of open mutiny, he halted at Bedriacum.’ Both 
of these events were superficially similar to the republican mutinies described 
in Livy, but there was one significant difference. When republican soldiers 
mutinied it was because they doubt the tactical wisdom of their commander, 
or because the fear their commander lacked faith in their abilities. The 
allegiance or honesty of the republican commanders was never questioned.852 
When both Spurinna and Gallus attempted to restrain their men, however, the 
Othoniani were quick to question the loyalty of their commanders. In their 
initial resistance to Spurinna the Praetorians convinced themselves that their 
general was playing his own game: ‘prodi Othonem et accitum Caecinam 
clamitabant.’853 ‘they cried that Otho had been betrayed and Caecina was here 
by invitation.’ Later Gallus’ own troops came to the same conclusion:  
suspectum id Othonianis fuit, omnia ducum facta prave aestimantibus. 
certatim, ut quisque animo ignavus, procax ore, Annium Gallum et 
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Suetonium Paulinum et Marium Celsum—nam eos quoque Otho 
praefecerat—variis criminibus incessierant.854 
This created suspicion among the Othonian troops, who put an 
unfavourable construction on everything their generals did. Cowardly 
and loud-mouthed elements among them vied with each other in 
assailing Annius Gallus, Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus, who had 
also been given command by Otho. 
 
These reactions from the Othoniani were remarkable, and demonstrated a 
fundamental shift in the relationship between the milites and their 
commanders. The point of contention was no longer merely differing opinion 
on tactics, it had become an issue of loyalty. Taking actions that the soldiers do 
not agree with was seen as indication not that they have misjudged the quality 
of their army or the danger posed by the enemy, but rather that they were 
working to undermine the Othonian cause. As we have seen, the Othoniani 
were particularly quick to judge any actions by officers and senators as 
evidence of treachery. In Tacitus’ narrative, the army represents Otho’s only 
real group of determined supporters.855 Because the only two parts of the 
Othonian cause – as understood by the milites – were the emperor himself and 
the soldiery, there was no room for the social hierarchy of the legion. In 
Tacitus’ narrative there is evidence that even the physical representations of 
the military heirarchy had been disrupted by the Othoniani. We have discussed 
above Othos own appearance as an unshaven miles gregarius, but when the 
plot first began, Tacitus describes the arming of the soldiery:  
                                                          
854 Tac. Hist. 2.23.4 
855 Chilver (1979: 222) 




rapta statim arma, sine more et ordine militiae, ut vix praetorianus aut 
legionarius insignibus suis distingueretur: miscentur auxiliaribus galeis 
scutisque, nullo tribunorum centurionumue adhortante.856 
Arms were immediately seized, with no care for procedure or military 
order – so that a praetorian could hardly be distinguished from a 
legionary by his gear – these were mixed with the helmets and shields of 
auxilliaries, with no encouragement from the tribunes or centurions.  
 
The Othoniani tended towards becoming an army without hierarchy, both in 
appearance and in behaviour. A semblance of the social hierarchy was present 
– when they went to war they marched with centurions and tribunes – but if 
any suspicion fell on the officers this hierarchy would collapse and the soldiers 
would accept no man’s authority over them except Otho’s. Following the riot 
in Rome, Otho took steps to address this in his speech to the troops, where he 
tried to incorporate his soldiers into the hierarchy of his larger empire. The 
behaviour of his men in the subsequent campaigns shows that he had been 
unsuccessful. The Othonian cause never resestablished the hierarchy either of 
the state or of the camp. Otho’s attempts to recruit the soldiery to his cause 
and the way that they took over the process had the effect of bypassing the 
hierarchy of the legion. The only loyalties shown by Otho’s soldiers were to 
him.  
The situation with the Vitelliani was a more complicated. At the outset 
in Germany, as in Rome, the centurions were not trusted by their mutinous 
men, even though, as with the Othoniani, the majority of the officers either 
supported Vitellius’ rebellion or made no move to stop it. Indeed, one of the 
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causes of the plot was a rumour that both milites and centurions would suffer 
under the new regime: ‘accessit callide vulgatum, temere creditum, decimari 
legiones et promptissimum quemque centurionum dimitti.’857 ‘There was also 
a report, ingeniously spread and recklessly believed, to the effect that the 
legions were being decimated, and all the most energetic centurions 
dismissed.’ There was, to be sure, a much stronger sense of solidarity between 
the ranks in the Vitellian army than in the Othonian. Despite this, the soldiers 
retained a deep suspicion of any officers they saw to be acting against their 
own interests. When the German armies declared for Vitellius, the only open 
resistance came from four centurions of XXII who acted to protect the portraits 
of Galba. These men were arrested and imprisoned, not by the Vitellian 
officers, but by the soldiery itself: ‘impetu militum abrepti vinctique.’858 ‘by an 
assault of the soldiery they were apprehended and confined.’ Tacitus is clear 
that it is the soldiery who are the driving force in the arrests, as he generally 
reserves the collective singular noun miles for common soldiers.859  
Similarly, when the Vitelliani felt that they had been held back from 
attacking the forces of Otho at the first battle of Cremona they mutiny, and 
imprisoned Julius Gratus, their praefectus castrorum: ‘tamquam fratri apud 
Othonem militanti proditionem ageret.’860 ‘on the grounds that he was 
concerting treachery with his brother.’ Here Tacitus is not explicit that the 
milites were acting on their own, but it can be confidently suggested that they 
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were, as he frames the situation as in castris seditio and in Tacitus those are 
always driven by the common soldiery. The Vitellian cause was marked by a 
military hierarchy that largely remained intact, though tension did exist. Like 
the Othoniani, the Vitelliani are also quick to ascribe sinister motives to a 
decision made that appears to be counter to the interests of their emperor. 
The hierarchy remained intact so long as all parts of it appeared to be acting in 
cohesion. When the faction finally fell apart, it was the officers that deserted 
Vitellius and the soldiers. His men stayed loyal to the end, fighting in the streets 
to defend their emperor. 
The Flaviani, on the other hand, present a remarkably stable internal 
hierarchy throughout most of the Historiae.861 There was no trouble between 
the milites and the centurions or tribunes. This was due to the differing way 
they were recruited. Tacitus makes repeated reference to the fact that the 
factions taking part in the civil war were composed of individuals with differing 
temperaments and motivations. As the Othonian plotters gained momentum: 
‘suspensos ceterorum animos diversis artibus stimulant...’862 ‘they worked by 
various devices on the wavering minds of the remainder...’ Some men were 
won over by implying their careers were at risk, other reminded of the lack of 
donative. Others were frightened into allegiance with the threat of a posting 
to the frontier. Each man was recruited into the plot with differing motivations 
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and with a differing degree of commitment: ‘isque habitus animorum fuit ut 
pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur.’863 ‘Such 
was the temper of men's minds that, while there were few to venture on so 
atrocious a treason, many wished it done, and all were ready to acquiesce.’ 
This mix of levels of commitment and varied motives also characterised the 
Vitellian cause, both among the officers and the German legions.864 Tacitus 
records that the subversion of the Eastern armies to Vespasian’s cause was 
also done on an individual basis ‘ut cuique ingenium’865 ‘according to each 
man’s temperament.’ But the Eastern legions were brought into the cause 
carefully and with appeals to men of all. Further, much more than either the 
Othonian or Vitellian cause, the foundation for Vespasian’s proclamation was 
laid over a period and organised from above. As a result, the legions joining 
Vespasian in the east do so with their internal hierarchies intact. 
The only serious trouble between the men and the command structure 
occurred when the Danube legions declared for Vespasian, but there too the 
internal hierarchy of the legions was largely preserved. Doubts were raised and 
threats made toward certain of the legates who were considered to be 
insufficiently loyal to the new regime or were already unpopular. Ampius 
Flavianus was under threat for his life due to his relation to Vitellius and 
because he had alienated the men under his command.866 Aponius Saturnius 
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was likewise in danger because he was believed to have been in 
correspondence with Vitellius.867 In both cases the hostility towards the legates 
was universal – Tacitus mentions no centurions or tribunes who offer support 
to the threatened commanders – and order was restored when each man 
retired from his position and headed east to join Vespasian as a privatus. 
The Flavian hierarchy was the only one of the three factions to take 
concrete steps to reinforce or restore the social order. Hearing of demobilised 
praetorians operating as armed gangs in Liguria, the procurator Valerius 
Paulinus was dispatched to recruit them to Vespanian’s cause and use them to 
capture Forum Julii in his name. Significantly, it was Paulinus’ personal 
connexion to the troops that allows him to reincorporate them into the 
structure of the Flavian forces: ‘eo gravior auctor, quod Paulino patria Forum 
Iulii et honos apud praetorianos, quorum quondam tribunus fuerat’ ‘.868  
The most telling evidence that the Flavian army retained its internal 
heirarchy is demonstrated by the fact that the primary cause of tension 
between the soldiery and the officers was due to a perceived lack of 
aggressiveness by command. Just as the early republican commanders of Livy’s 
narrative were in danger of having their hand forced by enthusiastic 
legionaries, so too did Vespasian’s generals risk losing control of their men if 
they hesitated to give battle when the soldiers thought it the most prudent 
option. The situation was most explicit in the aftermath of Cremona when 
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Tacitus describes the difficult tactical situation and the dilemma faced by the 
Flavian officers:  
quae super cuncta terrebat ipsorum miles periculi quam morae 
patientior: quippe ingrata quae tuta, ex temeritate spes; omnisque 
caedes et vulnera et sanguis aviditate praedae pensabantur.869  
But above and beyond all these factors, they were frightened of their 
own troops, who preferred risk to waiting. Playing safe was dull, taking a 
chance offered possibilities. Whatever the cost in death and wounds and 
bloodshed, it counted for nothing when weighed against their appetite 
for spoil. 
 
This mentality was shared among the factions of the civil war. Throughout 
Tacitus’ narrative of civil war the driving force remained the soldiery, and their 
initiative was responsible for much of the tactical or strategic decisions. 
Generals only occasionally and only with difficulty were able to convince – or 
force – their men to take actions the soldiers disagreed with. Yet this was 
hardly a new factor in Roman warfare, Livy’s narrative contains several 
examples of generals and milites at odds over strategic or tactical decisions. In 
the Flavian army the situation was the same. 
Amongst the Othonians and Vitellians, the fractured nature of the 
military hierarchy effected their interpretation of such disagreements. As each 
of their armies was comprised of men with differing levels of commitment and 
differing interests, any disagreement was seen as reflecting the personal 
motivations or loyalty of the commanders and their commitment to the 
emperor. To the soldiers, a general refusing to give battle to a superior force 
was not a tactical decision, it was an indication that their commander’s loyalty 
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was suspect. Any attempt to hold men back from attacking a city was not done 
out of concerns for its inhabitants, but because they had come to a prior 
arrangement. Any decisions made by commanders were interpreted through 
not through the tactical circumstances of the day but in a context where each 
man was either a supporter of the emperor or an enemy. 
When Antonius attempted to camp the Flavian army at the Milvian 
bridge before entering Rome, he too was countermanded by his soldiers. ‘sed 
omnem prolationem ut inimicam victoriae suspectabant...’870 ‘But they were 
suspicious of any postponement, thinking it would prejudice victory.’ Here 
again differing strategies were met not only with argument but with suspicion. 
But here the suspicion was not that Antonius was working to undermine the 
cause, but rather that his tactics might have led to defeat. This places the 
actions of the Flavians in an entirely different context, and one common to 
Roman commanders in foreign as well as civil wars. This was, in fact, a function 
of the military hierarchy. Since the early republic, Roman soldiers felt they had 
the right to question the actions of their generals if those actions threatened 
their chances for victory. The mirror here is not Othonian or Vitellian troops 
challenging their officers as traitors, but Sextus Tullius debating the strategy of 
Samnite war with his general, or Caesar’s men urging him to cross a river and 
attack.  
Flavian soldiers were also more open about their interests in other 
moments when their commanders are unable to restrain them. Before the sack 
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of Cremona, the men are careful to frame their adamant demands that they 
attack the city in terms of strategic considerations: ‘quasi debellatum foret, 
pergere Cremonam et victos in deditionem accipere aut expugnare 
deposcunt’871 ‘they thought that the fighting was over and clamoured to press 
on towards Cremona to receive, or take by force, the surrender of a beaten 
enemy.’ Of course, Tacitus is quick to inform his reader that any strategic 
considerations are secondary to the soldier’s desire to ensure that the loot 
from the captured Cremona go to them rather than their commander.872 This 
jealous approach to the spoils of Italy is a recurring motivation to the Flaviani. 
Their enthusiasm to press on to Rome was also driven not only by their desire 
to sack Rome but also their determination that they not share the spoils with 
any reinforcements on their way to Italy: ‘aegre id pati miles et victoriam malle 
quam pacem; ne suas quidem legiones opperiebantur, ut praedae quam 
periculorum socias.’873 ‘This was hardly to be tolerated by the soldiery, who 
preferred victory to peace. Nor would they wait for their legions, considering 
them partners in profit rather than danger.’ Here too, however, no one doubts 
the loyalty or commitment of their officers and here too we are reminded of 
republican soldiers concerned with the division of spoils during a campaign. 
Superficially, the mood of the Flaviani outside Cremona was clearly 
similar to that of the Othoniani at Placentia, as evidenced by the similarity of 
Tacitus’ language: The Othoniani act ‘spretis centurionibus tribunisque’ ‘after 
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rejecting the centurions and tribunes’; during the Flavian clamour to attack 
Cremona ‘spernuntur centuriones tribunique’ ‘the centurions and tribunes 
were rejected.’ In both cases the disorder went hand in hand with a temporary 
rejection of the military hierarchy. However, we should be careful not to read 
a similar level of violence in this action as in the events of AD 14 or the 
Othonian panic in Rome. In whatever way Otho’s troops rejected the 
centurions and tribunes outside of Placentia, it clearly did them no harm, as 
they were on hand to restore order a short time later.874 But, there is a 
fundamental difference. Only among the Othoniani are the officers suspected 
of treasonous planning. The Flaviani see their officers’ actions as being 
motivated by personal greed, not out of a desire to weaken Vespasian’s move 
for the throne. 
Tacitus Historiae is an account of three simultaneous Roman emperors. 
The armies of each of the claimants had internal hierarchies that mirrored the 
social structure of their empire. As each miles in these armies engages with his 
military – and social – hierarchy as an individual, the Othoniani, Vitelliani, and 
Flaviani operated not as armies within a single state, but as three competing 
states. The fortunes of the three factions of the civil war revolved around the 
degree to which the internal military hierarchy of the army is retained in the 
chaos of civil war. The social structure of Otho’s army is broken, not despite 
the soldiery’s intense loyalty towards their commilito, but because that loyalty 
provided no place for the ranks that were supposed to fit between the emperor 
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and the milites gregarii. Vitellius’ army mostly preserves the social structure of 
an imperial Roman army, though there remained some tension. However, it is 
this hierarchy that weakens the army, as the soldiers began to reflect their 
princeps. Due to the nature of the Flavian conspiracy, the army of Vespasian 
largely retains its hierarchy, and any disruptions to it are founded in the Roman 
tradition of questioning the decisions of command, not because the soldiers 
doubt the loyalty or commitment of their generals. While these three 
emperors moved their army across the empire as separate states, there was a 
fourth state, currently without an emperor or an army, the people of the 
empire and of Italy. The final section will examine how each of the factions 
interacted with the civilian sphere. 
 
The Soldier and the Civilian 
 
The civil war of AD 69 did not just involve violence committed against 
other Roman armies. It was also the context of widespread violence against 
the civilian population. Each of the factions – the Othoniani, the Vitelliani, and 
the Flaviani – were responsible for violence against the people of Italy during 
the civil war. Vitellius’ army also subjected provincial populations to pillage 
during their march on Italy. Importantly, these moments of violence were not 
a symptom of the breakdown of the internal hierarchy of the armies, as troops 
turned against civilians both in periods of serious disorder and also in moments 
when the social order of the legions was intact. Indeed, Tacitus reserves the 




most graphic and extended accounts of pillage for the Flavians, the army he 
presents as the most consistently disciplined of the three factions.  
This section will examine the violence committed by each of the 
factions and the status of the military hierarchy to demonstrate that the 
depredations of the armies of AD 69 were not the result of the breakdown of 
the military social order. Rather, the status of the internal discipline was largely 
irrelevant to a Roman army’s capacity for violence. Roman armies capacity for 
violence was related to the degree to which the armies had become quasi-
states themselves, and as a result showed little sign of common feeling not 
only with other Roman armies, but with the larger Roman state itself. 
Alongside an erosion of common feeling, the three factions interacted with the 
cities of Italy and the provinces through the lens of the larger struggle for 
supremacy. In each interaction, soldiers judged the inhabitants of an area 
either to be supporters to or enemies of the emperor and his soldiers.  
Otho’s men showed the first indications that they were willing to use 
their weapons on Roman civilians. At the time of Galba’s death Tacitus makes 
it clear that Otho’s soldiers were keen to turn on the urban population and it 
was only with difficulty that he was able to keep them from their designs. The 
new emperor is described ‘avidum et minacem militum animum voce voltuque 
temperans.’875 ‘restraining the greedy and threatening temperament of the 
soldiery.’ The minds of the soldiers are further described: ‘caedis et praedarum 
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initium et optimo cuique perniciem quaeri apparebat.’876 ‘It was apparent that 
the beginning of murder and looting and the destruction of the best men was 
desired.’ With a mix of concessions and firmness, Otho was able to forestall 
any open violence between his men and the Roman population.  
The relationship between the soldiery and the civilian population of 
Rome was a tense one.877 Otho was prompted to order the assassination of 
Galba after ‘armari plebem nuntiabatur.’878 ‘he was informed that the plebs 
were being armed.’ He considered the possibility that the plebs be armed as a 
serious enough threat that it led him to begin the coup. Certainly, up to his 
death the urban plebs were full throated in their opposition to Otho: ‘Universa 
iam plebs Palatium implebat, mixtis servitiis et dissono clamore caedem 
Othonis et coniuratorum exitium poscentium ut si in circo aut theatro ludicrum 
aliquod postularent’879 ‘Then the entirety of the plebs, mingled with slaves, 
were filling the Palatine with discordant cries for the death of Otho and the 
destruction of the conspirators as if they were requesting some variety of 
games in the circus or theatre.’  
Tacitus warns the reader not to see the demands of the urban populace 
as sincere, but more important is the reaction of the soldiers themselves. From 
                                                          
876 Tac. Hist. 1.45.2 
877 Sailor has written convincingly about how Tacitus perceived of the degree to which the 
principate undermined Rome’s position as the focus and centre of the empire (2008: 188-191). 
What is remarkable is that the first soldiers to see Rome as hostile territory are not the 
provincial armies of Vespasian or Vitellius, but the men of the praetorian guard, composed of 
Italians and permanently stationed in the vicinity of the city and the newly formed members 
of the fleet, also quartered in central Italy. 
878 Tac. Hist. 1.40.1 
879 Tac. Hist. 1.32.1 




the beginning of Otho’s reign they saw the urban populace as hostile to them 
and their emperor. Tacitus presents Othoniani as men with long memories and 
prone to grievance. It was grievance against Galba that motivates the legio 
classica to join Otho’s cause.880 Hostility towards Vitellius following Otho’s 
death led many of them to switch sides and join Vespasian’s cause.881 The 
discharged Praetorians, in particular, were so hostile to Vitellius and his 
followers that they launched a private war against the Vitellian Maturus in 
Liguria until Antonius was able to recruit them to Vespasian’s side.882 The 
Othonian hostility towards the urban populace was similarly founded in the 
grievance that the city had supported Galba and opposed Otho until Galba’s 
death.  
While violence against Rome itself was stopped by Otho, the actions of 
his soldiers in Liguria were not simply the result of the unrestrained greed of 
his men, but rather part of his military strategy. With the Vitellians making 
rapid advances into northern Italy, he deployed forces to Liguria as a 
diversionary move.883  Even there, however, the characteristic disorder of the 
Othoniani undermined the official plans and the hierarchy of the army was 
disrupted. Though Otho gave command to three men – two primipili and a 
tribune, one of the centurions proved to be ineffective and the tribune 
somehow provoked the distrust of the men and ‘per licentiam militum 
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vinctus.’884 ‘through the disorder of the soldiery he was imprisoned.’ Command 
then passed to the ambitious primipilus Suedius Clemens. The depredations in 
Liguria are presented by Tacitus as being desired both by the soldiery and their 
commander. Clemens is ‘proeliorum avidus.’885 ‘greedy for battles.’ The 
intense violence of the campaign against the population of Liguria is described 
graphically by Tacitus: ‘non Italia adiri nec loca sedesque patriae videbantur: 
tamquam externa litora et urbes hostium urere vastare, eo atrocius, quod nihil 
usquam provisum adversum metus.’886 ‘It did not seem to be either Italy or the 
seat of the empire that was attacked. It was as if they torched, devastated, and 
pillaged foreign shores, even more atrociously because no provisions had been 
made against the threat.’ 
The passage is worth careful consideration for two reasons, firstly, it is 
the first indication of a fact that becomes common in the Historiae, that Roman 
soldiers were perfectly capable of regarding the inhabitants of Italy as enemies 
and thus have no qualms about attacking them as such. Second, the level of 
the violence is emphasised, with the string of historical infinitives establishing 
that the actions of Clemens’ forces were brutal and methodical.887 The 
methodical way the pillaging progresses suggests that, at this point, the actions 
of the Othonian forces were still being directed by Clemens and some 
semblance of the military hierarchy remained. However, once the local 
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population attempted to resist Clemens vanishes from the narrative and it 
appears that the soldiers were acting on their own initiative: ‘Inritatus eo 
proelio Othonis miles vertit iras in municipium Albintimilium... calamitatibus 
insontium expleta avaritia.’888 ‘Provoked by this, the soldiery of Otho directed 
their anger against the city of Albintimilium...their avarice was sated by the 
ruin of the guiltless.’ This passage also illustrates another important aspect of 
the hostile attitude that Roman soldiers show towards civilians in the Historiae, 
that the milites regarded the local populations not simply as bystanders who 
were ripe for plunder, but as enemies. 
Once the locals had been organised by the local procurator – a known 
Vitellian – and fought back, the soldiers seized the initiative. While Clemens 
was in command the devastation of Liguria was directed by military concerns. 
Once the inhabitants had fought back under the direction of a Vitellian, the 
soldiery saw them as hostile forces. Further, the men acted out of both avaritia 
and ira. This combination of greed for the possessions of the civilian populace 
and hostility to them as perceived enemies of the emperor played a part in 
much of the violence of AD 69.  
Such violence toward the civilian population is not restricted to the 
Othonian forces, where the military hierarchy has broken down. Valens 
devastated the lands of the Helvetii as he approaches. There is no indication of 
any disorder within his army, indeed, Tacitus explicitly paints the legate as the 
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director of the pillaging, keen to respond to provocation from the Helvetii with 
devastation – belli avidus, as Tacitus puts it.889 At first the actions were 
conducted under the orders of the commander. There is little evidence of 
serious disorder in army, and indeed Tacitus presents the brief conflict with 
the local forces as an example of a Roman army acting as it should, with an 
overall strategy directed by the general and various legionary and auxillia 
forces acting in ordered cooperation.890  
When the Helvetii appealed to the Roman forces, they faced the 
hostility of a unified hierarchy. This hostility, too, was provoked by an attempt 
as resistance by the Helvetii.891 Caecina’s keenness for war has already been 
noted, and Tacitus reports that the emperor and the soldiery were equally 
matched in their disinterest in mercy. The vehemence of the soldiers is 
particularly stark: ‘ciuitatis excidium poscunt, tela ac manus in ora legatorum 
intentant.’892 ‘They demanded the extermination of the citizens, and waved 
their weapons or fists in the faces of the delegates.’ Yet, when a particularly 
well-spoken Helvetian defended his people, it was the soldiers who broke with 
the rest of the army and demanded that they be spared. ‘effusis lacrimis et 
meliora constantius postulando impunitatem salutemque ciuitate 
impetrauere.’893 ‘with flowing tears and requests for better treatment they 
secured the safety and health of the citizens.’ Here a temporary breakdown of 
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the military hierarchy did not result in violence against the citizenry, but 
instead the soldiers were the ones to press for restraint. 
The last minute deliverance of Vienna from the Vitelliani has already 
been discussed. In that situation the people of Lugdunum convinced the 
soldiers to attack Vienna by presenting it as a hostile city: ‘cuncta illic externa 
et hostilia.’894 ‘all in that place was foreign and hostile.’ By framing the people 
of Vienna as enemies of the Vitelliani, the efforts of Lugdunum to convince 
them to attack Vienna were so successful: ‘ut ne legati quidem ac duces 
partium restingui posse iracundiam exercitus arbitrarentur.’895 ‘that, indeed, 
no legates or commanders of the faction judged it possible to restrain the 
wrath of the army.’ It was only when the people of Vienna have made 
individual and personal supplications to the soldiers that they have calmed 
enough that Valens is able to placate them with a donative.896 Thus while it 
was the state of disorder that prompts the soldiers to consider attacking 
Vienna, it was that same disorder that makes them available to the personal 
entreaties of the Viennenses, and prompted them to abandon the plan. In the 
cases of Rome, Liguria, the Helvetii, and Vienna the factor that drove the 
desires of the soldiers to attack was not the status of the military hierarchy, it 
was the fact that the soldiers had come to regard the civilian population as 
hostile. 
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It is in his account of the sack of Cremona that Tacitus goes to the 
greatest length to demonstrate that the soldiers had come to see the civilians 
as their enemy. Even as Antonius Primus tried to calm his men, Tacitus provides 
the reader with a list of grievances that the Flaviani held towards the 
inhabitants: 
exercitus praeter insitam praedandi cupidinem vetere odio ad excidium 
Cremonensium incubuit. iuvisse partis Vitellianas Othonis quoque bello 
credebantur; mox tertiadecimanos ad extruendum amphitheatrum 
relictos, ut sunt procacia urbanae plebis ingenia, petulantibus iurgiis 
inluserant. auxit invidiam editum illic a Caecina gladiatorum spectaculum 
eademque rursus belli sedes et praebiti in acie Vitellianis cibi...897  
Quite apart from its natural taste for plunder, the army had old scores to 
settle, and was bent on wiping out the Cremonese. It was held that they 
had once before supported the Vitellian side, in the war against Otho; 
and later the men of the Thirteenth, left there to build an amphitheatre, 
had been the target of their mockery and insults, this behaviour being 
typical of the impudent attitude of city mobs. The feeling against them 
was aggravated by a gladiatorial show Caecina had given at Cremona, its 
renewed employment as a base, and the way in which they offered the 
Vitellians food in the fighting line... 
 
These grievances all frame Cremona firmly as Vitellian in the eyes of the 
soldiery.898 And the prominence that Tacitus gives them suggest that they 
played as much a part in the motivations for sacking the city as the soldiers’ 
desire for the loot within the walls. Later in the campaign, the Flavian army’s 
desire to attack another Italian city, Carsulae, sparked another dispute 
between Primus and his men. The circumstances are very similar, Primus and 
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his officers hope to negotiate the city’s peaceful submission while the milites 
preferred to attack it quickly.899 Here, unlike Cremona, Primus was successful, 
and the soldiers were convinced to wait in peace. The differing results from 
such similar situations are at first a puzzle. Ash argues that Primus’ failure to 
protect Cremona and his success at Carsulae represent the anarchic state of 
civil war, in such circumstances the ability of a general to control his men 
cannot be predicted.900 However, the determination of the soldiers of AD 69 
to see everyone as either a supporter or an enemy of their emperor suggest a 
different interpretation. Cremona was too firmly established as a hostile, 
Vitellian city in the minds of the soldiery for Primus to divert their ire. Carsulae 
is never presented as offering either resistance to the Flavians or support for 
Vitellius, as a result Primus is able to persuade his men to restraint. 
The soldiers of AD 69 approach the civilian populations with the same 
suspicion and hostility that they show towards their commanders and their 
officers. In the major outbreaks of violence in the Historiae the discipline of the 
men or the status of the armies’ internal hierarchies play less of a rôle than the 
soldiers’ perception of their victims as partisans of the other factions. Civilian 
populations were judged in the same way as the officers of the various armies, 
as loyal supporters or as hostile traitors. This new dynamic of power was as 
much a part of the willingness of the soldiers of AD 69 to do violence in Italy as 
the ‘provincialisation’ of the frontier armies.901 The readiness of the largely 
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Italian Othoniani to turn their swords on the population of Italy demonstrates 
that there was more to their violence than simple cultural difference. 
Conclusion 
 
In the Historiae more than either his other works or the works of other 
historians Tacitus portrays the Roman army as a collection of individuals with 
their own motivations, loyalties, and temperaments. He gives the reader 
insight into their psyches and provides some of them with names. As a result 
the defining drive of the Tacitean soldier was not his identity as a fellow soldier 
to his peers nor was it his status as a member of a citizens’ militia. Rather it 
was his personal relationship with his emperor, cultivated by appeals to his 
loyalty and his interests. 
At first blush, this appears similar to the situation presented by both 
sources and scholars of the late republic. Then, too, the standard view has it, 
Rome had been split between armies whose loyalty was more strongly felt for 
their commanders than for the Roman government.902 Yet the situation in AD 
69 was different, and if anything, more dangerous. The soldiers of the civil wars 
allied with the prominent generals out of a hope for advancement but they did 
not have the same slavish loyalty demonstrated by, for example, the 
Othoniani.903 Nor did loyalty to their general override the social structure of 
the army, in Caesar’s commentaries, when tribunes and centurions consider 
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defecting, they bring milites with them.904 In comparison, as we have seen, in 
AD 69 even a hint of disloyalty could cost officers their lives at the hands of 
distrustful soldiers. Further, even during the civil wars, Roman soldiers were 
never fully separated from the Roman state.905 
The soldiers of AD 69 interacted with the Roman state in a very 
different way. Their loyalty to the emperor overrode any other connexions. 
Tribunes and centurions were judged by their perceived loyalty to the soldiers’ 
chosen candidate for emperor. The soldiers of other armies were regarded as 
enemies to such a degree that Otho’s soldiers continued to fight the Vitelliani 
even after their own candidate had committed suicide. The civilian populations 
of Rome, Italy, and the provinces were judged to have earned the ire of a 
Roman army, not because of any feeling of foreignness, but because their real 
or perceived resistance cast them as enemy partisans and thus subject to the 
fury of the soldiers. 
This tendency towards anarchy and violence was the dark secret of the 
new imperial system. A good emperor would take steps to secure the 
intermediate hierarchies, and thus restrain the imperial Roman soldier’s 
tendency towards anarchic violence, but the tensions remained. Galba never 
understood this new context, and failed to secure the loyalty of his soldiers. 
Flavian success in the civil war was due to the care that Vespasian and his 
generals took to secure and maintain the internal social and military hierarchy 
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of their faction, but even their troops turned violent when faced with the 
supporters of another emperor. Otho realised the dangers of circumventing 
the hierarchy of the Roman state following the riot of the praetorians, and, in 
his speech in the camp, tried to convince his men to see themselves not only 
as his soldiers, but as soldiers of the republic and the senate. 
The difference between the soldiers of AD 69 and the soldiers of the 
republic can be illustrated by comparing the musings of Livy and Tacitus on two 
periods of severe military disorder. Reflecting on the mutiny of 342 BC, Livy 
describes the climactic meeting between the mutinous army and the soldiers 
gathered at Rome to meet them: 
ubi primum in conspectum uentum est et arma signaque agnouere, extemplo 
omnibus memoria patriae iras permulsit. nondum erant tam fortes ad 
sanguinem ciuilem nec praeter externa nouerant bella, ultimaque rabies 
secessio ab suis habebatur; itaque iam duces, iam milites utrimque congressus 
quaerere ac conloquia.906 
As soon as they came within sight of one another and recognized one another's 
arms and ensigns, all were at once reminded of their fatherland, and their anger 
cooled. Men were not yet so hardy in shedding the blood of countrymen; they 
knew no wars but those with outside nations, and thought that frenzy could go 
no further than secession from their people. And so on either side both the 
leaders and their men began to seek for ways to meet and confer together.  
 
The Roman soldiers presented in Livy’s history remain fundamentally Roman 
and incapable of making war upon each other. When the two armies come into 
contact, they immediately revert to Roman citizens, politicking and negotiating 
to find a resolution to the issue that prompted the mutiny. It remains the 
politically engaged and republican force that it is throughout Livy’s account. 
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There is a similar moment in Tacitus’ Historiae when the Flavian soldiers 
enter Rome in pursuit of the remaining Vitellians: 
Id facinus post conditam urbem luctuosissimum foedissimumque rei publicae 
populi Romani accidit, nullo externo hoste, propitiis, si per mores nostros 
liceret, deis, sedem Iovis Optimi Maximi auspicato a maioribus pignus imperii 
conditam, quam non Porsenna dedita urbe neque Galli capta temerare 
potuissent, furore principum excindi.907 
This was the most deplorable and disgraceful event that had happened to the 
Commonwealth of Rome since the foundation of the city; for now, assailed by 
no foreign enemy, with Heaven ready to be propitious, had our vices only 
allowed, the seat of Jupiter Supremely Good and Great, founded by our 
ancestors with solemn auspices to be the pledge of Empire, the seat, which 
neither Porsenna, when the city was surrendered, nor the Gauls, when it was 
captured, had been able to violate, was destroyed by the madness of our 
Emperors. 
 
By the time the Flavian soldiers entered Rome in the fourth book of the Historiae, a 
Roman army had reached the stage where it was capable causing the destruction of 
the Capitoline temple. This change was caused not by the fact that Roman legions had 
become essentially foreign, but because military service now involved a loyalty to the 
emperor that superseded any other allegiances. The cause of the destruction of the 
capital – as well as the sack of Cremona – was indeed the furor principum, as a war 
between emperors placed a soldier in a situation where his status as a citizen was 
subordinate to his status as a loyal subject of his emperor 
The Roman army had become separated from the larger Roman state 
through its periods of service and the distances required in garrisoning the 
empire. The soldier’s primary hierarchy was not the social structure of the 
Roman state, but rather a quasi-state that reflected Rome formed by his legion. 
He represented the general populace while his officers provided the social 
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strata above him. At the top of his hierarchy was the emperor. In times of 
peace, this system was sustainable, as soldiers of different armies shared the 
same emperor, even if the rest of their social structures were distinct. A soldier 
on the Rhine and a soldier in Syria had different commilitiones and officers but 
their emperor, the fundamental figure through which they related to the 
Roman state, was the same.  
Alongside the account of the Pannonian mutiny, this chapter firmly 
pushes back against the longstanding and pervasive misunderstanding of 
Tacitus’ representation of the common Roman soldier. In this the Historiae has 
been better served than the Annales, with two recent works examining Tacitus’ 
portrayal of the Roman soldier in the work.908 Both of these, I argue, are 
undermined by the fact that they remain to a degree in thrall to the traditional 
interpretation of the Tacitean soldier as irrational, disorganised, and foreign. 
In Ash’s interpretation, the soldiers of the civil wars are largely extensions and 
reflections of their commanders. Missing from her account is any engagement 
with the fact that relationship between each of the factions and its soldiers is 
a relationship formed by negotiation and self interest, and the behaviour of 
the soldiers is influenced more by the nature of this relationship than by the 
personality of the generals. Master’s work is also too quick to present the 
legionaries of the civil war as foreign, rather than Roman forces. This is not how 
Tacitus portrays the soldiers, the danger comes not from the men as somehow 
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foreign, but rather that each of the factions represents a competing form of 
the res publica, personified by its respective emperor.  
The outbreak of civil war put stress on imperial system of military 
service. Each of the three quasi-states, the Flaviani, the Othoniani, and the 
Vitelliani had formed in different circumstances and as a result their 
relationship with their emperor was different. How they interacted with the 
other parts of the Roman state – the social structure, the civilians, the 
provincials – was filtered through that relationship. While military service had 
previously been a communal activity that built social structures – either the 
republic or the plebeian order – now it had become a personal activity that 
revolved around the dynamic between two people: the individual miles 
gregarius and the princeps. 
  






It now falls to me to restate my conclusions. I will begin by restating the 
conclusions of each of the chapters, then I will present the narrative of change 
that is formed by comparing the three ideologies of military service. Then I will 
demonstrate the value of this thesis as a study of the representation of soldiers 
and military service by my chosen historians. I will deal first with the individual 
specifics of this representation and then expand the context to the larger 
implications of the way that soldiers and military service are presented by 
Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. This provide new contributions to our understanding 
of each historian’s writing of the past. 
In the first chapter I examined how, to Sallust, the Roman people 
developed a habitus that was responsible for Rome’s rise to greatness through 
military service that strengthened concordia, not undermined it. This habitus 
was shared throughout the Roman state by all citizens regardless of social class 
and was marked by a desire for gloria, a disdain for hardship, and a frugal 
home. This showed that Sallust’s conception early Rome had a much larger 
place for the whole Roman citizenry than has often been understood. Once the 
Roman people had become fractured, driven by greed and ambition the 
habitus was no longer sustainable. Without the old habitus to channel the 
drives and inclinations of the Roman people, the republic soon became 
corrupt. However, given the fundamental nature of military service in the 
Sallust’s early Rome, by conducting war in the traditional way later generals 
could cultivate within his army a reflection of the virtutes of the maiores. The 




reforming nature of military command conducted according to the mos 
maiorum is demonstrated by examinations of the campaigns of Metellus and 
Marius in the Numidian war, Sulla in the east, Catiline in Italy. Military service 
in Sallust’s conception of the republic is not, then, an obligation that citizens 
had to discharge. Rather, it is an activity fundamental to being Roman and one 
that performed correctly reforms and strengthens the entire Roman people. 
The second chapter demonstrated that, in Livy’s narrative, military 
service is presented as the foundation of a distinctly plebeian military identity 
which provided the social capital and status that plebeians used to legitimise 
themselves. This military identity was distinct from, and often at odds with 
élite Romans. As the primary focus for plebeian self-identity, the Roman army 
was the primary engine of organised resistance to the patres. In Rome’s later 
foreign wars, the Roman army continued to be a politically engaged and 
continued to agitate for its interests and rights when on campaign. Throughout 
Livy’s narrative, military service is presented as the primary way that plebeian 
citizens engaged with the Roman state as citizens, and the mechanism by 
which they secured their libertas and ensured that they benefited from the 
actions of the state. 
Chapter Three examined how Tacitus engaged with the earlier models 
of military service in his portrayal of the mutinies of AD 14. There, the historian 
represented the mutinies not an imperial revolts, but rather as a final 
representation of kind of mutiny common during the republic. In AD 14 the 
soldiers revolted over practical concerns about their conditions, not to appoint 




a new emperor. This was the traditional republican method of resistance by 
dissatisfied soldiers of the republic. Tacitus used the suppression of the mutiny 
to show that under the principate mutiny now presented a much greater 
danger to the state than it had before and that imperial soldiers no longer had 
access to mutiny as a way to address grievances. Imperial military service now 
had as its chief pillar not the connexion between the soldier and the state, but 
the connexion between the soldier and the emperor. The tension and violence 
in the narrative is caused by the soldiers misunderstanding of the new dynamic 
of imperial soldiering.  
The final chapter considered how, in his account of the events of AD 
69, Tacitus continues to represent the fundamental relationship of the 
individual Roman soldier was his loyalty to the emperor not his connexion to 
with the state or to his fellow citizen. This was the only way in which a Roman 
soldier engaged with the Roman state. As a result, in a context where there 
were multiple emperors, soldiers regarded both other soldiers and citizens as 
either supporters or enemies of their chosen emperor. This made the armies, 
in effect, separate states at war not just with each other but with the larger 
Roman world. Military service now no longer forged and strengthened a 
soldier’s identity as a Roman citizen, but rather it cultivated a new identity as 
a loyal soldier of the emperor. 
To Sallust, military service as a communal and reforming process by 
which a citizen takes engages with his state and his fellow citizens. For Livy it 
was the means by which the plebeian citizenry asserted and protected its 




status through communal action and negotiation with the élites. Finally, 
service under the eagles took place in a context where the Roman soldier’s 
only significant connexion to the Roman state was through his personal loyalty 
to the emperor. In the works of each historian, the behaviour and attitude of 
the soldier is presented as a reflection of the place that their military service 
plays in the Roman state. 
This thesis has used close readings to elucidate the rôle of military 
service in the Roman state as understood by Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. It has 
established that each saw Roman soldiers as an important and influential part 
of the res publica and how to each of them, but in different ways, the soldiers 
represented the part of the Roman people capable of wielding political power 
in opposition to the élite. The historians’ understanding of the political rôle of 
soldiers is fundamentally linked to issues of the citizenship and libertas of the 
Roman people, as in each of their accounts, soldiers represent the largest 
number of representations of non-élite citizens. Understanding the ideology of 
military service for each of the historians provides insight into their 
understanding of the place of Roman citizens in the res publica. 
The representation of the miles gregarius in the works of Roman 
historians is an issue that has seen relatively few detailed surveys. This is 
particularly striking compared to the wealth of scholarship on the experience 
of Roman soldiers serving in her armies, both under the republic and the 




principate.909 Carrié, in what remains the closest thing to a general survey, 
noted this in 1993.910 Since then there has been some movement, but it has 
tended towards examining how their representation has figured into larger 
cultural discourse, for example Roman conceptions of manliness.911 Other 
surveys have lumped the soldier with other related but distinct groups.912 To a 
greater or lesser degree, however, much of these surveys remain influenced 
by the traditional idea, articulated by scholars like Carrié, Campbell, and Phang, 
that because the Roman soldier was poor, the élite authors disdained him and 
did not give his presentation much thought. 
The chapters of this thesis have challenged that perception of the 
individual historians, whether driven by Livy’s disinterest or Tacitus disdain. Yet 
this thesis only begins the work of complicating the our understanding of a 
generally negative and dismissive attitude towards Roman soldiers. If this 
perception cannot be said to apply to three such prominent Latin historians as 
Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, then surely it cannot be confidently projected across 
Roman literature – or at least the remaining Roman historians. 
This thesis proceeded by carefully surveying the portrayal of soldiers 
and defining the ideology of military service presented in Sallust, Livy, and 
Tacitus. These have been shown to be far more complicated that the simple 
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repeating of commonplaces or aping of their sources. Rather, they reflect each 
historian’s individual understanding of the part that military service played in 
the Roman state and the way that Roman citizens, as soldiers, engaged with 
their community. This contributes something new both to our understanding 
of the how each of the chosen authors reconstructed the past, and to the larger 
dialogues of military service present in the ancient sources. It also provides 
insight into how Roman authors conceived of the crisis and reformation of the 
res publica as Rome transitioned from a republic to an empire. As the sources 
themselves demonstrate, that process involved the transition of Roman 
soldiers from citizens to subjects.  
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